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Abstract 
In this dissertation I theorize and analyze the rhetorical deployment of a "politics of 
location" within the context of poststructural theories of discourse, subjectivity, and agency. 
In her book, Blood Bread and Poetry, Adrienne Rich coins the phrase "a politics of location," 
which marks an effort to move away from a hegemonic Western feminism that universalizes 
all women's experiences and constructs a normative (and hence limiting and exclusionary) 
subject of feminism. Rich forwards a politics of location as a radical materialist political 
stance that grounds feminist theory in accountability for the situatedness of knowledge 
production. I extend Rich's phrase to theorize how radical, lesbian feminists have used a 
politics of location as a signifying practice to construct alternative subjectivities and assert 
discursive agency. 
More specifically, in this project I historicize and contextualize a politics of location 
as it developed within lesbian feminist interchanges during the 1980s and early 90s. This is a 
significant historical juncture for two reasons. First, the universal concept of "woman" came 
under radical critique by third-space feminists. Second, feminist publishing houses began to 
proliferate as a counter-public context for the dissemination of new voices and knowledges, 
thus allowing for the invention of new discursive strategies within feminist conversations. 
After historicizing a politics of location, I trace its development as a rhetorical strategy 
deployed specifically within interchanges between radical, lesbian feminists. Additionally, I 
use a Foucauldian theory of discursive formations to show how this rhetorical strategy 
interrupts the normative subject of the rhetorical tradition. Finally, I show how a politics of 
location contributes to the growing field of research on feminist rhetorical theory. 
1 
Introduction 
Chela Sandoval argues that we must reclaim "theory from the halls of the academy 
where it has been intercepted and domesticated" (7) by looking to the survival skills of 
marginalized people because the "oppositional consciousness developed by subordinated, 
marginalized, or colonized Western citizen-subjects who have been forced to experience the 
so-called aesthetics of 'postmodern' globalization as a precondition for survival... [is the] 
constituency that is most familiar with what citizenship in this realm requires and makes 
possible" (9). This dissertation follows the insights of and call forwarded by Sandoval. I 
contend that a politics of location is a discursive survival strategy used by radical, lesbian 
feminists working in coalitions to assert discursive agency and to realize new forms of 
subjectivity. In effect, I believe that these marginalized subjects enact poststructural theory 
by utilizing a politics of location as a discursive strategy for self-representation. In their 
writing they theorize multiple, contradictory, non-innocent subjectivities, discover potentials 
for (constrained) agency, and maintain hope for the possibility of social change by invoking a 
politics of location. Thus, this project speaks to some of the current theoretical problems of 
subjectivity and agency (particularly the nihilistic tendencies of discursive determinism) in 
poststructuralism by looking to one of the survival skills of the oppressed for clues about 
how marginalized subjects cope in a postmodern world as fragmented, multiple, fluid selves 
without losing a vision of social transformation. 
Before I proceed I want to explore my own complicated and non-innocent 
positionality as I potentially "domesticate" a politics of location in this academic dissertation. 
I understand my project as an act of representation, a representation of writings of a group of 
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radical, lesbian feminists, but perhaps more significantly, an act of self-representation. As 
indicated above, my desire is to reclaim a discursive strategy used by radical, lesbian 
feminists to write new subjectivities, to allow the voices of an oppressed group to speak to 
current academic conversations about discursive agency, subjectivity, and the potential for 
social change. However, in accord with Gayatri Chakravtory Spivak, I understand that 
representation of an "Other" always involves some degree of "epistemic violence" on the part 
of an intellectual/critic ("Can the Subaltern Speak").1 Such violence is inescapable and is 
particularly dangerous when intellectuals suggest that we create spaces for the oppressed to 
"speak for themselves" (276). In the case of this project, to suggest that my representation of 
the writings of radical, lesbian feminist affords them the opportunity "to speak for 
themselves" would elide my own subject position—my interests, my motives/desires, my 
epistemological framework—which, according to Spivak, would effectively mute these 
voices even further. 
Spivak advocates a critical/responsible approach to representation, which is not to 
imply that we can avoid epistemic violence; instead, it leads to a greater degree of 
accountability on the part of the intellectual. Further, she suggests that marking the 
positionality of the investigating subject can amount to a "meaningless piety" (271); 
however, it is less dangerous than "the first-world intellectual masquerading as the absent 
1 In "Subaltern Talk" Spivak expresses a concern that the term subaltern is being appropriated by theorists as a 
"buzzword for any group that wants something that it does not have" (290). In "Can the Subaltern Speak?" she 
defines the subaltern as a "group, whose identity is in its difference" (285); in a later interview she defines it as 
a metaphoric space "that is cut off from the lines of mobility in a colonized country. You have the foreign elite 
and the indigenous elite. Below that you will have the vectors of upward, downward, sideward, backward 
mobility. But then there is a space which is for all practical purposes outside those lines" which is where the 
undefined subaltern are located ("Subaltern Talk" 288-289). I do not define the radical, lesbian feminist writers 
whose work I examine in this project as "subaltern" because of their access to feminist publishing houses, which 
enabled discursive self-representation. Nonetheless, I find Spivak's discussion of the dangers of intellectual 
representation useful in my efforts to understand the implications of my positionality. 
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nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for themselves" (292). Importantly, Spivak 
does not advocate that intellectuals refrain from representing the subaltern or refrain from 
"reporting on, or better still, participating in, anti-sexist work among women of color or 
women in class oppression in the First World or the Third World" (295). Silence or paralysis 
is not the answer to the dangers of epistemic violence that follows from intellectual 
representations of marginalized "others." 
Linda Alcoffs discussion of the problem of "speaking for others" is instructive in 
understanding my role as an intellectual representing "Others." Alcoff argues that the answer 
to the problems of representation cannot be that "one can only know one's narrow individual 
experience and one's 'own truth' and can never make claims beyond this" because it signifies 
a retreat that "significantly undercuts the possibility of political effectivity" (107). Perhaps 
more importantly, she points out that recognizing the dangers of representation and then 
purporting "to speak only for myself': 
assumes that an individual can retreat into her discrete location and make 
claims entirely and singularly within that location that do not range over 
others and, therefore that an individual can disentangle herself from the 
implicating networks between her discursive practices and others' locations, 
situates, and practices.. .But there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in 
which my words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of 
others. (108) 
Alcoff goes on to argue that the statement "I speak only for myself' ultimately abnegates 
accountability for the way in which one's practices have "effects on others; [but] it cannot 
literally erase those effects" (108). 
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In this project I understand that I do not simply "speak for myself," nor do I simply 
"allow" the voices of radical, lesbian feminists to "speak for themselves." I am entangled in 
a complicated and contradictory network of discursive practices—somewhere between 
academia and a radical, lesbian feminist counter-public. In many respects, one of my aims in 
this project is to use my position as a radical, lesbian feminist academic to create a dialogue 
between these two discursive communities. Following Spivak's and Alcoff s discussions of 
accountability, I engage in "speaking for others," in representing the writings of radical, 
lesbian feminists within an academic framework because I refuse to retreat from potential 
political engagements.2 At the same time, I understand that my act is fraught with 
complications and dangers—there will be (mis)interpretations, (mis)recognitions, and 
(mis)representations. I do not purport to offer "the final word" on the texts I analyze herein 
nor "the final word" on the significance of a politics of location. And yet I recognize that no 
matter how much I expose my partial perspective and non-innocent positionality, as Spivak 
indicates, I will fail. Inevitably, I will become the "transparent intellectual." This is not 
cause for retreat or paralysis. It is a call for accountability and responsibility. 
In an effort to interrogate my positionality as investigating subject, I ask; What 
motivates me to theorize a politics of location? 
Most obviously, part of my motive is to fulfill a degree requirement, to write a 
dissertation. But this doesn't really say much. Let me step back a few years. In a recent 
survey course on histories and theories of rhetoric my professor iterated time and again that 
our purpose as graduate students is to "create new knowledge," that our chosen paths in 
2 Contrary to the belief of some critics, I do believe that intellectual work can constitute a form a political 
engagement, however limited by the institutional boundaries of academia. 
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academia dictate that we must "contribute new and original work to the discipline." It was 
implied that if we could not "rise to this challenge," perhaps we had taken a wrong turn, 
perhaps we should consider a different path. In the context of reading the likes of Nietzsche, 
Burke, Foucault, Derrida, and Irigary, the task of creating "new knowledge" seemed both 
impossible and undesirable. Impossible because the notion of "originality" was put to rest 
quite a while ago. And undesirable because the notion of new and original knowledge 
implies a degree of individuality and "authorship" that is antithetical to my values. And yet, I 
was (and am) a "disciplined" student—I put myself to the task of "finding" my "original 
contribution." 
However suspect the concept of "contributing new knowledge" is for me, I cannot 
deny that my efforts to theorize a politics of location are motivated by my positionality in 
academia as a graduate student, a graduate student who refuses to face that she might have 
"taken the wrong turn." This dissertation is motivated by my desire to show that I can situate 
my interests within the field of rhetoric and that I can offer, if not a "new" idea, then a least a 
different angle from which to view current debates about the relationship between 
subjectivity, agency, and discourse. 
I ask myself, But how did I get here? Where is "here "? And why does any of this 
matter? 
Here is academia. Here is feminist theory. But getting here has taken nearly two 
decades of a circuitous route to the halls of the academy. That route has everything to do 
with this project. Like many women, I came to feminism desperate. Desperate for survival. 
From a young age I understood that power infused every corner of the world, and this power 
always begins in the home-space—from my parents' use of racism to inflate their sense of 
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self-worth to my father's degradation of my mother's position in poverty to my mother's 
complicity in allowing my body and my sister's body to be violated physically and sexually 
by my brother and step-father. The world I inherited was not a world I wanted to live in. 
"We were never meant to survive," writes Audre Lorde (Sister 42). I understand this. I lived 
this. I came to feminism as a refuge from a world that did not make sense to me. Feminism 
gave me words to name and define my material experiences. Feminism gave me hope that 
I/we3 could resist the abuse of power and the domination of others, hope that I/we could 
make ourselves and our world different from what I/we had been taught. Feminism gave me 
both the tools for survival and the hope for a life that can be more than simple survival. 
When I was sixteen I discovered Crazy Ladies, a local feminist bookstore.4 I started 
reading the work of bell hooks, Audre Lorde, Adrienne Rich, Gloria Anzaldûa, and Cherrie 
Moraga. These texts spoke to me; spoke to my desire for survival and my desire to imagine 
the potential for spaces and relations not built upon domination. They shaped my growing 
feminist consciousness and my own sense of subjectivity. They helped me understand that 
the subject of feminism can never be the disembodied "woman"; they helped me perceive my 
own subjectivity as dynamic, multiple, fluid, contradictory, and complicated. In these early 
years of my development as a feminist I learned the importance of "a politics of location," 
although I didn't name it as such at the time. Years later, I began reading poststructural 
theories that discussed the fragmented, multiple, contradictory "subject" and dynamic, inter-
31 use I/we here to indicate feminism as both an individual and collective endeavor. Or, as Adrienne Rich has 
stated, "there is not liberation that only knows how to say T; there is no collective movement that speaks for 
each of us all the way through" ("Notes" 224) 
4 Crazy Ladies attempted to survive for many years in the face of large conglomerates such as Borders Books 
and Barnes & Noble, but went out of business in 2002. I can't help but think what a significantly different 
world mine would have been without Crazy Ladies—both in terms of the feminist community that developed 
around the bookstore and the resources it provided me as a young feminist. 
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relational nature of power, I thought to myself, "Yes, I know this. I live this. Feminists have 
written about these very same things for years." The theory was exciting; it made my mind 
feel alive and engaged; and yet, there was a certain deadening aspect in the theory—the hope, 
the vision, the imagination was muted in the name of deconstructing "utopian ideals" and 
"essentialized identities." 
And so, my arrival "here" (in academia, in feminist theory, writing a dissertation on 
the rhetorical strategies of radical, lesbian feminists) is motivated by my own history. I 
sought feminism as a refuge, a "space-off (to borrow Teresa de Lauretis' term) from a world 
in which I did not want to participate. This space-off is not a Utopia, it is "the elsewhere of 
discourse here and now, the blind-spots.. .spaces in the margins of hegemonic discourses, 
social spaces carved in the interstices of institutions and in the chinks and cracks of the 
power-knowledge apparati" (Technologies 25). In feminism I discovered a "space-off in the 
writings of radical feminists who gave me the tools to begin reconstructing my own 
subjectivity and my sense of the "subject" of a feminism that aims to address a multitude of 
injustices in the world. I still believe in feminism as a space-off, a space that deconstructs as 
it reconstructs. I am driven (and this project is driven) by a desire to reclaim the strategies, 
the texts, that were so significant in the development of my feminist political sensibility. 
At the center of a politics of location (as I theorize it) is a desire on the part of radical, 
lesbian feminists to engage profoundly and responsibly with one another in an effort to enact 
social change at both the individual and collective levels. In my complicity with the 
epistemological orientation and discursive conventions of academia, a space that has 
"intercepted and domesticated" the methodology of the oppressed (Sandoval 7), I know that 
the profundity at the heart of a politics of location is diluted. In particular the discourse 
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conventions of academia force a kind of compartmentalization that leaves me curiously 
absent, or at best hidden, in the pages of this dissertation. I want to say: I am here. I am in 
this project. My complicated consciousness and sense of accountability has remained with 
me throughout the research and writing of this project. And yet, I remember one of my very 
first writing lessons: show don't tell. 
Recalling Spivak's words, I question if this introduction is a "meaningless piety" or a 
self-absorbed moment of navel gazing. I am in the "belly of the monster," as Donna 
Haraway would say. My good friend Susan tells me, "We need infinite numbers of new 
stories, not the select few, which we have, in the past, based our sense of self and our sense 
of the world upon." Donna Haraway insists that "Stories are not 'fictions' in the sense of 
being 'made up.' Rather, narratives are devices to produce certain kinds of meaning" 
(Modest_Witness 230). Thus, I want to suggest that this project is another story, a non-
innocent contribution to the conversation. I maintain that there is much to be learned from 
the discursive practices of a radical, lesbian feminist counter-public. In the pages that follow 
is my story and their stories, the line between me/they, mine/theirs is blurry at best. This is a 
story driven by an urgency to create a space for the colonized, the domesticated, the 
overlooked, and the forgotten, driven by the dream that we/I can make a difference, even 
within the halls of the academy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Third-Space Feminism and the Politics of Postmodern (Illegitimate) Subjectivity: 
Interrupting the Normative Subject of Feminism 
If... the formerly centered and legitimated bourgeois citizen-subject of the first 
world (once anchored in a secure haven of self) is set adrift under the 
imperatives of late-capitalist cultural conditions, if such citizen-subjects have 
become anchorless, disoriented, incapable of mapping their relative positions 
inside multinational capitalism, lost in the reverberating endings of colonial 
expansionism, and if... the psychic pathologies brought about in first world 
subjectivity under the domination of neocolonial drives in which the subject 
must face the very 'limits offiguration, ' then the first world subject enters the 
kind of psychic terrain formerly inhabited by the historically decentered 
citizen-subject: the colonized, the outsider, the queer, the subaltern, the 
marginalized. So too, not only are the 'psychopathologies, ' but also the 
survival skills, theories, methods, and the Utopian visions of the marginal 
made, not just useful but imperative to all citizen-subjects, who must 
recognize this other truth ofpostmodernism—another architectural model for 
oppositional consciousness in the postmodern world. 
—Chela Sandoval 27 
Poststructural theories have had a tremendous influence in contemporary studies of 
rhetoric. Rooted in the "linguistic/social turn" of the twentieth century, these theories (most 
notably those of Hélène Cixous, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, Fredric 
Jameson, Julia Kristeva, and Jean-François Lyotard) have placed discourse practices at the 
center of discussions about the production and circulation of knowledge, a shift which has 
given rhetoric a broad framework within which to claim a disciplinary identity. 
Poststructural theories call into question Enlightenment humanitarian ideals about the 
sovereign rational subject and the progressive development of knowledge and society. These 
theories have provided spaces for feminists to interrogate universal conceptions of the subject 
and positivist understandings of epistemology and the construction of knowledge. 
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However, postmodern theories have been problematized by feminist and critical 
theorists because the deconstruction of "the subject" has seemingly given us no place from 
which to articulate a theory of agency, subjectivity, and social change. In the words of 
Nancy Hartsock: "Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been 
silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of 
history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic?" ("Foucault on 
Power" 163). She argues that "postmodernism represents a dangerous approach for any 
marginalized group to adopt" (160) because it does not give guidance about how to proceed 
in the wake of the critique of Enlightenment ideals, that is, there is little room for imagining a 
different future if we are "always already" written as subjects. Likewise, Susan Bordo 
critiques a strictly theoretical appropriation of poststructuralism: 
But it is easy, I believe, to call for the wholesale deconstruction of concepts 
such as subjectivity, authority, and identity only so long as we remain on the 
plane of high theory, where they function as abstractions. Once we begin to 
examine the role played by such concepts as they are institutionally and 
socially embodied in contexts such as law and medicine, in which the 
philosophical blueprint is transformed into real social architecture, a different 
agenda may suggest itself. (96) 
Bordo argues that the abstract celebration of multiplicity, heterogeneity, and difference is 
inadequate; instead, we must ground feminism in analyses of socio-historical and cultural 
practices which have constructed normalized bodies and subjectivities. Hence, many 
feminists take a cautious approach in embracing postmodern theories. Teresa Ebert (1991) 
argues against ludic postmodernism, or the endless deferment of meaning, because in 
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"deconstructing grand narratives (such as emancipation), identities (like gender, race, and 
class), the referent, and experience as unfounded and divided by difference, ludic 
postmodernists end up dismantling the notion of politics itself as a transformative social 
practice outside of language" (887). Ebert forwards the concept of resistant postmodernism, 
which grounds itself in an epistemology of difference, rooted in social struggles rather than 
an endless deferment of meaning. Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore argue that a feminist 
postmodern theory entails a "rejection of certainty promised by modernist discourses, a 
rejection of a self-certain and singular subject, and a rejection of knowledges that promise 
answers which lead to closure. A poststructuralist feminist epistemology accepts that 
knowledge is always provisional, open-ended and relational" (7). Rather than doing away 
with notions of subjectivity, authority, and identity, these feminists suggest that 
poststructuralism provides some of the necessary tools for deconstructing normalized 
conceptions of the subject which can open new spaces for the reconstruction and 
reconceptualization of subjectivity itself 
Despite the ways in which feminists have cautiously embraced postmodern theories, 
the demise of Enlightenment ideals of being, knowing, and doing continue to call into 
question the potential for agency, subjectivity, and social change, a questioning that can lead 
to a sense of paralysis. It is within the context of poststructural theories that my dissertation 
project is situated. As the opening epigraph from Chela Sandoval indicates, there is more 
than one "truth" to postmodernism. Rather than simply looking at the "death" of the first-
world subject as it was understood through modernist ideals of the unified, fully cognizant, 
centered self, Sandoval argues that it is imperative to look to the methodology of the 
oppressed, who have "always already" been written as decentered, fragmented, multiple 
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subjects. She argues that the "oppositional consciousness developed by subordinated, 
marginalized, or colonized Western citizen-subjects who have been forced to experience the 
so-called aesthetics of 'postmodern' globalization as a precondition for survival... [is the] 
constituency that is most familiar with what citizenship in this realm requires and makes 
possible" (9). It is my argument that a politics of location, as employed in the writing of 
radical, lesbian feminists, is one tactic of the oppressed used to develop this oppositional 
consciousness and provides a discursive site from which to investigate the vexed question of 
how agency and subjectivity can be understood in a post-Enlightenment age. In this project I 
examine the rhetorical deployment of a politics of location, which I extrapolate from the texts 
of radical, lesbian feminists published during the 1980s and early 90s, when the universal 
concept of "woman" came under radical critique. I theorize a politics of location was used as 
a signifying practice by radical, lesbian feminists to write subjectivities into being, 
specifically looking at how a politics of location interrupts the code of normative power by 
denaturalizing the authority of the speaking subject and knowledge-maker. 
In this chapter I first situate my project within contemporary conversations about 
feminist rhetoric(s)5in order to argue that third-space feminist theories and a politics of 
location as a rhetorical strategy contributes to the growing body of work in this field. I then 
review how difference has been engaged from various feminist locations, which is relevant to 
5 I use the term rhetoric(s) in order to resist the assumption that there is a singular, monolithic set of rhetorical 
strategies that congeal around a similar monolithic form of feminist theory and politics. Much as there are 
many forms of feminism, there is also a plurality of feminist rhetoric(s). Equally significant, instead of simply 
utilizing the plural form (rhetorics), I place parentheses around the "s" to suggest movement between stability 
and change. The term, feminist rhetorics, can suggest a form of plurality that becomes devoid of political 
impact. Thus, the movement between stability (trying to define a tentative tradition of feminist rhetoric) and 
change (resisting the normalizing tendencies of "traditions" and "canons") imbues the term with the kind of 
politicized agenda that is at the heart of feminism(s). 
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understanding feminism as situated, historical political engagement. Next, I outline the 
theoretical framework of third-space feminism, a theory that locates the tension points 
between modernism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism as generative spaces. Third-space 
feminist theory, then, provides a lens through which to conceptualize how a politics of 
location, which I define as one potential strategy of the oppressed, operates as an agentive 
discursive strategy for writing subjectivities into be-ing.6 Finally, I historicize and describe a 
general theory of a politics of location, distinguishing it from identity politics and situating it 
within feminist standpoint theory. 
"New" Rhetorics/Feminist Rhetoric(s) 
Feminist rhetoric(s) is an increasingly visible and viable area of scholarship for 
rhetoricians. Scholars are re-visioning the landscape of what constitutes the "rhetorical 
tradition" to include not only women rhetoricians, but feminist articulations of how to engage 
language in ways that transform oppressive structures and practices. Krista Ratcliffe divides 
feminist rhetorical scholarship into four primary categories: recovering, rereading, 
extrapolating, and conceptualizing. Recovering entails finding and incorporating lost and 
marginalized texts into the rhetorical tradition (e.g., the work of Andrea Lunsford, Karlyn 
Kohrs Campbell, Jacqueline Jones Royster, Shirley Wislon Logan, Kate Ronald and Joy 
Ritchie, Cheryl Glenn). Rereading involves reading canonical texts through a feminist lens, 
as Susan Jarratt has done in Rereading the Sophists: Classic Rhetoric Refigured. Feminists 
who use the third method take texts that are considered non-rhetorical or writers who are not 
considered rhetorical theorists and extrapolate theories of rhetoric, which is the method 
61 use the hyphenation here to situate subjectivity as fluid and always in process or motion rather than a fixed 
epistemological state. That is, I understand that subjectivity is formulated through practices or engagement with 
the world; it is not a pre-discursive entity. 
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Ratcliffe uses in her work on Anglo-American feminist rhetoric and the method Karen Foss, 
Sonja Foss, and Cindy Griffin use in their book, Feminist Rhetorical Theories. Finally, 
conceptualizing requires articulation of entirely new theories of rhetoric that are both 
separated from and connected to the rhetorical tradition, which is evidenced in the work of 
Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva. This dissertation contributes to the field of feminist 
rhetoric(s) through an articulation of how a politics of location provides a feminist rhetorical 
strategy for addressing the complexity of issues that surround questions of agency and 
subjectivity in a post-Enlightenment era through the lens of third-space feminism. 
As feminist rhetoric(s) is becoming an increasingly canonized field, it is an important 
part of my project to situate feminist rhetorical strategies as fluid and mutable rather than 
fixed. Indeed, the potential of the field lies in our ability as scholars to open up rhetoric, 
rather than to "close it down" through further canonization. Hence, in this dissertation, I do 
not forward feminist rhetoric(s) as a "new" set of strategies that simply replace or redefine 
traditional rhetoric. Rather, I understand feminist rhetoric(s) as transformative to the extent 
that they embody a struggle for language rights, for public space, and for the articulation of 
multiple subjectivities. Feminist rhetoric(s), then, become practices of interruption, or in 
Andrea Lunsford's words "dangerous moves: breaking the silence, naming in personal terms, 
employing dialogics, recognizing and using the power of conversation, moving centripetally 
toward connections and valuing—indeed insisting upon—collaboration" (6 "On Reclaiming 
Rhetorica"). In academic contexts, the articulation of "new" rhetorics is often motivated by 
the disciplinary desire to participate in structures of domination, replacing the "old" with "the 
next best thing," and can contribute to a process of canonization that often leads to 
commodification and normalization, rather than "dangerous moves" in the struggle against 
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hegemonic structures. Hence, I interrogate the term feminist rhetoric(s) so as to maintain a 
critical edge, an edge that is constituted by a struggle to interrupt oppressive structures and to 
open the field of rhetoric. Most certainly, the context of academia does have a disciplining 
force that rewards us for participating in established structures and practices of knowledge-
creation and I don't believe we can reject this force in total; however, I do believe we must 
understand the very enterprise of our work in academic contexts as potentially dangerous if 
we forward "new," "alternative," or "feminist" rhetorics uncritically. A critical interrogation, 
then, involves two moves. First, it requires the understanding that no rhetorical move or style 
necessarily challenges traditional rhetoric; what constitutes the interruption of dominant 
discursive practices always varies across contexts and has everything to do with material 
relations of power (e.g., who gets to speak, who gets to be heard, who doesn't get to speak, 
etc.). Thus, we must situate the ideas we forward about alternative rhetorics within historical 
and contemporary contexts to understand their effectivity as "dangerous moves." In the case 
of this project, I situate a politics of location in the historical context of the feminist 
movement in the 1980s when women of color began to challenge normative subject of 
feminism (white, heterosexual, middle class, U.S.-born women). In this context, I contend 
that a politics of location was an effective discursive strategy for interrupting this normative 
subject and for enabling women to re-construct an intersubjectivity that created a stronger 
base for coalition politics. I also situate a politics of location in the context of contemporary 
rhetorical studies, which, I contend, continues to valorize a coherent, self-present subject that 
privileges universality, rationality, objectivity, and linear logic that leads to closure and 
domination over an audience. In the context of this normative subject of rhetoric, I suggest 
that a politics of location challenges the assumptions that undergird this subject and thus 
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provides a potential expansion of our understanding of rhetoric. Second, critical 
interrogation involves a degree of self-reflexivity, placing our work on the plane of critique 
by questioning our motives in offering "new knowledge." 
An analysis of Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin's invitational rhetoric provides an 
illustrative example of how decontextualizing "new" or feminist rhetoric(s) can be 
dangerous. Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin (1995) forward invitational rhetoric as an 
alternative to persuasive rhetoric. They suggest that the concept of persuasion is imbued 
with a patriarchal bias that intends to change others, which constitutes a practice of 
domination and control: "the act of changing others not only establishes the power of the 
rhetor over others but also devalues the lives and perspectives of those others" (3). Foss and 
Griffin propose that invitational rhetoric is built upon principles of equality, immanent value, 
and self-determination; it is these principles that constitute it as a feminist rhetoric, not the 
use of it by a particular population. They go on to argue that the process of invitational 
rhetoric involves an act of "offering" and three external conditions: safety, value, and 
freedom. While Foss and Griffin do not argue for the eradication of persuasive rhetoric, and 
while they do admit that invitational rhetoric may invoke change in an audience, this "new" 
rhetoric is held up as an ideal that is not fully contextualized or historicized within relations 
of power, effectively ignoring the differential subject positions that rhetors may occupy. 
For example, the authors suggest that processes of change are "accompanied by 
feelings of inadequacy, insecurity, pain, humiliation, guilt, embarrassment, or angry 
submission" (6); hence, invitational rhetoric should be built upon equality of all participants, 
affirmation and respect for others, and willingness to "yield" to the audience. However, this 
does not account for the material existence of dis-equal subject positions. Nor does it take 
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into consideration historical expectations of different subjects, such as the historical 
expectation that women and men of color affirm and respect white men and women even as 
they (white people) engage in dominating and degrading practices. A more contextualized 
understanding of the place of affirmation and respect in feminist rhetoric would include a 
discussion of different and dis-equal subject positions. That is, it might be an interruption of 
dominant discursive practices for a rhetor from a dominant group, who has not been 
necessarily expected to affirm, respect, or yield, to situate him or herself in this position. 
Foss and Griffin also suggest that safety should be a condition for this feminist 
rhetoric so that the audience does not feel threatened. While I don't believe a feminist 
rhetoric should preclude the possibility of creating conditions of safety, Foss and Griffin 
assume what I consider to be a false dichotomy behind their construal of safe conditions: in 
the absence of safety, the conditions necessarily become threatening. Perhaps more 
importantly, there is an assumption that safety is somehow transparent and that it can be 
created without taking into account the multiple subjectivities involved in any rhetorical 
situation. Safety is a contingent and continually shifting element that simply cannot be 
pinned down; and for many feminists it is not requisite for feminist communication. Indeed 
for third-space feminists who draw on work in coalitional politics, the concept of safety is too 
often built upon a homogenized understanding of the subject. That is, with an understanding 
that we, as individual subjects, occupy multiple and often contradictory subject positions, we 
can never create safety across our myriad subject positions. 
Finally, the invitational rhetoric that Foss and Griffin forward seems to be akin to 
coalitional politics insofar as it calls for the discovery of common ground between and 
among various stakeholders in a conversation, and this does seem to embody a more ethical 
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engagement of difference. However, their rejection of change as an act of dominance doesn't 
account for the ways in which change usually is painful and threatening. As Bernice Johnson 
Reagon has suggested in her work on coalition politics, "I feel as if I'm gonna keel over any 
minute and die. That is most often what it feels like if you're really doing coalition work. 
Most of the time you feel threatened to the core and if you don't, you're not really doing no 
coalescing" (356). Importantly, feminist rhetoric cannot be reduced to decontextualized or 
fixed ideals, nor can we ignore that feminist rhetoric(s) often involve processes of change or 
transformation, processes that can be painful and potentially threatening. 
In much the same way that Chela Sandoval argues that the oppressed must use all 
strategies and tactics at their disposal (discussed below), I believe that we must understand 
that no particular rhetorical style or strategy inherently challenges or accedes to dominant 
discursive practices. Indeed, it is the space of "no guarantees" that opens possibilities for a 
plethora of agentive moves. My goal in this project, then, is to historicize and contextualize 
how a politics of location acted as a feminist discursive strategy that enabled agentive 
opportunities for complex subject formation in the texts of radical, lesbian feminists during 
the 1980s and early 90s. An equally important part of my project is a projection of what a 
politics of location might offer feminists in the new millennium as the borders between 
modernism, postmodernism, and a postcolonialism become ever more blurred. In the 
remainder of this chapter I outline the feminist theoretical framework within which I situate a 
politics of location and I theorize a politics of location in relation to standpoint theory and 
identity politics to articulate the differences and similarities between and among these 
concepts. 
A View from Elsewhere: Engaging the Question of 'Difference' in Feminism 
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Judith Butler's critique of identity politics places the question of difference squarely 
in the middle of conversations about the relationship between feminism and poststructural 
theories. Butler offers a genealogy of how the concept of gender has been constituted in 
feminist theory through an examination of the work of Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and 
Monique Wittig in order to argue that feminism, when built upon the notion that "woman" 
constitutes a stable epistemological identity category, is exclusionary and ultimately limited 
in its potential for social transformation. She argues that the identity category of "women," 
often considered foundational to feminist politics, constrains the advancement of social 
change because it is based on a naturalized assumption of what it is to be a culturally 
intelligible woman. She suggests that "the internal paradox of this foundationalism is that it 
presumes, fixes, and constrains the very 'subjects' that it hopes to represent and liberate" 
(189). 
Rejecting an epistemologically-based feminism, Butler suggests that feminists resist 
the desire to return to something "before" constructed identities by creating "gender trouble" 
through signifying practices that subvert naturalized identity categories. That is, through 
repetition of acts that displace gendered norms, such as drag, the culturally unintelligible and 
impossible can be revealed. Embracing a Foucauldian conceptualization of power that 
rejects the idea that power is a possession held by sovereign subjects and asserts that power is 
a generative force exercised through socio-historical practices, Butler contends that power 
can be exercised through the disruption of binaries that ensure the naturalization of an 
oppressive identification system based on structuralism. Agency, then, is not a question of 
being and knowing, but a question of how signification and resignification operate as 
disruptive practices. Butler argues that there is a greater potential for agency through 
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embracing the potential of the performative rather than reaching back to a foundation 
because identity is never fully determined or fixed. Furthermore, any politics built upon a 
foundationalist structure, ultimately, will fall into the trappings of oppressively policing what 
can and cannot be culturally intelligible. 
While Butler's theory of the performative offers important moves away from a self-
defeating politics built upon stable epistemological identities, her theory has several 
significant shortcomings for feminist theorists (for example, see Bordo; Hennessy; 
Nussbaum). First, the level of abstraction in Gender Trouble creates a considerable gap 
between a theory of the performative and actual social practices of the performative, and 
obscured in this gap is a material and historical grounding in social practices of the 
performative or readings of the performative from different social positionings. The lack of a 
materialist grounding can lead to a kind of discursive essentialism in which everything is 
reduced to "text," effectively eliding analyses of the material conditions which produce 
normalized relations of domination and subordination and an understanding of how people 
are differently positioned within spheres of power. As Lawrence Grossberg has indicated, 
"While every individual is positioned within the domain of subjectivity, not all positions are 
equal [and] not all positions are empowered to speak the experience and knowledge available 
within the ideological field" (We Gotta 118). Hence, it is important to understand the 
implications of resignification and interpretation of social practices from differing social 
positions. While Butler does offer drag as an example of how the performative is socially 
practiced, her analysis nonetheless exists, for the most part, in the realm of abstraction. 
Susan Bordo offers the following analysis of Butler's theory: 
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[Performative theory] is ingenious and exciting, and it sounds right—in 
theory. And so long as we regard the body in drag as an abstract, unsituated 
linguistic structure, as pure text, we may be convinced by Butler's claim that 
the gender system is continually being playfully destabilized and subverted 
from within. But subversion of cultural assumptions (despite the claims of 
some deconstructionists) is not something that happens in a text or to a text. It 
is an event that takes place (or doesn't) in the reading of the text, and Butler 
does not explore this. She does not locate the text in question (the body in 
drag) in cultural context (are we watching the individual in a gay club or on 
the 'Donahue' show), does not consider the possibly different responses of 
various readers (male or female, young or old, gay or straight?) or the various 
anxieties that might complicate their readings, does not differentiate between 
women in male attire and men in female drag (two very different cultural 
forms, I would argue), and does not consult (or at least does not report on) a 
single human being's actual reaction either to seeing or to enacting drag. (292-
293) 
A critique of the abstract nature of Butler's theory is not to deny the potential for subversive 
possibilities in shifting from an epistemological understanding of gender to an ontological 
understanding; rather, it is to point out the limitations of a theory that does not return to the 
level of material practices that are culturally and historically situated in time and space. 
Additionally, the abstract nature of Butler's theory of performance leads one to 
question: For whom is this theory forwarded? Certainly the elitism of academic discourse 
has historically excluded the range of people who can be included in the conversation. 
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However, given Butler's interest in some of the exclusionary practices of a feminism based 
on universal notions of women, it is ironic that her theory lacks the kind of material and 
historical grounding that might extend the boundaries of the conversation to include those 
who are less well-versed in the "high-theory" of poststructuralism. Finally, while Butler 
seems to eschew any kind of totalizing theory, if embraced uncautiously, her theory also 
becomes another over-arching umbrella theory, attempting to universally account for how 
social change does or does not occur, becoming what Bordo has deemed a "new feminist 
methodologism that lays claims to an authoritative critical framework, legislating 'correct' 
and 'incorrect' approaches to theorizing identity, history, and culture" (217). 
Other theorists have begun to articulate the potential for social transformations 
through theories of radical contextualism and location that address some of the limitations of 
embracing poststructural theories whole-cloth (Goldzwig; Haraway; Hegde; Sandoval; 
Wander). These scholars look both within and beyond poststructuralism to articulate a space 
of skeptical re-constructionism, a space that takes us beyond the negative critiques of 
modernism in order to create constructive possibilities for thought that enable humans to live 
meaningfully without locating that meaning in some ultimate warrant or absolute "Truth" 
shared by all people. Rather than embracing poststructural theory in total, these scholars use 
poststructuralism as a tool for interpretation and critique of historical and cultural forces that 
have created systems of domination and subordination. 
Radha Hegde, in her work on feminist communication theory, argues that postmodern 
and postcolonial theories provide fertile ground that can "extend the representational 
possibilities of feminist communication theory in order to make it transnationally responsive 
and more politically engaged" by providing a "location from elsewhere" from which to 
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engage with issues of difference (271). The concept of a view from elsewhere is borrowed 
from Theresa de Lauretis' (1987) theory of discourse. She suggests that "elsewhere" is a 
view from the margins in hegemonic constructions, which are perceived from the standpoint 
of centered positions, as "blinds spots, or the space-off (de Lauretis Technologies 25) of 
hegemonic centers of representation. Ultimately, Hegde argues that we need to recover a 
radical feminist politics of location from elsewhere and a politics of experience that borrows 
from postmodern and postcolonial theories in order to enable feminist scholars to "build 
coalitions and alliances to gain theoretical momentum in order to represent alterity" (290). 
Central to Hegde's argument for a view from elsewhere is the assumption that gender 
is not a stable category; rather it is a highly contested one, and if feminists are to represent 
women's experiences, we need a theoretical framework for understanding differences that 
engages them rather than elides them. Towards an understanding of how difference has been 
elided, Hegde addresses the trappings of both modernist and postmodernist assumptions 
about difference for feminist communication scholars. In her analysis of modernism, she 
reveals four of the major assumptions of Enlightenment that are antithetical to a view from 
elsewhere: 
(a) the grand rationalistic view of science where truth about reality can be 
'positively' established by uncovering causal explanations, (b) reality has an 
objective structure that can be uncovered and understood, (c) the valorization 
of objectivity in the research process and the separation of the researchers and 
researched, and (d) the view of the subject as a bounded autonomous 
individual. (277-278) 
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She goes on to argue that it is the modernist drive for closure, certainty, and control 
embedded in the above assumptions that create a major problem for understanding difference 
from a feminist standpoint. She states that a modernist response to difference as a 
harmonious celebration of pluralism, "elides serious political and intellectual engagement 
with the issues" because it rests on the assumption that difference is a "static, self-evident 
entity" (271). Alternatively, postmodern assumptions of endless play or relativistic 
accommodation "at best flattens out the differences that feminists want to reinstate in our 
theoretical enterprise" (278), which creates an apolitical theoretical framework that is 
counterproductive to a critical feminist viewpoint. Therefore, Hegde forwards postcolonial 
theory as a place from which to locate a theoretical vantage point that complicates 
poststructuralism. Through postcolonial theory we can resist what has come to be 
understood as a de-politicized celebration of differences: "the heterogeneity and difference 
that emerge from postcoloniality are conflictual and contingent and not the same as urbane 
multiplicity or the postmodern pastiche" (283). For Hegde, where postmodern theories 
enable the deconstruction of modernist narratives and assumptions, postcolonial theory 
extends the conversation by providing a more materially grounded deconstruction of 
modernist assumptions. I argue that a politics of location provides a "view from elsewhere" 
that resists the modernist drive for closure, certainty, and control through an articulation of 
subjects who speak from both centered and decentered social positionings. 
Chela Sandoval provides another critique of feminist politics that elides difference, 
which she names as U.S. hegemonic feminism, which she borrows from Spivak. Sandoval 
argues that this form of feminism is typically built around white feminists who make calls for 
unity, serving an underlying need for homogeneity that secures whiteness as a central 
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organizing feature for feminist politics. Audre Lorde also notes that the call for sisterhood 
occludes differences: "By and large within the women's movement today, white women 
focus upon their oppression as women and ignore differences of race, sexual preference, 
class, and age. There is a pretense to a homogeneity of experience covered by the word 
sisterhood that does not in fact exist" (Sister 116). The call for unity in the name of 
"common oppression against women" elides both differences among women and different 
manifestations of oppression against women. Sandoval argues that hegemonic feminism 
plays itself out in four different phases: liberal, Marxist, radical/cultural, and socialist. 
These phases can be understood as "'women are the same as men,' 'women are different from 
men,' 'women are superior,' and the fourth catchall category, 'women are a racially divided 
class'" (51). The problem with hegemonic feminism is the way in which it is organized 
around a logic of exclusion. That is, each phase is understood as self-contained and in 
opposition or contradiction to the other phases. For Sandoval, this compartmentalization 
reifies a feminist norm in such a way that it reproduces hegemony and "rigidly circumscribes 
what is possible for social activists who want to work across their boundaries" (53). 
Hegemonic feminism is particularly problematic when looking for theories which engage 
difference because feminists who exist on the margins understand that no one form of 
political action or ideological phase is suited for all contexts and circumstances. Sandoval 
calls for engagement among and between differential positionings in order to realize 
potentials for social change that have been effaced by compartmentalization: 
It is in the activity of what Anzaldua calls weaving 'between and among' 
oppositional ideologies as conceived in this new topographical space, where 
another and the fifth mode of oppositional consciousness and activity is found. 
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I think of this activity of consciousness as the 'differential,' insofar as it 
enables movement 'between and among' ideological positionings (the equal-
rights, revolutionary, supremacist, and separatist modes of oppositional 
consciousness) considered as variables, in order to disclose the distinctions 
among them. (58) 
Following Sandoval's call for de-compartmentalization, I examine the deployment of a 
politics of location in feminist rhetoric(s) with an understanding that locations are temporally 
and spatially situated within fluid and shifting borders rather than rigid or fixed structures. 
This sheds light on the potential for transformation and oppositional consciousness through 
movement between and among ideological frameworks. 
While Sandoval calls the enactment of different forms of resistance "tactics" rather 
than "strategies" (following de Certeau), her call to enact multiple forms of resistance across 
ideological structures is akin to the notion of strategic essentialism which has been theorized 
by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1990) and Emma Perez (1998). Strategic essentialism is 
born of the understanding that political representation always entails some form of 
essentialism. Spivak argues that "since it is not possible not to be an essentialist, one can 
self-consciously use this irreducible moment of essentialism as part of one's strategy" {The 
Post-colonial 109). Strategic essentialism, then, is a move to politically represent oneself 
against dominant ideologies. Emma Perez describes it as a tactic that is deployed by 
marginalized "others" in the process of claiming the right to self-name (in specific historic 
moments) and demand space so that it "thwarts cultural and political suicide" ("Irigaray's" 
88). This form of essentialism provides spaces for the female imaginary which is often 
elided by what Perez deems "invasionary" politics by white men and women. In addressing 
27 
the argument that demands by Chicana lesbians or women of color in general to their own 
spaces are "exclusionary" moves, she takes a radical materialist stance, arguing that "even 
though postmodern theorists have retired hierarchies, domination, unequal socioeconomic 
relations, unequal gender relations, and unequal racial relations, all still thrive" (""Irigaray's" 
93). As an example of invasionary politics, she critiques the way in which women of color 
are expected to be "cultural workers," bringing about the moral conscience of white women, 
as represented in the book, Conflicts in Feminism (which casts conflict as pleasurable and 
discounts the pain and often compromised positioning of women of color in these conflicts). 
More often than not women of color are invited to dialogue with white women—usually in 
abusive ways, not with each other. Perez also examines how Chicana lesbians were attacked 
for being "terrorists" and "exclusionary" in their attempt to hold a closed panel at the 
National Association for Chicano Studies in 1990. Ultimately, she argues that when Chicana 
lesbians attempt to speak, "any effort to make spaces and create discourses are threatened by 
invasionary politics" ("Irigaray's" 96-97); hence essentialistic strategies "are never the 
solution, but they are a process for finding and expressing one's multiple voices" ("Irigaray's" 
92). 
As I will illustrate in the final section of this chapter, a politics of location has been 
critiqued for falling into the trappings of essentialism—thereby fixing the speaking subject 
within rigid identity categories. However, much like the work of Perez and Spivak, this 
project is grounded in the assumption that temporal and spatial claims to identity categories 
represent strategic moves to name one's historical and political location and to claim the right 
of naming and taking space within frameworks which might otherwise erase the existence of 
those who are culturally unintelligible. As a strategic move, a politics of location, then, is not 
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an effort to unearth pre-discursive, essential identities. Nor is the claiming of identity 
positions through a politics of location construed as a stopping point or a "point of arrival" to 
some fixed state. Rather a politics of location strategically claims identities in order to 
investigate and excavate the embedded meanings within particular identity categories in 
order to ultimately engage in a larger process or movement towards the re-construction of 
subjectivities. For example, in her essays in Sister Outsider Audre Lorde claims an identity 
as a black, lesbian, feminist, poet in order to investigate the interconnectedness of her 
identity positions and explore how these identities inform her interactions with others. She 
strategically essentializes her identity in a political move to claim spaces that allow her to 
name herself and explore how her position in the world impacts her experiences. Her 
purpose, however, is not to define "the " black, lesbian, feminist, poet experience in the 
world. Instead, she strategically invokes her social position as a departure point for 
understanding her relations with others with the overarching hope of re-constructing her 
subjectivity in a manner that does not reproduce relations of domination. The way in which 
the invocation of identity positions is situated within a larger project that ultimately seeks to 
complicate and reconstitute subjectivity reveals the strategic character of this form of 
essentialism. 
Third-space feminism insists that no one theory or ideological positioning can be 
demarcated as a point of departure for social action for oppressed peoples. Sandoval argues 
that because hegemonic feminism is structured on the need for homogeneity and a fixed 
understanding of gender, the possibility for coalitional politics is precluded. In place of fixed 
identities, Sandoval suggests that identities formed through coalitional politics must be both 
fixed in a degree of strength at the same time that they are mutable: 
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The differential mode of social movement and consciousness depends on the 
practitioner's ability to read the current situation of power and self­
consciously choosing and adopting the ideological stand best suited to push 
against its configurations...Differential consciousness requires grace, 
flexibility, and strength: enough strength to confidently commit to a well-
defined structure of identity for one hour, day, week, month, year; enough 
flexibility to self-consciously transform that identity according to the 
requisites of another oppositional ideological tactic if readings of power's 
formation require it. (60) 
Hegde, Sandoval, Perez, and Spivak engage difference by embracing a complex of theories 
to understand the fluid movement between margin and center, spaces of fixedness and spaces 
of ambiguity. Difference is not engaged as a mere celebration of plurality but as a launching 
point for a differential consciousness that can lead to coalitional politics. The theoretical 
vantage point third-space feminists argue for enables a more complicated engagement with 
the question of agency. Using a hybrid fusion of modern, postmodern, and postcolonial 
theories enables a feminist "view from elsewhere" that embraces a dialectical movement 
between margins and centers in such a way that destabilizes the category of gender by 
perceiving it precisely as a highly contested category. That is, though the pre-given 
modernist agent is called into question, a radical, materialist understanding that overlapping 
discourses that create "subjects in process" provides the potential for constrained agency. As 
Lawrence Grossberg has suggested from a cultural studies theoretical vantage point, "the 
subject is always 'a subject-in-process-' constantly determined and constantly determining" 
("The Ideology of Communication" 95). Through this hybrid theoretical approach, Hegde 
defines agency as "the coming together of subjectivity and the potential for action" (288). 
The potential for action is located within both local and global contexts which provide a 
necessary launching point from which to engage the politics of difference that examines the 
construction of women's subordination and the potential for agency within multiple 
hierarchies of power. 
The Subject of Differential Consciousness 
For feminists and critical theorists interested in agentive opportunities for 
marginalized "others," poststructural deconstruction of the subject marks a move to question 
the construction of the normative, universal subject rather than a move to do away with the 
concept altogether. Too often, calls for the death of the subject are made from those 
positioned within the center of hegemonic structures. Philip Wander suggests that we "ask 
about what is not being said, or who is and who is not involved in the saying-listening, and 
[we] begin talking about people with names and histories, issues of personal import, and the 
process of selection and discrimination" (403). Chela Sandoval takes us into a space, which 
she deems "the methodology of the oppressed," to "reclaim theory from the halls of the 
academy where it has been intercepted and domesticated" (7) and in order to show that 
marginalized "others" provide methods for coping in a postmodern world because these 
subjects have always already experienced the world as fragmented, multiple, fluid selves. 
Importantly, she embraces difference in a way that doesn't fall into an apolitical pluralism or 
an endless play of differences that leads to a "schizophrenic" subjectivity (as Frederic 
Jameson has suggested). Sandoval provides a framework for understanding subjectivity in 
ways that locate a third space between the tension of modernist and postmodernist 
conceptualizations of subjectivity, arguing that the third-world subject "is most familiar with 
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what citizenship in this [postmodern] realm requires and makes possible" (Sandoval 9). 
Current debates that create clear demarcations between modernist and postmodernist theories 
bifurcates our perceptions of the subject: 
There is another way out of this unhappy paradox that sets a 
modernist/historicist view of an isolated but 'real' subject now under erasure 
against a poststructuralist/postmodernist view that the subject never existed in 
the first place—a third view of the citizen-subject.. .In order to perceive this 
third view, it is necessary to extend the so-called modernist/historicist position 
and the poststructuralist/ postmodernist position in order for them to similarly 
recognize that 'fragmentation' is neither an experience nor a theoretical 
construct peculiar to the poststructuralist or postmodern moments...The 
citizen-subject's postmodern despair over experiencing this condition can be 
released when the practitioner looks to the survival skills and decolonized 
oppositional practices that were developed in response to such fragmentation 
under previous cultural eras. (Sandoval 33) 
Sandoval's methodology of the oppressed does not claim a fixed method, standpoint, or 
relationship to modernist, postmodernist, or postcolonial strategies and tactics. Instead this 
methodology can be understood as situated between several theoretical models. Theoretical 
"purity" is not the objective of this methodology; rather the goal is a reconstitution of 
subjectivity through engagement with the "selves" in a variety of socio-cultural contexts in 
order to decolonize the imagination of what is possible. In her work on decolonizing 
Chicano/a history, Perez describes the colonial imaginary as a dichotomous way of thinking 
and naming (e.g., there are rulers and ruled) and in so doing, it creates silences and gaps 
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("Queering"). Alternatively, the decolonial imaginary is a space between the colonial and 
postcolonial. In The Decolonial Imaginary Pérez describes it as "that interstitial space where 
differential politics and social dilemmas are negotiated" (7). Thus, the decolonial imaginary 
is a resistant and rupturing space. It refuses a dichotomy between subject and object, 
oppressor and oppressed, looking instead to liminal spaces and liminal identities. To claim a 
stance of theoretical purity or authenticity that reproduces binaries would be antithetical to 
the goal challenging the power relations, silences, and erasures embedded in the colonial 
imaginary. Differential consciousness, then, is enacted through "an anticolonial, mestiza, 
U.S. feminist of color, queer, and differential conceptualization of the subject... [which] 
cannot fully inhabit either the modernist/historicist or the poststructuralist/postmodemist 
position, but rather inhabit each and partially" (Sandoval 33-34). These survival skills 
require an ethical commitment to coalitions between subordinated constituencies that read 
the world through a multitude of lenses in order to transform relations of domination and 
subordination. Additionally, these skills are always dependent on the ability to understand 
the interstices between modernism and postmodernism as a space for imagining "alternative 
realities [with] novel means of communication, creativity, productivity, mobility, and a 
different sense of'control'" (Sandoval 136). 
Importantly for Sandoval, resistance is the third term often left out of binary 
structures of domination and subordination, and it is in this third term that she identifies 
agentive opportunities for oppressed subjects to perform power through five technologies: 
"sign reading; deconstruction and reconstruction of signs; an ethical commitment to justice; 
and the differential movement that keeps all aspects of being in motion and mutation" (130). 
Sandoval defines the five technologies which comprise the methodology of the oppressed as 
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"techniques for moving energy" (82). Sandoval uses Roland Barthes' work Mythologies and 
his theory of semiotics as a framework for discussing the five technologies that allow for 
resistance. However, she contends that Barthes' theory has a significant shortcoming because 
he could not put semiotics in conversation with theories of resistance produced by the 
oppressed. Instead, he construed semiotics only within the purview of the "scientifically 
trained" mythologist (104). Sandoval argues that: 
Barthes's territorial range of control ended at the location where his semiotic 
theory of resistance should have met in coalition with those theories of 
resistance that have been generated by oppressed and colonized peoples. 
Unable to negotiate that leap, Barthes constructed instead a view of semiotics, 
of "mythology," and of resistance where the individual practitioner can only 
act alone, isolated, and in despair. The border-crosser Barthes was not able to 
recognize the new kinds of warriors, the shape-shifters who comprised his 
allies in resistance.. .Barthes saw himself as discoverer of a new terrain that 
was, as yet, unpeopled. (113) 
Despite these shortcomings, Sandoval suggests that Barthes' theory offers a significant 
contribution to our understanding of how the oppressed act in the world, asserting agency 
through resistance to structures of domination (105). Following Barthes' framework, 
Sandoval suggests that the form of resistance embodied in the first three technologies of the 
oppressed (sign reading, deconstruction, reconstruction) "comprises an 'archaeological' dig 
through meaning and consciousness that can return meaning production to 'its healthy state: 
that of the arbitrariness of the sign and the resulting mobility that keeps history, language, 
meaning, and spirit alive" (104). The fourth technology (differential movement) operates as 
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a type of hinge for the first three technologies because it permits a "flexible" or 
"improvisational" response to shifting power dynamics, which ultimately enables the first 
three technologies to occur (112). The fifth technology guides or drives the first four; 
Sandoval explains that it is "an ethical ideological code that is committed to social justice 
according to egalitarian redistributions of power across such differences coded as race, 
gender, sex, nation, culture, or class distinctions" (112). The first three technologies are 
particularly relevant to this project. I illustrate in chapters four, five, and six, through 
analyses of the work of Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldua, Minnie Bruce Pratt, Marilyn Frye, 
and Dorothy Allison, how a politics of location can be understood similarly as an 
archeological dig, or an excavation of embedded meanings of identity positions and a 
subsequent deconstruction and reconstruction of identities, which ultimately situates 
subjectivity as fluid and mobile. 
Importantly, much like Teresa Ebert (1993) and Peter McClaren (1994) who argue for 
"resistance postmodern," Sandoval's articulation of resistance allows for transformative 
potential of marginalized subjects to intervene in processes of domination. However, as 
Rafael Pérez-Torres has suggested, "This is not to say that Chicanos [or other marginalized 
'others'] have formed a postmodern culture avant la lettre. It is to say that Chicanos have 
lived and survived (which is a form of triumph over) the disparities made plain by the critical 
light of postmodernism" (qtd. in Sandoval 16). I argue that a politics of location is an effort 
to rhetorically engage in oppositional consciousness in such a way that reveals the 
imaginative tension points between modernist and postmodernist notions of subjectivity. 
Analyzing how radical, lesbian feminists use a politics of location provides us with insight 
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about how an oppressed group of subjects have survived (and thrived) as partial, fragmented, 
and contradictory subjects-in-process. 
Within her configuration of differential consciousness, Sandoval also challenges the 
dichotomy between modernist and postmodernist conceptualizations of power. Through a 
modernist lens, power is understood as sovereign, held by oppressors over the oppressed, and 
is configured as vertical movement from "above." This, however, doesn't account for the 
ways in which power can be enacted in forms of resistance from "below," nor does it allow 
for a more complicated understanding of subjectivities across positions of privilege and non-
privilege. Through a postmodernist lens, power is understood as "as a globalized, flattened 
but mobile, terrain... [which] comes complete with power nodules inhabitable by collective 
subjectivities who are perceived as capable of accessing, with equal facility, their own 
peculiar quotients of power" ( Sandoval 74). Sandoval contends that some postmodern, 
(perhaps superficial) conceptualizations of power suggest we have equal ability to exercise 
power and "allow hierarchical and material differences in power between people to be erased 
from consciousness, even while these same economic and social privileges are bolstered" 
(75). Within leftist social movements, this notion of being "equivalent contenders on the grid 
for the services of power" (75) leads to a kind of compartmentalization and antagonism 
across lines of different identity categories (nation, race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) that 
are antithetical to the kind of coalitional politics that Sandoval contends are necessary for 
social change. Hence, she argues for a multi-dimensional conceptualization of power, one 
that focuses both on semiotic positioning and movement by understanding that subjects have 
been constructed through material structures of domination and subordination at the same 
time that the oppressed have the ability to reconstruct social positions through any "media at 
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their disposal—whether it is narrative as weapon, riot as speech, looting as revolution" (77). 
Much as Perez and Spivak call for strategic essentialism as one tactic in an ongoing struggle 
for survival and social change, Sandoval argues that our understanding of power can be 
neither modernist or postmodernist; rather, we must look at the contrast between them as a 
generative space for understanding how power can be tactically enacted by subordinated 
groups. Hence, through efforts to describe how one's politics are grounded in socio-cultural 
and historical locations, which often include positions of privilege and non-privilege, center 
and margin, power is revisioned as resistance to or interventions in systems of domination, 
using the "available means" to reconstitute one's subjectivities in coalition with others. 
Following Emma Perez's work on decolonizing the imagination (1999), Sandoval 
suggests that we must move from a "rhetoric of'supremacy'" to a rhetoric of transformation 
(130). The primary strategy for this move is the centering of love, as it can enable coalitional 
politics. She argues that: 
a diverse array of thinkers are agitating for similarly conceived and 
unprecedented forms of identity, politics, aesthetic production, and coalitional 
consciousness through their shared practice of a hermeneutics of love in the 
postmodern world, and it demonstrates that the apartheid of theoretical 
domains dividing academic endeavors by race, sex, class, gender, and identity 
is annulled when this fundamental linkage is discerned. (4) 
The move to discuss love as a hermeneutic in theoretical and academic contexts might seem 
antithetical to the kind of rigorous intellectual engagement established within the Western 
tradition of rhetoric that relies so heavily on cognitivist notions of rationality. However, I 
believe this call for love provides just the kind of hermeneutic necessary for refusing the split 
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between mind/body/spirit. It is also a necessary component for understanding one of the 
central reasons why the lesbian feminists that I examine in this project used a politics of 
location as a rhetorical strategy. Sandoval suggests that "Love as social movement is enacted 
by revolutionary, mobile, and global coalitions of citizen-activists who are allied through the 
apparatus of emancipation" (184). As I will show in chapter two, a politics of location was 
enacted through the desire to live in connection with other feminists through differences; it 
was not an effort to further compartmentalize women according to social positioning. Love 
for these lesbian women, then, became a central motivating force in building coalitions that 
could affect social change both from within feminist communities and within dominant 
cultural communities. Attempting to resist the ways hegemonic feminism created a 
normalized feminist subject, the hermeneutic of love operated as that which could enable 
these writers to be allied in ways perhaps not as immediately salient in other types of 
coalitional politics where differences were erased in order to claim common ground. That is, 
the desire to live in loving connection with others became the common ground upon which to 
work for changes in the social order that rejected isolation, exploitation, and hatred. 
For third-space feminists, the tensions among different constructions of subjectivity 
in modernism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism are a struggle over the terms by which 
subjectivity is articulated and no one theoretical framework is embraced as an end all answer 
to questions about agency, subjectivity, and social change. Rather, it is the struggle, the 
tension points in the intersections of these theories, that provide generative spaces for 
imagining a more just and egalitarian society. Unfortunately, as Sandoval points out, 
"differential U.S. third world feminist criticism (which is a set of theoretical and 
methodological strategies) is often mis-recognized and under-analyzed by readers when it is 
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translated as a demographic constituency only (women of color), and not as a theoretical and 
methodological approach in its own right" (171). This is not to call for an erasure of women 
of color as creators and developers of the differential consciousness that Sandoval articulates 
as a methodological approach; rather, it is to suggest that any field which calls for radical 
social change needs to be infused with third-space feminist theory and methods. Indeed, it is 
my argument that the methodology of the oppressed extends current conversations in the 
field of feminist rhetoric(s) into theoretical spaces that can help complicate our understanding 
of the speaking subject within feminist rhetorical frameworks. In the final section of this 
chapter I place a politics of location within the historical context from which it initially 
emerged and I offer a brief definition of how I use the term (I offer a fuller theoretical 
discussion in chapter two). I then situate a politics of location in relation to feminist 
standpoint theory and identity politics in order to establish how a politics of location is a set 
of discursive practices for reconstituting subjectivity. 
Historicizing a Politics of Location, Standpoint Theory, and Identity Politics 
In her early work Adrienne Rich had the "dream of a common language" (1978), 
which was marked by a move to situate all women, similarly, in opposition to male 
patriarchal norms. This form of feminism, which Sandoval names hegemonic feminism, 
effectively erases differences and power inequities among and between women and among 
and between men and women of different races, classes, and cultures. In her later work, 
beginning in the early 1980s, Rich begins to question whether the quest for a single cause of 
domination and oppression, such as patriarchy, can be useful to a global feminism. She 
interrogates the implications of her own position as a white, Western woman by suggesting: 
"Why not admit it, get it said, so we can get on to the work to be done, back down to earth 
again? The faceless, sexless, raceless proletariat. The faceless, raceless, classless category 
of'all women.' Both creations of white Western self-centeredness" ("Notes" 218-219). In 
her book, Blood Bread and Poetry, Adrienne Rich coins the phrase "a politics of location," 
which marks an effort to move away from hegemonic feminism that universalizes all 
women's experiences in the world and constructs a normative (and hence limiting and 
exclusionary) subject of feminism. More recently, Chandra Talpade Mohanty has extended 
Rich's theory into the arena of postcolonial studies. She defines a politics of location as "the 
historical, geographical, cultural, psychic and imaginative boundaries which provide the 
ground for political definition and self-definition for contemporary U.S. feminists" 
("Feminist Encounters" 74). 
Importantly, while Rich coined the phrase "a politics of location," the shift in 
feminism in the 1980s that this phrase identifies was propelled through the work of radical 
women of color who challenged singular constructions of identity and identification in 
women's liberation and anti-racist movements and called for analyses of intersecting systems 
of domination. I concur with Teresa de Lauretis (1987), who suggests that: 
the shift in consciousness.. .may be said to have begun (if a convenient date is 
needed) with 1981, the year of publication of This Bridge Called My Back, the 
collection of writings by radical women of color edited by Cherrie Moraga 
and Gloria Anzaldua, which was followed in 1982 by the Feminist Press 
anthology edited by Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith with 
the title All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are 
Brace. It was these books that first made available to all feminists the 
feelings, the analyses, and the political positions of feminists of color, and the 
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critiques of white or mainstream feminism. The shift in feminist 
consciousness that was initially prompted by works such as these is best 
characterized by the awareness and the effort to work through feminism's 
complicity with ideology, both ideology in general (including classism or 
bourgeois liberalism, racism, colonialism, imperialism, and I would also add, 
with some qualifications, humanism) and the ideology of gender in —that is 
to say, heterosexism. (10) 
Alternatively, a shift could be identified earlier, in 1977, with the publication of The 
Combahee River Collective's "A Black Feminist Statement," which challenges hegemonic 
feminism and calls for feminist political activism that addresses the intersectionality of race, 
gender, class, and sexuality. Or, a historical shift could be located at the Third Annual 
National Women's Studies Conference in June of 1981, which was organized around the title 
and theme "Women Respond to Racism." As Chela Sandoval (as then secretary to the 
National Third World Women's Alliance) has discussed in her report "Feminism and 
Racism," the conference marks a significant moment in the feminist movement because it 
ultimately reproduced racism (in structure, organization, and individual interactions), it 
divided women into two oppositional categories ("white" and "third-world"), and it provided 
the context for women of color to collectively (and painfully) discover common ground that 
could infuse feminism "with new and different meanings" (64). Wary of the false unity of 
sisterhood put forward by white feminism which led to erasure and oppression of differences, 
the women of color at the conference defined a new kind of common ground, which 
Sandoval describes as a "positive perception of difference" (67) rather than one that perceives 
difference as divisive. She explains that after struggling with differences in the women of 
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color morning consciousness raising group that seemed to place the women in opposition to 
one another, they ultimately came to understand that "through the compassionate inclusion of 
our differences and the self-conscious understanding that each difference is valid in its 
context, we are awakened to a new realm of methodological, theoretical, political, and 
feminist activity—with a pool of differences, born of survival and resistance, at our disposal" 
(67). This common ground led to the examination of how the participants' "learned 
sensitivity to mobile webs of power" could be transformed into oppositional consciousness 
(66). In her report, Sandoval forwards oppositional consciousness as that which can move 
feminism out of stagnation because it: 
creates the opportunity for flexible, dynamic and tactical responses, it is 
another critical theory for political action which allows us no single 
conceptualization of our position in society. Rather, it focuses us instead upon 
the process of the circulation of power, on the skill of reading its moves, and 
on the recognition that a new morality and effective opposition resides in a 
self-conscious flexibility of identity and of political action which is capable, 
above all else, of tactically intervening in the moves of power in the name of 
egalitarian social relations. (66) 
While the 1981 NWS A conference ended with divisions between third-world and white 
women that were further "intensified and cemented with antagonism" (70), it provided the 
material and historical context for women of color to collectively push against the false unity 
of hegemonic feminism and begin agitating for a "new kind of political movement" (67). 
Whatever the specific moment, in the late 70s and early 80s calls by radical women of 
color in the United States for visibility and for spaces to speak the heterogeneous, complex, 
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and oftentimes contradictory needs, desires, and identities of women marks a turning point in 
feminism. It is this turning point, or rupture in the "order of things," that I believe allowed 
for radical feminists to begin invoking a different set of rhetorical strategies that pushed 
feminism into new territory. In fact, in her essay, "The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge 
Called My Back and Anglo-American Feminism," Norma Alarcôn suggests that the 
contributors to This Bridge were "speaking subjects of a new discursive formation" (356). 
As I will discuss in chapter two, the potential for interrupting normative subjectivity occurs 
through a collective set of intervening discursive practices by illegitimate subjects, not 
through the individual will of sovereign subjects. Changes in practices can lead to changes in 
the order of discourse. It is my argument that a politics of location, motivated through the 
collective call of radical women of color and anti-racist white women, is one such set of 
discursive practices which historically allowed for the creation of alternative forms of 
intersubjectivity. 
I offer this brief history to point out that although the phrase "a politics of location" 
was coined by Rich, the rhetorical strategies deployed through this rhetorical/political 
positioning were used by many feminists, particularly third-space feminists prior to the 
Rich's invention of it in 1984. In this project I use a politics of location to denote both social 
location and the places or locations to which authors who invoke this strategy look for an 
understanding of their identities. That is, writers who invoke a politics of location work to 
unearth the socio-political significance of the identity positions they claim. In interrogating 
and deconstructing the meaning of particular identities, these writers also locate what might 
be considered alternative topoi, such as emotion (including hope, desire, anger, and fear) and 
physical geography, as sites that can provide clues for deconstructing pre-established 
identities and reconstructing subjectivities that are not based on relations of domination and 
subordination. Finally, the telos, end point, or final location to which a politics of location 
points for the reconstruction of intersubjectivity is not fixed beyond the desire to create non-
oppressive ways of interacting and being in the world. Any "final location" is deferred 
through the understanding that subjectivities are defined through interactional relations with 
others and thus are always in the process of be-coming through continued engagement. 
In brief, I define a politics of location as a set of discursive strategies used for 
political definition and self-definition created at a historical juncture when radical feminists 
of color were calling for a disruption of hegemonic feminism. These strategies function as a 
self-reflexive rhetorical and political effort to move beyond universalized notions of 
subjectivity and positivist notions of knowledge construction and into a historical and 
material contextualization of subjectivities and knowledges as always in processes of be­
coming. More specifically, in the chapters that follow I extrapolate the discursive strategies 
(which I collectively name a politics of location) from narratives and political essays by 
Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldua, Minnie Bruce Pratt, Marilyn Frye, and Dorothy Allison, 
narratives which focus on self-representation and the representation of relations between and 
among social positions. For example, Minnie Bruce Pratt's essay "Identity: Skin Blood 
Heart" is a narrative that uses a politics of location to self-represent her Southern, Christian, 
white, middle class, female identity and the way in which that social location or identity has 
been constructed in relation to others. As another example, Audre Lorde's essay "Eye to Eye: 
Black Women, Hatred, and Anger" uses a politics of location to represent Lorde's social 
position in relation to other black women. A politics of location maps identities as a strategy 
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for representing relations between social positions in the effort to excavate embedded 
meanings of particular social positions. 
I contend that there are several reasons why a politics of location marks a significant 
rhetorical and political move (which I discuss at length in the next chapter); a politics of 
location: 
challenges the universal subject of feminism and the normative subject of 
phallogocentric rhetoric, both of which are reductive and exclusionary, and hold 
the potential to oppressively essentialize speaking subjects; 
speaks multiple, contradictory, non-innocent subjectivities into be-ing, thus 
providing opportunities for discursive agency; and 
resists absolute relativism and is driven by the "hermeneutics of love," which 
maintains a place for imagination, hope, and a vision of a more egalitarian world. 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, I situate a politics of location within Chela Sandoval's 
methodology of the oppressed. It is one of the discursive sites to which we can look for clues 
about how the oppressed survive in a postmodern world as fragmented, contradictory, 
multiple subjects without falling into despair or a schizophrenic state. A politics of location 
provides us with strategies of representation in which subjects have a degree of constrained 
agency that allows them to discursively intervene in relations of domination. 
Standpoint Theory and A Politics of Location 
A politics of location runs parallel to feminist standpoint theory, and thus shares 
many of the same theoretical assumptions about situated knowledges and situated subjects. 
In "The Feminist Standpoint," Nancy Hartsock defines standpoint theory as that which takes 
a historical and materialist approach to the construction of knowledge, always understanding 
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that epistemology "grows in complex and contradictory ways from material life" (160). 
Donna Haraway defines nonessentialist feminist standpoints as "cognitive-emotional-
political achievements, crafted out of located social-historical-bodily experience—itself 
always constituted through fraught, noninnocent, discursive, material, collective 
practices—that could make less deluded knowledge for all of us more likely" 
(Modest Witness 304n32). Similarly, Hartsock argues that standpoint theory "is achieved 
rather than obvious, a mediated rather than immediate understanding" ("The Feminist 
Standpoint" 162). Understanding how the material and historical conditions inform 
epistemology and the creation of knowledge is a process that requires a critical 
consciousness and a continued engagement with and interrogation of assumptions. Thus a 
particular epistemological standpoint is not realized simply by one's position in society 
relative to others, nor is an epistemological standpoint a final "point of arrival." A feminist 
epistemology requires continual resistance to oppressive forces. Importantly, standpoint 
theory recognizes "the power realities operative in a community, and points to the ways the 
ruling group's vision may be both perverse and made real by that group's power to define the 
terms for the community as a whole" ("The Feminist Standpoint" 162). Hence, power is 
understood as an exercise in naming frameworks and activities that create communities, a 
power that also can be exercised oppositionally through collectively defining alternative 
frameworks and activities. 
Many similarities exist between a politics of location and standpoint theory—most 
obviously that truths are mediated by a subject's material and historical location in the world. 
I do not suggest that a politics of location exists within an entirely new framework separate 
from standpoint theory. Instead, I conceive of standpoint theory and a politics of location in 
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a relationship similar to that of two overlapping circles. That is, the two share a set of 
assumptions, but also distinctive characteristics of each. Feminist standpoint theory is 
distinguished by its greater emphasis on epistemology—on issues of how knowledge is 
constructed. A politics of location is distinguished by its focus on discursive representations 
of identity positions—on how subjectivity is discursively deconstructed and then 
reconstructed. As indicated above, I conceive of a politics of location as a discursive practice 
used to excavate the meaning of identity positions so that new forms of subjectivity can be 
forged within coalitional movements for social change. Another significant way to 
differentiate these two concepts is that standpoint theory generally has been used as a broad 
theory that informs methodological inquiries in feminist scholarship, but a politics of location 
has been used as a rhetorical and political move to construct alternative subjectivities in a 
lesbian feminist counterpublic. Of course, a definitive distinction between standpoint theory 
and a politics of location is difficult to maintain because they do share many of the same 
assumptions; likewise, the delineation between epistemology and subjectivity is imprecise 
within a poststructural theoretical framework because the two easily slide into one another. 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this project I differentiate a politics of location from 
standpoint theory because their sites of inquiry are different—my research on a politics of 
location involves an investigation of discursive practices of self-representation in essays and 
narratives by radical, lesbian feminists whereas standpoint theory investigates broader 
theoretical questions of epistemology and methodology, which are often more contained 
within academic conversations. In many respects, a politics of location is a discursive 
performance of feminist standpoint theory within a particular community of feminists. 
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Identity Politics and A Politics of Location 
A politics of location is often conflated with identity politics because it arose during 
the height of a socio-historical moment when identity politics was embraced by many 
political movements, in particular the Civil Rights movement, the feminist movement, the 
gay liberation movement, and Black nationalism. My project operates from the assumption 
that a politics of location is distinct from identity politics, which is a particular political 
mobilization of identities that currently has been thoroughly critiqued through poststructural 
theories of subjectivity. In particular, Judith Butler's theory of gender and performativity has 
called into question the limits of identity politics built upon fixed or naturalized 
conceptualizations of what it means to be a culturally intelligible woman. In place of identity 
politics, which operates from an epistemological foundation, Butler argues that the point of 
departure for feminists should be practices of signification that disrupt assumptions about 
what has previously been "culturally unintelligible and impossible" (189). Other theorists, 
who embrace identity politics as a form of strategic essentialism, have also pointed out the 
homogenizing effects of a political movement that is simply based on the "'deadly sameness' 
of abstraction" (Rich "Notes" 221). Emma Perez has argued that "The mistake within any 
arena, whether academic or political, is that a common enemy bonds 'us' and makes 'us' all 
the same, while 'they,' the common enemy, are also all the same" ("Irigaray's" 95). 
Furthermore, identity politics has become institutionalized and appropriated by right wing 
conservatives without a similar feminist vision for radical social change. For example, 
Henry Giroux has astutely pointed out how an identity politics of whiteness has been 
mobilized through the discourse of individualism, traditional values, and family values as an 
effort to counteract multicultural and multiracial democratic diversity in the veiled name of 
white supremacy (225). 
I contend that the radical potential of a politics of location was not given due attention 
because it often is subsumed within identity politics. Furthermore, as indicated earlier in this 
chapter, I believe that a politics of location is one methodology of the oppressed; as such, it 
provides a practical discursive strategy for coping in a postmodern world as fragmented, 
multiple, subjects in a manner that does not sacrifice a hopeful vision that relations of 
domination and subordination can be interrupted. Hence, one of the primary purposes of this 
project is to reclaim a politics of location as a radical, political discursive move that speaks to 
current conversations about poststructural subjectivities, agency, and social change. 
Importantly, a politics of location is not merely a reflexive moment of self-disclosure 
in a text; that is, it is more than a horizontal listing of adjectives that indicate the identity 
positions of a rhetor, such as race, class, and sexuality. It is an unearthing of the subject 
positions into which writers have been interpellated and a critical interrogation of how those 
subject positions inform relationships with other subjects. Susan Bordo's examination of the 
body as a cultural text and site of struggle is instructive in clarifying the distinction I draw 
here between a symbolic form of identity location (listing one's subject positions) and a 
practical form of identity location (unearthing embedded meanings of social positions). In 
her analysis Bordo draws on Foucault's distinction between the "intelligible body" (the 
symbolic form) and the "useful body" (the practical rules), which she clarifies is a shift in 
register, not a shift to a biological understanding of the body (181). The "intelligible body" is 
the symbolic abstraction or the generalized cultural representation of a normative body, 
which mirrors or works in conjunction with the practical body. The practical body is formed 
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through "a set of practical rules and regulations through which the living body is 'trained, 
shaped, obeys, responds'" (181 emphasis in original). Bordo argues that feminist theorists 
must study both cultural representations of the body and the practical lives of those bodies, 
the practical rules through which those bodies are realized. Similarly, a politics of location 
establishes the rhetor's cultural identity through what might be considered "culturally 
intelligible" symbols (for example, Minnie Bruce Pratt names herself as a white, middle 
class, Southern woman). She then moves on to examine the practical rules and regulations in 
which she has engaged (and now resists) that have shaped that particular identity (for 
example, she examines the rules of morality which have formed her consciousness and 
actions as a white, Southern, middle class woman). 
As a radical rhetorical political move that critically interrogates identity positions, a 
politics of location is marked by dialectical movement between the already constructed and 
the potential to rewrite subjectivities through self-representation and a search for new 
narratives of women's experiences. In Rich's words, it is born of the "need to understand 
how a place on the map is also a place in history within which as a woman, a Jew, a lesbian, 
a feminist I am created and trying to create" ("Notes" 212). Representation through a politics 
of location often invokes strategic essentialism, which, as mentioned above, is born of the 
understanding that political representation always entails some form of essentialism. 
According to Perez, it is a tactic that is deployed by marginalized "others" in the process of 
claiming the right to name (in specific historic moments) to "[thwart] cultural and political 
suicide" and provide spaces for the female imaginary ("Irigaray's" 88). Naming one's 
positionality and representing one's experiences in the world is born of the desire to speak 
subjects into be-ing in a manner that recognizes how particular subjects have already been 
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scripted without falling into the despair of totalizing notions of either 
essentialism/determinism or relativism/social constructionism. Whereas identity politics 
often is founded upon an essentialism that serves to fix identities by calling forth the 
epistemological "essence of women," a politics of location invokes strategic essentialism as a 
momentary political tactic or launching point from which to name and represent oneself 
against dominant ideological identity formations. 
Thus, a politics of location situates social locations as points of departure from which 
to understand how subjectivities have been constituted by dominant ideologies with the 
ultimate aim of reconstituting those subjectivities. In effect, a politics of location operates as 
a process through which writers engage in political re-presentation of the speaking subject, a 
representation that does not preclude internal diversity or intersubjectivity (within the 
speaking subject or the community). A politics of location is founded upon the assumption 
of "difference from within"; the aim is not to transcend difference, but to reclaim it, within 
individual subjectivities as well as within collective political and social movements. In sum, 
a politics of location is part of the rhetoric and politics of representation. 
As I will argue in chapter three, a politics of location keeps identities mobile and fluid 
through two primary moves: an analytic deconstruction of inherited subject positions and an 
epistemic reconstruction which produces new forms of subjectivity based upon inter­
dependence. As an analytic strategy, a politics of location uses a form of strategic 
essentialism to locate and map out relationships with other subjects. This mapping of 
relations involves an archaeological dig in which inherited subject-positions built upon 
relations of domination and subordination are excavated and deconstructed. Mapping and 
excavating then reveal possibilities for reconstructing intersubjectivity based upon egalitarian 
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relations. Thus the point of a politics of location is not to fix identities, rather, it is to offer 
agentive opportunities for subjects to co-construct a fluid and mobile intersubjectivity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Illegitimate Subjects of Rhetoric: 
Theorizing a Politics of Location as Interruption of the Normative Subject of Rhetoric 
until recently, the figure of the rhetor has been assumed to be masculine, 
unified, stable, autonomous, and capable of acting rationally on the world 
through language. Those who did not fit this pattern—women, people of color, 
poorly educated workers, those judged to be overly emotional or unstable— 
those people stood outside of the rhetorical situation, for they were considered 
neither capable of nor in need to remembering and inventing arguments. 
From a feminist vantage point, however, it is impossible to take the 
subjectivity of the rhetor for granted, impossible not to locate that subjectivity 
within the larger context of personal, social, economic cultural, and 
ideological forces, impossible not to notice not only the context itself, but also 
who is absent from this context as well as what exclusionary forces (regarding 
knowledge and argument, for example) are at work there. 
—Lisa Ede, Cheryl Glenn and Andrea Lunsford 412 
Efforts to make women legitimate by situating them in patronymic narratives 
does nothing to enfranchise them—because it does nothing to the 
phallogocentric economy which disenfranchised them. 
—Michelle Ballif 95 
Feminist rhetorical scholarship has addressed the limitations of a canon that is 
overwhelming authored by white, elite males (Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, 
Erasmus, Ramus, Bacon, Campbell, Blair, Whately, and Richards). Even though, as Cheryl 
Glenn has noted, "Fading away is rhetoric as we have known it—exclusively upper-class, 
male, agonistic, and public, yet seemingly universal" (2), the traditional canon continues to 
hold center stage in contemporary rhetorical studies. Not only are most texts in the canon 
produced by white, elite males, but their theories of rhetoric also have produced a "normative 
subject" of rhetoric, legitimizing some speaking subjects and delegitimizing "others." Much 
as the normative subject of Enlightenment erased "othered" subjects from history, Western 
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rhetoric has defined itself around a similar normative subject which has produced 
exclusionary standards about who can speak, who will be heard, what can be spoken, what 
forms of knowledge are legitimate, and what communication strategies are most effective. 
Legitimate speaking subjects historically have been people who are highly literate, have 
access to formal education, and have the right to participate in the public sphere. Hence, the 
normative subject of rhetoric is not merely grounded in masculinist values, but also values 
inflected by class, race, and social status. The normative subject of rhetoric is problematic 
for two primary reasons. First, the construction of normative rhetorical strategies, 
exigencies, and contexts effectively excludes, or de-legitimizes those considered 
inappropriate subjects. Second, the values of this "legitimate" or normative subject are not 
necessarily congruent with those of marginalized "others." 
I turn to Foucault's theory of discourse to elucidate how discursive practices construct 
legitimate speaking subjects, to show that the normative subject of rhetoric has come into 
being through a set of stabilizing practices which determine who can speak and who will be 
heard. Discerning how normative subjects are formed through rules and regulations is a 
necessary precursor to understanding that intervention occurs through a collective set of 
practices that enact a different form of subjectivity. For Foucault, discourse is an event or 
practice, rather than a reflection of knowledge or simple expression of authors/subject. 
Subjects are constructed through discursive rules of formation (Archaeology). A discursive 
formation is a set of relationships between ideas or concepts that create an effect of order, 
unity, or regularity on what are otherwise disparate items (38). Foucault's theory is premised 
on the notion that truth (and thus knowledge) does not exist prior to discourse. 
Ideas/knowledge are constructed through a set of rules or procedures that he calls rules of 
formation, which can be divided into four basic categories: 1). Rules about what can be 
talked about, or in Foucault's terms rules that bring into being objects; 2). Rules about who is 
permitted to speak/write about objects, or rules that bring into being subject positions; 3). 
Rules that govern how concepts can be formed; and 4). Rules that govern strategies or 
theoretical frameworks. Foucault's discussion of the second set of rules, which he names 
enunciative modalities, is particularly salient to my project because it points to the necessity 
of understanding how the subject position of a discursive formation is determined before one 
can proceed to investigate the forms of reasoning that link the diversity of statements which 
comprise a discursive formation. Foucault contends that if we do not analyze the enunciative 
function of discourse we are likely "to see discourse as a phenomenon of expression—the 
verbal translation of a previously established synthesis" (55). In other words, unless we 
explore how discursive practices construct subjectivity, we cannot see the subject of rhetoric 
as the discursive enactment of a normalizing gaze. 
Enunciative modalities are rules through which subject positions are formed. These 
positions are determined by an interplay in a particular discursive formation between the 
"various statuses, the various sites, the various positions [the subject] can occupy or be given 
when making a discourse" (54). That is, the subject position of any discursive formation is 
created through the relations between who is granted the right to speak, the institutional sites 
from which the subject speaks, and the position of the subject relevant to the objects of the 
discursive formation (50-55). Enunciative modalities vary among different discursive 
formations and are always open to modification; however, Foucault suggests that "if there is 
a unity, if the modalities of enunciation that it uses, or to which it gives place, are not simply 
juxtaposed by a series of historical contingencies, it is because it makes constant use of this 
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group of relations" (54). Thus an examination of the enunciative modalities in the field of 
rhetoric can reveal a set of stabilizing practices that reveal a "normative" subject position for 
the rhetor. Additionally, in his lecture "The Discourse on Language," Foucault suggests that 
this form of regulation "amounts to a rarefaction among speaking subjects: none may enter 
into discourse on a specific subject unless he [or she] has satisfied certain conditions or if he 
[or she] is not, from the outset, qualified to do so" (224-225). The effect of a set of 
enunciative modalities within a discursive formation is the exclusion of subjects rendered 
illegitimate through non-conformity to the rules of enunciation. 
Foucault's project in revealing the function of discursive practices is not to negate the 
potential of changing discourse; rather his purpose is: 
to show that to speak is to do something—something other than to express 
what one thinks; to translate what one knows, and something other than to 
play with the structures of language (langue); to show that to add a statement 
to a pre-existing series of statements is to perform a complicated and costly 
gesture, which involves conditions (and not only a situation, a context, and 
motives), and rules (not the logical and linguistic rules of construction); to 
show that a change in the order to discourse does not presuppose 'new ideas', a 
little invention and creativity, a different mentality, but transformations in 
practice, perhaps in neighbouring practices, and in their common articulation. 
(209) 
Foucault's discussion of enunciative modalities points to the ultimate instability of any 
discursive formation's subject position. That is, because the exclusion of illegitimate subjects 
is produced through a continued reiteration of certain practices and relations between objects, 
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subject, concepts, and strategies it is possible to interrupt the normalizing forces of a field of 
relations. Changes in practices can lead to changes in the order of discourse. The potential 
for interrupting the normative subject of rhetoric occurs not through the will or force of a 
sovereign subject but through a collective set of intervening practices of illegitimate subjects. 
Again, in describing how knowledge is produced through discourse (in the case of 
this project, knowledge within the field of rhetoric) Foucault argues that it is first important 
to describe the subject position of a discursive formation; that is, we must first ask, who is 
accorded the right to speak? As the opening epigraphs by Lisa Ede, Cheryl Glenn, Andrea 
Lunsford, and Michelle Ballif indicate, feminists have begun to problematize the subjectivity 
of the rhetor by asking which subjects and which rhetorical strategies have been de-
legitimated by the rhetorical tradition. These questions move away from an additive model 
of change within contemporary rhetorical studies (add women to the canon and stir) and 
towards a radical revisioning of rhetoric through a feminist historiographical framework. 
Feminist historiography is premised on the assumption that simply adding women to the 
already existing tradition does little to actually construct a history of and for women. An 
inclusionary model positions traditional rhetorical theories as the standard by which to judge 
women's writing and speaking. Patricia Bizzell argues that this creates a double-bind for 
feminist historians, "Either women [and other marginalized subjects] and their texts have to 
be deformed to fit these standards under the unfriendly gaze of the critic seeking deficiencies, 
so goes the attack, or else women [and other marginalized subjects] who have unfortunately 
capitulated to these standards will be privileged over others who were trying to do more 
revolutionary work" (54). Michelle Ballif, who addresses the problem of legitimizing 
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women rhetoricians from a poststructural theoretical perspective, provides a particularly 
vivid metaphor: 
Everyone knows that the exchange rate of a dog of papered lineage—of 
legitimate birth—is exponentially greater than that of a mongrel. To provide 
woman with a history is to increase her value by making her legitimate, by 
giving her a proper name, by locating her within a proper family, by situating 
her in a proper narrative. This act of confirmation is nothing less than the 
ideological exercise of what Gayatri Spivak calls the 'tyranny of the 
proper—in the sense of that which produces both property and the proper 
name of the patronymic' ("Feminism" 91). To make woman proper by 
providing her with a history is the patronymic, phallogocentric enterprise par 
excellence. (92) 
Following the tenets of feminist historiography, my goal in this project is not to situate a 
politics of location within the "proper narrative" of the rhetorical tradition. Instead, in this 
chapter I will theorize how a politics of location operates as a strategy that interrupts the 
normative subject of the rhetorical tradition, effectively creating discursive spaces for 
"illegitimate" subjects to invoke different forms of making meaning through language. I 
begin by outlining the normative subject of traditional rhetoric, specifically as it has been 
discussed in the work of Lisa Ede, Andrea Lunsford, and Cheryl Glenn who use the five 
canons of rhetoric to expose the limitations of traditional rhetoric, and the work of Nancy 
Fraser who offers a critique of the bourgeois subject that is implicated in Habermas' notion of 
the public sphere, counter-publics, and the ideal speech situation. Finally, I theorize how a 
politics of location strategically interrupts this normative subject. 
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Defining the Normative Subject of Rhetoric 
In their work that examines the intersection of feminist theory and rhetorical theory, 
Lisa Ede, Cheryl Glenn, and Andrea Lunsford provide a critique of the normative 
assumptions that drive traditional rhetoric. They argue that "When Aristotle, Cicero, 
Quintilian, and Augustine considered the nature and province of rhetoric, they did not 
imagine that women—or those gendered feminine by their race, class, psychology, or other 
characteristics—might wish or be able to employ what Aristotle terms 'the available means of 
persuasion' to communicate their ideas" (438). With the understanding that maps are cultural 
artifacts that reveal socio-cultural values, they use the five canons of traditional rhetoric 
(memory, invention, arrangement, style, and delivery) as a map and heuristic to illustrate 
how feminist theories of language and subjectivity can stretch our understanding of these 
canons. 
Traditional conceptualizations of invention and memory influence what can be 
remembered, what can be known, and who can know. Ede et. al. show that feminist theories 
of knowledge challenge us to question how the public/private dichotomy has excluded forms 
of knowledge considered "personal" or based in lived experience. Quoting Audre Lorde, 
they suggest that rhetoric has not included intuitive or paralogical knowledge as resources for 
invention: 
As women, we have come to distrust that power which rises from our deepest 
and nonrational knowledge. We have been warned against it all our lives in 
the male world, which values this depth of feeling enough to keep women 
around in order to exercise it in the service of men, but which fears this same 
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depth too much to examine the possibilities of it within themselves, (qtd. in 
Ede, et. al. 413) 
In addition to exclusively valuing rationality as a means of knowing and remembering, the 
structure of traditional rhetoric is based on rational logic. In particular, Aristotle's logical, 
linear arrangement of claims (state your case and prove it) and the notion that an argument 
must have a beginning, middle, and end remains with us today and is often considered the 
most effective means of persuasion. However, Ede et. al. question this drive towards closure. 
What if the speaking subject does not aim to win over an audience or close down a 
conversation? What if the speaking subject "value[s] indeterminacy, nonclosure, and 
multiplicity of meaning" (Ede et. al. 418)? Equally important, conventions of style, 
decorum, and delivery have constructed a normative subject. Pointing out the way in which 
Margaret Fuller's conversational, collaborative style was devalued and dismissed by her 
peers, Ede et. al. suggest that speaking subjects who wish to be heard, but do not adhere to a 
traditional protocols of style are caught in a double-bind: 
For though some writers (including a number of feminists) experience style 
primarily as technique, many others find that style raises powerful and 
difficult personal, political, and ethical issues. Acutely aware of the 
patriarchal nature of the western phallogocentric tradition, many feminist 
writers feel themselves to be in a double bind. In order to claim authority and 
agency, to function as subjects in the discursive arena and thus further 
feminism's emancipatory goals, some feminists choose (as we choose in this 
essay) to adhere to the stylistic conventions of traditional Western 
discourse—conventions that sharply dichotomize the public and the private, 
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that devalue personal experience in favor of'objective' facts, 'rational' logic, 
and established authorities. (423) 
Ultimately, the work of Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford reveals how the values inscribed through 
classical conventions of invention, memory, arrangement, and delivery have led to normative 
assumptions that privilege rationality, objectivity, linear logic that produces closure, and 
domination over an audience. These values restrict what kinds of subjects are considered 
"legitimate," determining who gets to write, whose claims to knowledge is considered valid, 
and whose voices will remain silenced. 
Jurgen Habermas's theory of communication can be conceived as the culmination of 
Enlightenment's rational subject set in motion through Greco-Roman rhetorical theories. 
Habermas sought to retrieve reason as a means of creating a deliberative democracy which 
could lead to emancipation through autonomy, freedom, and justice. His theory of the ideal 
speech situation and its relation to the public sphere has offered a significant contribution to 
contemporary critical theories of how citizen-subjects can equitably deliberate about issues 
of the common good. Nancy Fraser offers a particularly lucid interrogation of Habermas' 
concept of public sphere and the limitations of the normative, bourgeois subject around 
which he developed his theory. Simply stated, she argues that "We can no longer assume 
that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere was simply an unrealized Utopian ideal; it 
was also a masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of 
class rule" (116). Her analysis is particularly salient to feminist rhetorical theory because too 
often the division of public and private spheres has been considered one of the central 
organizing structures that privileges masculinist discourses and world-views. However, 
Fraser complicates this reading of the private/public dichotomy by showing how this division 
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is inflected by race, culture, and economics, as well as gender. Eraser's analysis is not meant 
to undermine the concept of the public sphere; rather, she is interested in revealing the 
assumptions upon which Habermas' theory is based. She identifies three primary 
assumptions in Habermas' conceptualization of the public sphere that are relevant to a 
discussion of the legitimate subject of rhetoric: 
The assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to 
bracket status differentials and to deliberate as if they were social equals; 
the assumption, therefore, that societal equality is not a necessary 
condition for political democracy 
The assumption that the proliferation of a multiplicity of competing 
publics is necessarily a step away from, rather than toward, greater 
democracy, and that a single, comprehensive public sphere is always 
preferable to a nexus of multiple publics 
The assumption that discourse in public spheres should be restricted to 
deliberation about the common good, and that the appearance of private 
interests and private issues is always undesirable. (117-118) 
The assumptions Fraser interrogates render visible a normative subject position, one that is 
based upon a bourgeois, elite, masculinist participant in democratic spaces of public 
deliberation. That is, the erasure of social differences, the narrowing of public spaces to 
eliminate competing publics and the restriction of topics to a universal common good all 
operate to construct to a universalized subject position determining who can participate in the 
public sphere. 
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In his notion of the ideal speech situation, Habermas envisioned the public sphere as a 
space in which interlocutors could engage as equal peers in communication despite 
differences in social status. However, Fraser points out that subjects were to engage in 
communication merely "as if' they were equals, which leads to a "bracketing" of social 
inequalities. In much the same way that hegemonic feminism reproduces oppressions by 
bracketing out differences between women, Habermas' approach does not eliminate 
inequities nor produce the conditions for equal participation. Instead it renders them less 
visible and "works to the advantage of dominant groups in society and to the disadvantage of 
subordinates" because "unequally empowered social groups tend to develop unequally valued 
cultural styles" (120). The bracketing of differences leads to the assumption that the public 
sphere is "a space of zero degree culture, so utterly bereft of any specific ethos as to 
accommodate with perfect neutrality and equal ease interventions expressive of any and 
every cultural ethos" (120). Fraser suggests that in order for participatory parity to begin to 
be realized, we must recognize social inequities so that they can be addressed in ways that 
reveal the different cultural values and the differential access particular subjects have to 
engaging in public deliberation. 
The second assumption that Fraser addresses is Habermas' notion that a single, 
overarching public sphere is ideal for democratic states and that multiple publics undermine a 
true democracy. She contends that this ideal is interconnected with normative assumptions 
of who participates in the public sphere: the bourgeois, elite subject, arriving in spaces of 
public deliberation as a value-neutral participant. Instead, Fraser argues that "participatory 
parity is better achieved by a multiplicity of publics than a single public. ..for both stratified 
societies and egalitarian, multicultural societies" (127) because the concept of a democratic 
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public sphere implies a multiplicity of perspectives. Invoking Gaytrai Spivak's notion of the 
subaltern, Fraser forwards the concept of subaltern counterpublics, which have always 
existed alongside dominant publics: 
members of subordinated social groups—women, workers, peoples of color, 
and gays and lesbians—have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute 
alternative publics... [that] are parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs. (123) 
In stratified societies, subaltern counterpublics function as spaces for subordinated groups to 
gather and formulate resistance to dominant publics, providing an apparatus to "offset, 
although not wholly to eradicate, the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by members of 
dominant social groups in stratified societies" (124). In egalitarian, multicultural societies, 
which presuppose a diversity of values through intercultural communication, counterpublics 
are necessary for their continuation because an overarching, comprehensive public would be 
antithetical to the structure of such societies. Hence, in both types of society multiple publics 
provide spaces for interrupting normative assumptions that privilege universal rhetorical 
strategies and styles and provide opportunities for greater participation of diverse subjects in 
public deliberation. 
Third, Fraser critiques Habermas' assumption that there must be proper boundaries 
that delimit the scope of topics that can be discussed within the public sphere. His 
boundaries are founded upon an assumption that places notions of the "common good" in the 
public sphere and notions of particular or "special interest groups" in the private sphere. 
Fraser argues that no interests or topics should be bracketed out prior to public interrogation; 
indeed, we cannot know precisely what the common good might be prior to deliberation. 
The division between private and public is not simply a dichotomy embedded in masculinist 
assumptions; rather, notions of the private and public are "cultural classifications and 
rhetorical labels.. .frequently deployed to delegitimate some interests, views, and topics to 
valorize others" (131). Hence, she suggests we interrogate the very division of public and 
private interests so that we might understand how these terms limit the scope of admissible 
topics in public conversations. 
The normative subject position of rhetoric, then, is typically filled by a unified, fully 
present subject, who relies on rational, linear thought processes for the production and 
dissemination of knowledge. The preeminent style of this subject has been one that leads to 
domination of the audience and closure, rather than an opening of a dialogue. The legitimate 
subject speaks from nowhere (through the invocation of objectivity) and everywhere 
(speaking on matters of "Truth" for the common good); that which is considered "different" 
in matters of public deliberation has been bracketed out and deemed personal or pertaining to 
"special interest groups." Finally, the assumptions that undergird this subject construct 
"legitimate" rhetorical strategies that have led to the exclusion of alternative modes of 
discourse. In the remainder of this chapter I theorize how a politics of location provides a set 
of interventionist practices that interrupts the normalizing forces undergirding the traditional 
subject of rhetoric. More specifically, following Krista Ratcliffe's delineation of work in the 
field of feminist rhetorics as explained in chapter one, I extrapolate a theory of a politics of 
location as a collective set of intervening practices from texts written by a group of radical, 
lesbian feminists in the 1980s and early 90s (Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldua, Minnie Bruce 
Pratt, Marilyn Frye, and Dorothy Allison). In the next section, I first discuss the material 
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context that allowed for the creation of alternative discursive practices, I then explain the 
connection I draw between a lesbian feminist counterpublic and a politics of location, finally, 
I develop a theory of a politics of location as set of discursive practices for interrupting 
normative subjectivity and re-writing a fluid, mobile intersubjectivity. 
Illegitimate Speaking Subjects: Interrupting the Normalized Subject of Rhetoric 
The opportunity for radical, lesbian feminists to redefine their subjectivities and 
desires through a politics of location was greatly aided by the proliferation of feminist 
publishing houses, conferences, journals, lecture series, and festivals in the late twentieth 
century—in effect, a feminist counterpublic. As Fraser indicates, counterpublics are a 
necessary component of democracy: 
insofar as these counterpublics emerge in response to exclusions within 
dominant publics, they help expand discursive space. In principle, 
assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation will now have to 
be publicly argued out. In general, the proliferation of subaltern 
counterpublics means a widening of discursive contestation, and that is a good 
thing in stratified societies. (124) 
Importantly, this counterpublic provided a material means to employ alternative rhetorical 
strategies as well as the means to disseminate alternative world-views that were not 
constrained by the "normative" standards of dominant academic or popular publishing 
companies. Fraser argues that in this particular counterpublic "feminist women have 
invented new terms for describing social reality, including 'sexism,' 'the double shift,' 'sexual 
harassment,' and 'marital, date, and acquaintance rape.' Armed with such language, we have 
recast our needs and identities, thereby reducing, although not eliminating, the extent of our 
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disadvantage in official public spheres" (123). Through publishing houses such as Aunt Lute 
Press, The Feminist Press, Kitchen Table Press, radical, lesbian feminists were able to 
participate in the kind of counterpublic that enabled them to represent their subjectivities 
through counter-discursive strategies, one of which was a politics of location. 
Before I proceed to theorize how a politics of location interrupts the normative 
subject of rhetoric, I first want to explain the connection I draw between a politics of location 
and a radical, lesbian feminist community. I understand a politics of location as one set of 
discursive strategies used by some women who identify as radical, lesbian feminists. Thus, 
the use of a politics of location as a discursive performance of social identities has a 
contingent correlation to women who identify as radical, lesbian feminists, a correlation 
which is a product of a socio-political communal commitments rather than a product of a pre-
discursive or essential "lesbian existence" or the label radical, lesbian feminist. Teresa de 
Lauretis' (1997) identification of two concurrent drives in feminist theories is useful in 
understanding the socio-political commitment that I contend is central to the kind of radical, 
lesbian feminist community that invokes a politics of location. In her analysis of the 
contentious debates about essentialism in various forms of feminist theory, de Lauretis 
suggests that what might distinguish lesbian feminism from other forms of feminism are two 
drives which exist in mutual contradiction: an erotic/narcissistic drive and an ethical drive. 
The object of the erotic drive is "difference, rebellion, daring, excess, subversion, disloyalty, 
agency, empowerment, pleasure and danger...[which] rejects all images of powerlessness, 
victimization, subjection, acquiescence, passivity, conformism, and femininity" (335-36). 
The object of the ethical drive is "community, accountability, entrustment, sisterhood, 
bonding, belonging to a common world" (336). She argues that these contradictory drives 
pull in two directions—towards "critical negativity of its theory, and the affirmative 
positivity of its politics" (336). Likewise, it is the dual drive and the tension produced 
between the two that I believe is at the heart of a community of radical, lesbian feminists who 
invoke a politics of location as a discursive performance for reconstructing subjectivity. 
Thus, a politics of location is driven both by a socio-political commitment to difference, 
agency, and empowerment as well as by commitment to belonging, community, and the 
desire to live in loving connection with other women. 
A Politics of Location and the Question of Difference and Community 
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, one of the counter-discursive strategies 
that a politics of location invokes is reflexivity about the entrenched assumptions of a 
feminism that built itself upon a universal notion of "woman's experiences." Rich argues, "If 
we have learned anything in these years of late twentieth-century feminism, it's that that 
'always' blots out what we really need to know: When, where, under what conditions has the 
statement been true?" ("Notes" 214). In challenging the universal subject of hegemonic 
feminism, a politics of location also interrupts the normative subject of rhetoric by calling 
into question the ability of a rhetor to make grand assertions about "Truth," knowledge, and 
the common good. The acute attention to the locatedness of a rhetor that Rich argues for 
leads to a series of questions that reveal the contingent nature of meaning-making: For 
whom am I writing/speaking? Toward what end am I writing/speaking this? Given the 
particularities of my location, what are the limitations of the knowledge I am participating in 
creating? From when am I writing and to whom am I writing this text? Thus, a politics of 
location constructs a different kind of subject of rhetoric: a subject who centers difference 
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rather than universality, maintaining a degree of accountability for the claims to knowledge 
she makes, which are understood as partial, interested, and non-innocent. 
The move to investigate and theorize partial knowledges through a politics of location 
has been critiqued for the potential to devolve into apolitical pluralism or endless relativism. 
Christina Crosby (1992) argues that differences and calls to positionality are deployed in 
feminist standpoint theories (particularly in the work of Nancy Hartsock and Sandra Harding) 
in such a way that binds difference to a kind of "empiricist historicism" which assumes that 
differences in social location and identity are "self-evident, concrete, there, present in history 
and therefore the proper ground of theory" (137 italics in original). Whereas Crosby is 
interested in the way difference leads to a celebratory pluralism that is politically ineffective 
in engaging difference in such a way that moves us into space that can transform the circular 
logic of ontologically-based politics, Sylvia Walby argues that the differences employed in a 
politics of location "exaggerate and reify boundaries between.... social groupings" (191) and 
"endorse existing inequalities" (200). Walby suggests that a "politics of location depends 
upon notions of chasms between different communities and identities... [and] is based on a 
position which reduces knowledge to location and power" (202). As such, she argues that the 
focus on difference and a politics of location is inadequate for a global feminism. In place of 
a politics of location Walby argues that feminists should embrace argumentation based upon 
the scientific method, Habermas's notion of the common good, rational deliberation, and 
"procedures for effective trusted communication" (199). While Walby contends that feminist 
theory must attend to differences, these differences (and the claims to partial knowledge they 
imply) must be transcended because they create chasms between women rather than common 
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ground. Walby suggests that there must be some universal standards by which to measure 
social progress that move beyond friendship and shared values because: 
Working with those who are 'different' is hard if the political form employed 
is based on empathy rather than debate, friendship rather than alliances, 
community rather than association, consensual agreement rather than majority 
voting. Political differences in this context can become highly emotive, 
fragmenting friendships, communities and the political project itself. (198) 
I agree that differences can be construed as walls which divide political subjects based on 
essentialist identities or social locations and can lead to isolation and negative fragmentation 
of political movements. However, this is a limited understanding of how differences and the 
call to partial and interested knowledges operates within political discourses that invoke a 
politics of location. For example, in her examination of the revisionist myth-making of 
Gloria Anzaldûa, Paula Gunn Allen, and Audre Lorde, AnaLouise Keating argues that these 
writers create threshold identities, "which mark transitional, in-between spaces where new 
beginnings and unexpected combinations can occur" (2). She contends that "it is the refusal 
to acknowledge and accept differences—rather than the reverse—that erects what Lorde 
describes as 'the wall that separates / our sameness' (Chosen Poems, 109), and prevents open 
dialogue between differently situated readers" (59). In accord with Keating, I believe the 
problem is not differences themselves, it is the assumption that differences create walls that 
divide rather than potential thresholds, (or third spaces between dangerous dichotomies). 
Differences can be employed to mobilize political subjects into unknown territory. Rather 
than calling for the elision of differences, the end to fragmentation, and the establishment 
common ground, universal standards, or "trusted communication" prior to political 
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engagement, it is possible to perceive that common ground can be discovered in third-spaces 
through engagement with differences. 
Walby also suggests that without a universal, pre-established set of argumentative 
procedures there can be no hope to move outside the constraints of our individual 
differences, and that we are hopelessly bound to "story-telling," which amounts to 
"intellectual defeatism" (190). While I believe that common ground, to a large extent, is not 
produced prior to engagement, I understand that there must be something that drives politics 
beyond the personal or individual. I contend that the "common ground" that motivates a 
politics of location is not a single entity, but a combination of de Lauretis's "erotic drive" and 
"ethical drive." These drives, and the conflicts between them, maintain a generative tension 
(rather than an either/or dichotomy) that uses differences as productive rather than reductive. 
This is the common drive that motivates a politics of location to move beyond the individual. 
Indeed, Rich's articulation of a politics of location does not aim to reduce each speaking 
subject to her differences, instead she insists that "there is no liberation that only knows how 
to say T; there is no collective movement that speaks for each of us all the way through" 
("Notes" 224). The tension is the common ground. The assumption of partial, non-innocent 
knowledge creators at the heart of a politics of location entails more than a narcissistic 
examination of the self because it aims to find meaningful connections between the particular 
and the general through focusing on the tension points between the "I" and the "we." In her 
examination of how essays by June Jordan and Minnie Bruce Pratt offer examples about how 
to work across differences, Mary Eagleton argues that "Locatedness... offers a workable 
strategy for bridging T and 'we' and the multiple differences those figures embrace" (132). 
For example, Audre Lorde consistently names and explores her experiences as a black 
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lesbian, feminist, mother and proceeds to make connections between her life and the lives of 
others. Lorde also calls her reader to do the same: 
And where the words of women are crying to be heard, we must each of us 
recognize our responsibility to seek those words out, to read them and share 
them and examine them in their pertinence to our lives. That we not hide 
behind the mockeries of separations that have been imposed upon us and 
which so often we accept as our own. (43) 
While a politics of location insists on maintaining accountability for the partiality of our 
positions and claims to knowledge, it is also built upon a responsibility for seeking 
connections with others in a larger movement towards collective change. 
As indicated above, Walby suggests that a politics built upon location, partiality, and 
"story-telling" precludes the kind of rigorous knowledge creation that occurs through 
reasoned debate and communication "done in good faith, between people equally situated 
with regard to relevant resources" (193). (In many ways, this is a call to a normative subject 
of rhetoric, which brackets out differences in the name of creating trust, common ground, and 
communication through good faith.) I disagree with Walby's logic (that equality and 
commonality precede rigorous engagement and the production of knowledge) and as I 
illustrate below, a politics of location reveals a reversal of the conditions which create 
community and knowledge. First, there is a rigorousness to a politics of location because 
subjects who invoke this discursive strategy begin with the recognition that subjects are not 
"equally situated" which, coupled with the contingent and partial nature of knowledge-
making, reveals that struggle over language, naming, and representation are central to politics 
of location. This is similar to Haraway's theory of cyborg feminism in which she suggests 
72 
that writing is the preeminent technology of cyborgs because it is infused with a "struggle for 
language and [a] struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates 
all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism" {Simians 176). Similarly, a 
politics of location assumes that perfect communication through simple transmission of 
knowledge (or narration of experience) is not possible because reality is not presumed to be 
transparent or evident prior to communication. Instead, meaning is arrived at through a 
rhetor's struggle with language and with contradictory subject positions—both how she has 
been represented across social locations and how she might choose to re-present herself. As 
well, meaning is arrived at through rhetors' struggle with one another within feminist 
counterpublic exchanges. 
For example, in chapter five I show how Minnie Bruce Pratt invokes a politics of 
location in her essay "Identity: Skin Blood Heart" in which she confronts and deconstructs 
racism and anti-Semitism. Pratt's narrative is marked by internal struggle to become aware 
of how her inherited assumptions about safe space, home, and community are built upon a 
material history of "places secured by omission, exclusions, or violence" (26) as well as an 
external struggle with other women to realize a different kind of community. Pratt's narrative 
is not a simple or linear movement from oppression to freedom, from unconscious living to 
mindful engagement. Instead it is a narrative in which the creation of a more just world is 
premised upon daily struggle: "I have learned that.. .the process of change is long, and since 
the unjust world is duplicated again every day, in large and small, so I must try to recreate, 
every day, a new self striving for a new just world" (46). Pratt proceeds to explore how she 
recreates her self in shifting social contexts, how she continues to engage with the struggle to 
seek social change, and how she seeks new ways of being that allow her to live in loving 
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connection with other women. Chandra Mohanty and Biddy Martin have suggested that 
Pratt's narrative helps open a dialogue about how feminists might conceive of home 
differently. They challenge the assumption that there are "homes" within feminism which 
neatly align with sexual, racial, or ethnic identities and they examine Pratt's essay as an 
example of a white feminist theorizing her experiences on "the edge," exposing the "illusory 
coherence" of her social positions. They suggests that Pratt's narrative reveals how 
"Community. ..is the product of work, of struggle; it is inherently unstable, contextual; it has 
to be constantly reevaluated in relation to critical political priorities; and it is the product of 
interpretation, interpretation based on an attention to history, to the concrete, to what 
Foucault has called subjugated knowledges" (307-08). 
I contend that within the framework of a politics of location, community (and trust 
and faith) become products of a rigorous struggle over representation, not a priori conditions 
for effective communication. The centering of struggle is a significant element of a radical, 
lesbian feminist counterpublic that maintains hope for interrupting practices of domination 
because one of the preeminent means of reproducing oppression is through the elision of 
conflict or difference. To repeat Nancy Fraser's claim, counter-publics provide spaces for 
"subordinated social groups [to] invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (123). Struggle and 
conflict are articulated within a politics of location as central interests and needs of a lesbian 
feminist counterpublic in the formulation of "agitational activities" (Fraser 124), which can 
lead to new conceptualizations of community. Thus an emphasis on conflict challenges 
dominant discursive practices built upon the assumption that differences (either in the form 
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of social status or competing publics) should be bracketed out of spaces of public 
deliberation. 
A Politics of Location and the Question of "Story-Telling" and Experience 
In her call to move beyond the fragmentation, partiality, and dis-unity of a politics of 
location, Walby argues that a politics of location has led to the conclusion that "all we can 
aspire to is 'story-telling'" (190) and further, that "Myth, fiction, ethics, and aesthetics are a 
very weak basis for feminist knowledge claims" (193). However, I believe this is a reductive 
understanding of how experience is invoked by writers who use this strategy. The use of 
experiential narratives and story-telling through politics of location constitutes a significant 
interruption of the normative subject of rhetoric by validating that which has been 
marginalized into the realm of the "private sphere" or "special interests." Furthermore, re­
claiming the validity of exploring and interrogating experience can lead to the production of 
new knowledges and subjectivities. For instance, Mohanty contends that writing and reading 
narratives have always been a significant element of third-space feminism because they 
involved rewriting and remembering history, which: 
is significant not merely as corrective to the gaps, erasures, and 
misunderstandings of hegemonic masculinist history, but because the very 
practice of remembering and rewriting leads to the formation of politicized 
consciousness and self-identity. Writing often becomes the context through 
which new political identities are forged. It becomes a space for struggle and 
contestation about reality itself. If the everyday world is not transparent and 
its relations of rule, its organizations and institutional frameworks, work to 
obscure and make invisible inherent hierarchies of power (Smith 1987), it 
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becomes imperative that we rethink, remember, and utilize our lived relations 
as basis of knowledge. ("Cartographies" 34) 
Mohanty qualifies that third-world women's narratives are not "evidence of decentering 
hegemonic histories and subjectivities"(34) in themselves. Instead, it is the combination of 
how these experiences are written, read, and theorized that leads to the disruption of 
hegemony. Of course, calls to experience and new narratives of women's lives have been 
problematized by poststructuralist feminists because they often reify essentialist notions of 
subjectivity. For example, Joan Scott suggests that experience too often is used as a form of 
foundational evidence to make knowledge-claims in such a way that positions individuals 
(and knowledge) as extant prior to experience, rather than positioning subjects (and 
knowledge) as constituted through experience. While making visible the experiences of 
subordinated social groups serves an important function in documenting lives which have 
been occluded, Scott argues it does not allow for an interrogation of : 
the constructed nature of experience, about how subjects are constituted as 
different in the first place, [questions] about how one's vision is 
structured—about language (or discourse) and history—are left aside. The 
evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the fact of difference, 
rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, 
how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world. 
(25) 
Scott recommends that we resist "naturalizing 'experience' through a belief in the unmediated 
relationship between words and things," (36) and instead, focus on experience as a process 
through which identity and knowledge come into being. 
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I contend that this is precisely how narratives of experience are used in the work of 
writers who invoke a politics of location. Experience is not invoked simply as a corrective to 
the historical omission of particular women's lives, rather the focal point of the experiences 
invoked through a politics of location is a desire to understand, deconstruct, and reconstruct 
lived relations between subjects. To use Haraway's language, experience and the politics of 
representation are positioned as non-innocent through a politics of location: 
Women do not find 'experience' ready to hand any more than they/we find 
'nature' or the 'body' preformed, always innocent and waiting outside the 
violations of language and culture. Just as nature is one of culture's most 
startling and non-innocent products, so is experience one of the least innocent, 
least self-evident aspects of historical, embodied movement. (Simians 109) 
A politics of location does not naturalize experience to suggest that it provides access to a 
pre-discursive reality, nor is experience forwarded as the "truth" of women's lives. The 
invocation of experience is part of a larger process of collective struggle for the 
reconstruction of new possibilities for alternative subjectivities. 
As an example of how the narration of experience is driven by a critical 
understanding that experience and subjectivity are culturally mediated through collective 
struggle I return to Pratt's essay. As indicated above, Pratt narrates how she has come into a 
greater consciousness about racism and anti-Semitism and the degree to which her 
conceptions of home and community have been constructed through her experiences. One of 
the primary events that she narrates is the moment her husband (in collusion with her mother) 
took her children after she came out as a lesbian. Pratt describes this experience as 
ultimately breaking the shell of privilege in which she had lived, moving her into political 
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work for social justice. However, she suggests that her initial response to the experience of 
losing her children reified her subject position as a white Southern woman who had come to 
expect a certain degree of protection and safety in the world. She writes, "I also carried away 
the conviction that I had been thrust out into a place of terrible loss by laws laid down by 
men.. .1 felt that no one had sustained such a loss before. And I did not yet understand that to 
come to a place of greater liberation, I had to risk old safeties. Instead, I felt that I had no 
place, that, as I moved through my days, I was falling through space" (27). After this event, 
Pratt involved herself with NOW and searched for a new place she could call home. 
However, she explains how her political efforts and notions of safety were still deeply 
infused with racism and anti-Semitism. A second experience, years later, moves Pratt into 
greater consciousness of the limitations of her sense of self and knowledge. A group of 
Klansman and Nazis killed five anti-Klan demonstrators within 50 miles of her home. She 
narrates how she finds herself politically aligned with the demonstrators and yet, when a wife 
of one the Klansman stated in a newspaper report that she was surprised and shocked, Pratt 
realizes that she, too, was shocked that such events could happen in 1979. Thus, she begins a 
life-long process of questioning the limitations of her experience and the ignorance of "what 
had been or was being done in [her] name" (34). It is this process of critically interrogating 
her family history, her childhood experiences, and her experiences with NOW that moves her 
to a question how her subject position as a white, Southern woman has shaped her sense of 
self, safety, justice, and community: 
I groped toward an understanding of injustice done to others, injustice done 
outside my narrow circle of being, and to folks not like me, I began to grasp, 
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through my own experiences, something of what that injustice might be, 
began to feel the extent of pain, anger, desire for change. 
But I did not feel that my new understanding simply moved me into a place 
where I joined others to struggle with them against common injustices. 
Because / was implicated in the doing of some of these injustices, and I held 
myself, and my people, responsible, what my expanded understanding meant 
was that I felt in a struggle with myself, against myself. This breaking 
through did not feel like liberation but like destruction. (35-36) 
Pratt's narration of these crucial experiences in her life do not provide her access to a pre-
linguistic reality nor do they position her identity prior to experience. Instead, experience is 
invoked as a means of "exploring how difference is established, how it operates, how and in 
what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world" (Scott 25). Rhetors who use a 
politics of location maintain a reflective, non-innocent stance towards experience, 
questioning how their locations might impose limitations on the meanings they ascribe to 
experiences and social identities, with the hope of, in Pratt's words, moving beyond the 
"narrow circle of self' in a continual process of re-writing themselves. 
I contend that the re-writing of subjectivity that can occur through narratives such as 
Pratt's do not provide a "weak basis for feminist knowledge claims" (Walby 190). Walby 
equates the localization of knowledge with absolute relativism, which Haraway suggests: 
is a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally. The 
'equality' of positioning is a denial of responsibility and critical enquiry. 
Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of 
objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial 
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perspective; both make it impossible to see well. Relativism and totalization 
are both 'god-tricks' promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally 
and fully. (Simians 191) 
I believe that the emphasis on contextualized narratives of women's lives through the 
invocation of a politics of location leads to a stronger base for feminism because, as Susan 
Bordo suggests, representing "reality" in particular ways is "never innocent. We always 'see' 
from points of view that are invested with our social, political, and personal interests, 
inescapably -centric in one way or another, even in the desire to do justice to heterogeneity" 
(223). Pratt's narrative tells the story of coming to realize how her conceptions of home and 
community reveal the contingent, partial, and interested nature of our knowledges, not the 
indeterminacy of knowledge. 
Additionally, the non-innocent story-telling moves the rhetor into a space of 
accountability in which she takes responsibility for the ways in which time, space, and 
material history inform a speaking subject's statements of truth. That is, locating the 
space/time/history from which one speaks marks an effort to take responsibility for the ways 
that those locations inform meaning-making processes and the knowledges that are born of 
those processes. As Rich has described it, a politics of location is born of a desire to reveal 
particularities: 
When I write 'the body,' I see nothing in particular. To write 'my body,' 
plunges me into lived experience, particularity: I see scars, disfigurements, 
discolorations, damages, losses, as well as what pleases me. Bones well 
nourished from the placenta, the teeth of a middle-class person seen by the 
dentist twice a year from childhood. White skin, marked and scarred by three 
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pregnancies, an elected sterilization, progressive arthritis, four joint 
operations, calcium deposits, no rapes, no abortions, long hours at a 
typewriter—my own, not in a typing pool-and so forth. To say 'the body' lifts 
me away from what has given me a primary perspective. To say 'my body' 
reduces the temptation to grandiose assertions. ("Notes" 215) 
As indicated above, a politics of location reverses a Habermasian logic for creating the 
conditions of equitable public engagement. That is, greater equity among a diversity of 
women is the motive and goal of a politics of location; however, in order to reach greater 
equity, differences in values, histories, subject positions, and meaning-making processes 
must be foregrounded so that structures of stratification can be interrupted and heterogeneity 
can be embraced. Partiality and interestedness are the locus for constructing new 
knowledges and examining normative assumptions and representations of women's lived 
experiences, which cannot occur if we presume universality prior to engagement with the 
particular. Thus, writers who engage in a politics of location begin with the assumption that 
there is no universal women's experience to be narrated, nor is there one universal lesbian 
experience or subjectivity to be represented. For example, Audre Lorde, Minnie Bruce Pratt, 
Cherrie Moraga, and Dorothy Allison have all constructed, to use Moraga's terminology, 
"portraits of a queer motherhood." However, these writers do not presume a "totalizing" 
experience of lesbian motherhood. Their narratives point out both intersections and 
differences in experiences as lesbian women raising children with the common hope of 
creating and sharing the knowledges constructed from similar and different social positions 
across sexuality, race, class, and ethnicity. Audre Lorde frames her essay about raising a son 
in this way: 
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I have no golden message about the raising of sons for other lesbian mothers, 
no secret to transpose your questions into certain light. I have my own ways 
of rewording those same questions, hoping we will all come to speak those 
questions and pieces of our lives we need to share. We are women making 
contact within ourselves and with each other across the restrictions of a 
printed page, bent upon the use of our own/one another's knowledges. (Sister 
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A politics of location focuses on how women are differently positioned in the world, and 
hence, experience the world differently. Thus, politics of location is not driven by pre-
established universal assumptions of women's experiences nor by jouissance, or the endless 
play of difference, rather, it is motivated by conceptualization of non-innocent subjects who 
construct knowledge in the process of searching for connections with others in a process of 
change. Rich writes, "The movement for change is a changing movement, changing itself, 
demasculinizing itself, de-Westernizing itself, becoming a critical mass that is saying in so 
many different voices, languages, gestures, actions: It must change; we ourselves can 
change if ("Notes" 225 italics in original). In the process of transformation, a politics of 
location enables rhetorical agency through signification and resignification. Agency is not 
something that is held; rather it is discovered through the practice of a politics of location, 
through processes of change and re-creation. Speaking subjectivities into be-ing, then, is a 
radical rhetorical and political move that refuses to fix or stabilize identities or knowledges in 
a finalized and totalizing manner; it situates subjectivities and knowledge, and hence agency, 
as always in processes of coming into be-ing, thus interrupting the centered, fully-cognizant, 
unified subject of rhetoric. 
82 
A Politics of Location, Differential Consciousness, and the Hermeneutics of Love 
I believe that narrating experiences and representing women's lives through a politics 
of location, then, provides a launching point for differential consciousness, for the author as 
well as the audience. Sandoval argues that "differential consciousness and social movement 
[are] 'mobile,' 'flexible,' 'diasporic,' 'schizophrenic,' 'nomad[ic],' but it must be realized that 
these mobilities align around a field of force (aside from motion itself) that drives, inspires, 
and focuses them" (82). In a like manner, even though differences are centered through a 
politics of location, radical, lesbian feminists who invoke this rhetorical strategy are driven 
by the search for affinity with others through coalition politics. That is, a politics of location 
was formulated and then practiced within the context of a radical, lesbian feminist 
community, a community built upon a desire and hope to live (and love) in greater 
connection with other human beings in non-oppressive ways. Much of this hope is built 
upon the assumption that in using a politics of location to tell different narratives a more 
complex and complicated portrait of women's experiences could be woven. The motivation 
to discover alliances through writing new narratives was not motivated by individualism or 
the desire to produce an over-arching narrative of women's experiences that would close 
down on some truth: 
Feminist discourse and anti-colonial discourse are engaged in this very subtle 
and delicate effort to build connections and affinities, and not to produce one's 
own or another's experience as a resource for a closed narrative. These are 
difficult issues, and 'we' fail frequently. It is easy to find feminist, anti-racist, 
and anti-colonial discourses reproducing others and selves as resources for 
closed narratives, not knowing how to build affinities, knowing instead how to 
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build oppositions. But 'our' writing is also full of hope that we will learn how 
to structure affinities instead identities. (Haraway, Simians 113) 
As Lorde indicates, making connections through "the use of our own/one another's 
knowledges" motivates women who use a politics of location to create narratives of 
difference. This, I contend, is driven by Sandoval's hermeneutics of love. Sandoval draws 
on the later work of Foucault to suggest that social movement and differential consciousness 
occur through desire, which is: 
capable of driving the body and the will beyond their limits. Desire permeates 
being of all kinds... being-in-resistance as well as being-in-domination. 
Indeed, it is desire.. .that drives, focuses, and permeates all human activity. 
What is required, then is to reinforce an experiences and technology of desire-
in-resistance that can permit oppositional actors to move—as Audre Lorde 
puts it—'erotically' through power. (165) 
Prophetic love is that which exists between the self/other; it is a concept that resists the 
fixedness and hierarchy of an either/or dichotomy. Drawing on Barthes's critique of a 
Western ethic that drives the narrative of "falling in love," Sandoval explains prophetic love: 
Barthes's example: you love someone, and "either you have hope, and then 
you act, or else you have none, in which case you renounce. This is the 
discourse of the so-called 'healthy-subject'" who lives in the dominant: 
"either/or." But there is a third option, another approach to loving. This other 
course of action ensues when the loving subject instead tries to "slip between 
the two members" of the either/or alternative by saying... "I stubbornly 
choose not to choose; I choose drifting: I continue" (62, emphasis hers). This 
"drifting" is the movement of meanings that will not be governed; it is the 
intractable itself as it permeates through, in, and outside of power. (142) 
In the above example from Lorde, the hyphenation between "our own/one another's 
knowledge" exemplifies the way in which desire is unmoored from a fixed dichotomy and 
put in motion. Sandoval argues that within prophetic love "subjectivity becomes freed from 
ideology as it ties and binds reality. Prophetic love undoes the 'one' that gathers the 
narrative, the couple, the race, into a singularity. Instead, prophetic love gathers up the 
mezcla, the mixture that lives through differential movement between possibilities of being" 
(170). Returning to Pratt's narrative as an example how prophetic love motivates a politics of 
location, it is desire for connection with others that drives Pratt to move outside of herself 
into a space of shifting subjectivity. Her motive for confronting the injustices of racism and 
Anti-Semitism and deconstructing how her sense of self is built upon these systems of 
domination is driven by a desire "to get a little closer to the longed-for but unrealized world" 
(13) and by the desire "to speak from my heart, out of need, as a woman who loves other 
women passionately, and wants us to be able to be together as friends in this unjust world" 
(15). She goes on to suggest that the separation from others (a separation both self- and 
culturally/historically-imposed) causes her intense pain, a pain that can both debilitate and 
mobilize: "Sometimes this pain feels only like despair: yet I have felt it also to be another 
kind of pain, where the need to be with other women can be the breaking through the shell 
around me, painful, but a coming through into a new place" (19). Love operates in Pratt's 
essay, in Sandoval's words, as a "'punctum,' that which breaks through social narratives to 
permit a bleeding, meanings unanchored and moving away from their traditional moorings— 
in what, Barthes writes, brings about a 'gentle hemorrhage' of being (12)" (141). Throughout 
her essay, Pratt's vision of community is elusive and drifting as she unpacks the complex 
relationship between her inherited subject-position and her conception of home, but her 
desire to live in loving connection with others in ways that do not reproduce separation and 
domination allows her to "gather up the mezcla" and pushes her into differential 
consciousness. 
As Sandoval indicates in her theory of oppositional consciousness, hope and 
imagination are central to poststructural rhetorical and political efforts to discover agentive 
opportunities and speak subjectivities in be-ing because they mark a move away from the 
potential for nihilism and paralysis that have resulted from some interpretations of the subject 
as "always already" interpellated. Ultimately, politics of location suggests a degree of 
agency in the ability to envision that which has not been. As a rhetorical and political move 
that engages in processes of be-coming, a politics of location is rooted in hope and vision for 
creating a better world, one built on a concept of more egalitarian relationships rather than 
one built upon equality. The concept of equality has too often meant access to structures and 
positions of privilege that are built upon structures of domination. Equally important, the 
notion of equality often assumes that subjects share similar histories and speaking locations. 
Hence, an egalitarian approach must be distinguished from an approach based on equality 
because egalitarianism does not have the homogenizing and erasing effects of equality, it 
does not assume that all "subjects" arrive at social spaces that have (purportedly) been made 
"accessible" with the similar histories, cultures, or values. A politics of location calls into 
question the concept of equality because it does not assume that the locations from which 
subjects speak are equal. In locating the speaking subject in time/space/history, it mobilizes 
us to ask such questions as: Equal within what structures? Equal to whom? Moving past 
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mere equality and into spaces which call for egalitarian relationships, a politics of location 
works to envision what society and human relationships might look like without domination 
by understanding the limitations of the partial, interested, and non-innocent nature of the 
struggle over representation. There is no transcendental position from which to speak; thus 
the possibilities for transformation must be realized through a radical contextualization of 
speaking subjects and the understanding that "location forces and enables specific modes of 
reading and knowing the dominant" (Mohanty, "Feminist Encounters" 89). With these 
assumptions in place, the potential for social change and political agency envisioned through 
a politics a location depends upon continued engagement within mobile webs of power. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Analytical Framework: Cognitive Mapping, Semiotics and Refusal of the Self 
In this chapter I briefly return to Chela Sandoval's work to discuss the relationship 
between differential cognitive mapping and semiotics to a politics of location. These two 
skills of the oppressed provide the analytic framework for what I believe writers were doing 
as they invoked a politics of location to re-write their subjectivities. I then use Foucault's 
conceptualization of a "refusal of the self' to examine how differently positioned subjects 
interrogate identity categories. Foucault's concept operates as a framework for the two 
general categories I use in this project in chapters four and five: outsiders/within and 
insiders/without. 
As indicated in chapter one, Sandoval's theory exists in the tension points between 
modernist and postmodernist theories. Thus, she opposes any move towards "theoretical 
purity"—which suggests that we must choose between these theories and their 
conceptualizations of the subject and social action. She argues that marginalized subjects 
(these include mestiza, U.S. feminists of color, queer, or anticolonial subjects) have 
constructed ways of surviving and enacting social change through a differential 
consciousness. This differential consciousness ushers in the "methodology of the 
oppressed," which creates a space in the intersections of modernism and postmodernism. 
Sandoval argues that this is a space for imagining "alternative realities [with] novel means of 
communication, creativity, productivity, mobility, and a different sense of'control'" (136). 
In her discussion of differential consciousness, Sandoval extends the work of two of 
the prominent poststructuralist scholars: Roland Barthes and Fredrick Jameson, to argue that 
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the preeminent skills of the oppressed rely on semiotics (Barthes) and cognitive mapping, a 
situational representation on the part of an individual to the larger social totality (Jameson). 
As indicated in chapter one, Sandoval argues that Barthes' theory of semiotics is limited 
because he could not put semiotics in conversation with theories of resistance produced by 
the oppressed. This leads to a kind of paralysis in which "the individual practitioner can only 
act alone, isolated, and in despair" (113). Similarly, Jameson's interrogation of the 
"schizophrenic" effects of postmodernism and late capitalism on the first-world citizen-
subject has occluded a discussion of the survival skills of "the historically decentered citizen-
subject: the colonized, the outsider, the queer, the subaltern, the marginalized" (27). 
Sandoval argues that while Jameson forwards cognitive mapping as an attempt to "design an 
original and hopeful activity" (19) for citizen-subjects to realize their relationship to the 
fragmenting and shifting terrain of a postmodern world, his work falls into paralyzing despair 
because it requires "outmoded forms of consciousness and ideology in order to function" 
(30). More specifically, she argues that his version of cognitive mapping was limited 
because it "can only be accomplished in Althusser's terms, where the citizen-subject attempts 
to represent in some realistic, believable, cohesive, meaningful way its 'imaginary 
relationship' to its 'real conditions of existence,' an operation that is, however, hopelessly 
interrupted by postmodernism's engulfing cultural processes" (italics in original 30-31). 
Sandoval challenges the dichotomy created by Jameson that "sets a modernist/historicist 
view of an isolated but 'real' subject now under erasure against a poststructuralist/ 
postmodernist view that the subject never existed in the first place" by suggesting that 
"'fragmentation' is neither an experience nor a theoretical experience peculiar to the 
poststructuralist or postmodern moment" (33). She contends that the splitting of the subject 
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is a condition that the colonized "were invited to survive under modernist and previous eras, 
if survival were a choice" (33). This premise leads Sandoval to argue that the mutations in 
culture, which Jameson believed gave the previously centered subject "no place" from which 
to stand, provide the very condition that makes new forms of consciousness and identity 
available to both oppressors and oppressed (37). Positioning consciousness, identity, and 
ideology as masquerade rather than as fixed "realities," Sandoval reverses Althusser's logic, 
suggesting a "differential cognitive mapping" in which: 
it is the citizen-subject who interpellates, who calls up ideology, as opposed to 
Althusser's formulation, in which it is "ideology that interpellates the subject." 
To deploy a differential oppositional consciousness, one can depend on no 
(traditional) mode of belief in one's own subject position or ideology; 
nevertheless, such positions and beliefs are called up and used in order to 
constitute whatever forms of subjectivity are necessary to act in an also (now 
obviously) constituted social world. (31) 
Differential cognitive mapping provides the hope that Sandoval finds, ultimately, absent in 
Jameson's formulation because it is based on a negotiation, confrontation, and movement 
between ideological lines rather than a "break through the net of ideological lines" (19). 
Sandoval then places Jameson's and Barthes's work in conversation with one another 
to argue that differential cognitive mapping (also called cultural mapping) coupled with 
semiotics are two of the necessary skills in developing an oppositional consciousness: 
Cultural mapping depends on its practitioner's continuing and transformative 
relationship to the social totality. Readings of this shifting totality will 
determine the interventions—the tactics, ideologies, and discourses that the 
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practitioner chooses in order to pursue a greater good, beginning with the 
citizen-subject's own survival. Reading signs to determine power relations is 
its principal technique, the readings obtained are the indications that guide all 
movement. This differential form of oppositional consciousness is a field 
with no specific content until such readings are produced. Within this zone, 
the subject maps and remaps its positions along mobile and alternative 
trajectories. (30) 
Within her theory of semiotics and differential cognitive mapping, there is an understanding 
that subject positions are not "real," in the positivist understanding of the word, yet they are 
potentially meaningful in the process of calling up identity markers and critically 
interrogating them to create differential consciousness. This is not a consciousness that 
stands at a critical distance outside of the social totality, but a consciousness that travels and 
is marked by a "mobile, flexible, diasporic force that migrates between contending 
ideological systems" (30). Sandoval shows that through the overlap of semiotics and cultural 
mapping (see Figure 1), five technologies of the oppressed are revealed that allow for 
agentive opportunities to intercede in cultures of domination: "sign reading; deconstruction 
and reconstruction of signs; an ethical commitment to justice; and differential movement that 
keeps all aspects of being in motion and mutation" (130). She suggests that semiotic 
elements (reading, deconstructing, and reconstructing signs) "comprises an 'archaeological' 
dig through meaning and consciousness that can return meaning production to 'its healthy' 
state: that of the arbitrariness of the sign and the resulting mobility that keeps history, 
language, meaning, and spirit alive" (104). When taken together, five technologies are 
"techniques for moving energy" (82); thus the methodology of the oppressed is a means of 
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addressing the paralysis of some poststructural theories that call into question the potential 
for resistance and social change within the shifting terrain of a postmodern world. 
5 Technologies of the Oppressed 
CulturahMapping Semiotics Sign Reading 
Deconstruction 
Reconstruction 
Differential Movement that enables 
a flexible response to shifting power 
dynamics (this technology enables 
the first three to occur) 
Ethical commitment to social 
justice with a vision of egalitarian 
redistribution of power (this 
technology "drives" the first four) 
Figure 1 : Sandoval's five technologies of the oppressed revealed through the intersection of 
semiotics and cultural mapping. 
As indicated above, reading signs to identify power relations and mapping social 
positioning provide the analytic framework to understand what writers were doing through a 
politics of location. Following the metaphor of an archeological dig, a politics of location 
involves an investigation and excavation of the meanings embedded within social identities, 
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which then enables discursive agency to re-construct a differential form of subjectivity, a 
subjectivity not based on stratified power relations. For example, in "Eye to Eye," Audre 
Lorde engages in mapping and sign reading to identify the ways in which black women have 
formed their identities in relation to one another and in relation to the larger culture. 
Although in much of her work Lorde reclaims anger as a positive emotion, in this essay 
Lorde reads the sign of anger between black women in a different light. She asks, "why does 
that anger unleash itself most tellingly against another Black woman at the least excuse? 
Why do I judge her in a more critical light than any other, becoming enraged when she does 
not measure up?" (145). Reading the signs of what it means to be a black woman in relation 
to a larger social totality, Lorde writes, "We are Black women born into a society of 
entrenched loathing and contempt for whatever is Black and female" (151). She then 
deconstructs these relations by tracing the historical and cultural forces that inform black 
women's identities and sense of self. For example, she locates the ways in which she, as a 
black woman, has had to survive in the face of much social hatred and hostility directed at 
her as black woman: 
Every Black woman in america has survived several lifetimes of hatred, where 
even in the candy store cases of our childhood, little brown niggerbaby 
candies testified against us. We survived the wind-driven spittle on our child's 
hope and pink flesh-colored bandaids, attempt rapes on rooftops and the 
prodding fingers of the super's boy, seeing our girlfriends blown to bits in 
Sunday School, and we absorbed that loathing as a natural state. (156) 
Next, Lorde moves to deconstruct how the contempt for what is black and female bleeds into 
black women's reactions to one another: "we do not love ourselves, therefore we cannot love 
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each other. Because we see in each other's face our own face, the face we never stopped 
wanting. Because we survived and survival breeds desire for more self. A face we never 
stopping wanting at the same time as we try to obliterate it" (155). In her deconstruction, she 
reveals how the anger and mistrust between black women is mis-directed, that is, anger is 
internalized rather than projected outward towards a society that loathes what is black and 
female. 
In reading and deconstructing the signs of anger and mistrust between black women, 
Lorde clears a space for the reconstruction of her inter subjectivity with black women: "If we 
can learn to give ourselves the recognition and acceptance that we have come to expect only 
from our mommas, Black women will be able to see each other much more clearly and deal 
with each other much more directly" (159). In her reconstruction, Lorde maintains a place 
for the unknown of what might become of black women's subjectivities, "We must recognize 
and nurture the creative parts of each other without always understanding what will be 
created" (173). However, she does goes on to detail what it might look like for black women 
to resist the internalized loathing taught in a racist/sexist culture by reclaiming an ancient 
history of black women bonding and offering mutual support and envisioning what that kind 
of trust might look like through differential movement. This differential movement re­
deploys anger to "demolish the past" (152) and employs love to envision a different future: 
We can learn to mother ourselves.. .We will begin to see each other as we dare 
to begin to see ourselves; we will begin to see ourselves as we begin to see 
each other; without aggrandizement or dismissal or recriminations, but with 
patience and understanding for when we do not quite make it, and recognition 
and appreciation for when we do. (173) 
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Lorde invokes a politics of location to excavate the meaning of relations between black 
women in a hopeful effort to reconstruct intersubjectivity. 
I believe mapping and sign reading are useful analytical frames for understanding 
what writers are doing when engaging in a politics of location as a rhetorical strategy for re­
writing subjectivity. In particular, mapping provides an important metaphor for 
understanding a politics of location as a rhetorical strategy that is different from identity 
politics because maps are non-essential constructs, the border and boundaries of which are 
highly contested artifices that can be shifted, erased, or realigned—and these "realignments" 
have everything to do with power, either as an exercise of oppression or resistance. Thus, 
maps are "non-real" entities, yet entities which have significant meanings as representations. 
For example, in her essay, "The Use of Anger: Women Responding to Racism" Lorde's 
larger project is to reclaim the positive force of black women's anger. Thus she reads the 
sign of anger and maps its relationship differently than she does in "Eye to Eye: Black 
Women, Hatred, and Anger" (as discussed above). Thus mapping through a politics of 
location reveals how the meaning ascribed to her identity and emotions as a black woman is 
relational and situational. Mapping one's various identity positions also avoids "tootsie roll 
metaphysics" or "pop-bead metaphysics," which Elizabeth Spelman suggests is a dangerous 
pitfall of some forms of identity politics: 
This is a version of personal identity we might call tootsie roll metaphysics: 
each part of my identity is separable from every other part, and the 
significance of each part is unaffected by the other parts. On this view of 
personal identity (which might also be called pop-bead metaphysics), my 
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being a woman means the same whether I am white or black, rich or poor, 
French or Jamaican, Jewish or Muslim. (136) 
Pop-bead metaphysics implies that each of our identity positions is detachable from the 
others like beads on a necklace, and thus can be added and removed at will. Mapping 
identities, on the other hand, foregrounds the interlocking relationships between and among 
identity positions—no part can be understood in separation from the whole. Mapping is not a 
linear string or a set of simple binary opressor/oppressed relations, but a complex matrix of 
"relationality," to borrow Chandra Talpade Mohanty's word ("Cartographies" 13). 
Sign reading as an archaeological dig also helps frame a politics of location as 
something more than a mere statement of identity positions. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, stating one's position is a rhetorical strategy often used to introduce a piece of 
writing (for example, "I am a white working class lesbian"). However, this is not what I 
deem a politics of location because the identity markers are usually proclaimed as if they are 
self-evident and "real." Further, this strategy is problematic because the author typically 
proceeds with her argument or narrative, leaving unquestioned how those social locations 
inform and limit the claims she articulates in the remainder of the article or essay. A politics 
of location is a more complex discursive strategy than a mere listing of identity positions, 
because while identity positions are called up as a tactic, there is no assumption that the 
meanings of the identities are self-evident, nor is it assumed that those who claim similar 
identities are politically aligned. For example, in "Eye to Eye," Lorde begins with the 
premise that "connections between Black women are not automatic by virtue of our 
similarities and the possibilities of genuine communication between us are not easily 
achieve" (153)—which moves away from identity politics which assumes identification 
through a shared social location. Yet, she calls up this identity position to deconstruct the 
cultural and historical forces which have shaped black women's sense of self and then 
reconstruct a more life-affirming inter subjectivity between black women. 
Sign reading and mapping, then, reveal that a politics of location is an unearthing of 
the subject positions into which women have been interpellated and a critical interrogation of 
how those subject positions inform relationships with other subjects. Writers who used a 
politics of location call up identity markers to analyze the "practical rules and regulations" (to 
use Susan Bordo's language) which construct women's subjectivities and cultural mapping in 
order to understand the inter-relationships between and among social identities. The goal of 
a politics of location is the assertion of discursive agency through resignification which can 
lead to intersubjectivity based on an ethical commitment to justice and more egalitarian 
relations. 
Refusal of the Self 
As indicated above, a politics of location is not an effort to affirm a "true" self at the 
core of one's being; it is an effort to locate subject positions and excavate the meaning 
embedded in particular socio-cultural positions, which can potentially create spaces for 
different ways of being, ways of engaging with others that are not grounded in relations of 
domination and subordination. In reading signs and mapping identities through a politics of 
location, the radical, lesbian feminists whose work I analyze in this project engage in a form 
of what Michel Foucault calls a "refusal of the self' in his later work on ethics and care of the 
self. In this work, Foucault focuses on "the models proposed for setting up and developing 
relationships with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the 
decipherment of the self by oneself, for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish with 
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oneself as object" (The Use of Pleasure 29). Care of the self does not mean simply being 
interested in oneself, nor does it mean having a certain tendency to self-attachment or self-
fascination" (243). Care of the self involves understanding that we constitute ourselves 
through real practices; thus Foucault does not advocate a "discovery of the self," he suggests 
studying practices which bring into being our subjectivities. In such analysis, then, is the 
potential to refuse what we are and begin to promote new forms of subjectivity. Sandoval 
suggests that resistance (the third term often left out of the binary between subordination or 
domination) can be located in a "refusal of the self," a refusal of unreflexive identification 
with hegemonic representations of various subject positions in order to create agentive 
opportunities for the reconstruction of subjectivities (160). Mapping and semiotics are 
tactics that enable a dis-identification with hegemonic representations of the self. 
However, in keeping with the assumption that all subjects are not equally positioned, 
I don't believe dis-identification operates similarly across different contexts because women's 
lives are at stake in incredibly different and disproportionate ways. I use the concept "refusal 
of the self to call attention to the fact that sign reading and mapping through a politics of 
location operates differently based on one's position relative to normative subjectivity, a 
position that shifts with different spatio-temporal contexts. Those who identify with a 
subordinated position initially move in a positive direction, to positively reclaim a subjugated 
identity; those who identify with a dominant position initially move in a negative direction, 
to deconstruct unreflected-upon privileges and prejudices embedded in dominant identity 
positions. Of course, this differential approach to understanding how a refusal of the self is 
related to a politics of location becomes terribly complicated with the understanding that 
most subjects occupy positions of both oppressed and oppressor. As a method, it would 
seem to require precisely the kind of pop-bead metaphysics that I have argued is antithetical 
to the ways in which Sandoval conceptualizes identities through the technologies of sign 
reading and differential cognitive mapping. However, I conceive of a refusal of the self not 
as a method, per se; rather, it is a conceptual tool with which to think about how sign reading 
and mapping one's identities operates differently depending on one's subject position. That 
is, this concept begins with the assumption that although equity may be one of the goals of 
engaging in a feminist rhetorical strategy, not all subjects arrive on "equal" or similar ground. 
To reiterate Nancy Hartsock's words, "Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us 
who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather 
than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic?" 
("Foucault on Power" 163). Thus, to suggest that those subjects who historically have been 
denied the right to define themselves for themselves engage in a "refusal of the self' in the 
same manner as those subjects who have not been denied this right would be at best, 
misleading, and at worst a reification of an oppressive framework that collapses all subjects 
into a universalized position. 
Ann Ferguson theorizes a similar process in her work on bridge identities. She argues 
that those with "target identities" (oppressed groups) must engage in a different process of 
reconstituting their identities than those who wish to be allies with the "target" group 
(oppressive groups) to construct identities that ultimately can bridge this divide: 
Step 1 for target identities (those in subordinate or oppressive relations with 
another social group) involves... the simple affirmation of potential value in 
oneself as a member of a social group.. .In contrast, the first step for those in 
dominant positions who wish to be allies against the oppression of target 
groups is to make a critique of the hitherto negative aspects of one's social 
identity; that is, a devaluation of one's assumed moral superiority. (105) 
Feminists who use a politics of location as a discursive strategy for reconstituting their 
subjectivities follow a similar pattern of differential movement (either positive re-valuation 
or negative de-valuation) dependent on their social location relative to normative 
subjectivity. Importantly, because a politics of location requires an intense excavation of 
meanings embedded in particular identity categories, it entails more than a simple refusal of a 
social identity.7 It first requires a full exploration of the meaning of identity categories and 
then a refusal of ways of being, acting, and thinking that are built upon relations of 
domination and subordination. For example, using a politics of location to map the meaning 
of their middle class, Southern, white feminine identity positions, Minnie Bruce Pratt and 
Marilyn Frye do not simply refuse to be "white," as this would elide the important work of 
first excavating what white, Southern, middle class femininity looks like. Instead, the first 
step involves an interrogation of what whiteness is, what it looks like, how it contributes to 
the texture of their daily lives; the second step requires a refusal of ways of being that feed 
relations of domination or subordination so that new ways of being can be discovered. 
Again, I use Foucault's refusal of the self to call attention to the different processes in 
which dominant and non-dominant subjects initially engage when invoking a politics of 
location. The ultimate goal of sign reading and mapping through a politics of location, 
however, remains similar for both kinds of subjects: the reconstruction of subjectivity that 
enables coalition politics across differences. In the next chapter I use language from 
7 I will argue in chapter five that those who occupy dominant positions can never totally disavow themselves of 
their privileged social status. 
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standpoint theories of epistemology to identify two general subject positions: 
outsiders/within and insiders/without.8 I invoke these terms to exemplify that a politics of 
location operates as a refusal of self differently dependent on one's relative position to 
normative subjectivity and as a way of organizing my analyses in chapters four and five of 
the texts that illustrate how a politics of location operates as a discursive strategy for 
excavating and re-writing subjectivity. 
81 elaborate on the term insider/without in chapter five. In short I use the term to categorize those subjects who 
exist in normative or dominant social positions (which is, in the case of this project, relative to an already 
marginalized lesbian social location). Insider/without represents lesbians in dominant racial social locations 
who are "insiders" but are "without" the spontaneous consciousness of unreflected-upon privilege. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Mapping Resistant Subjects: Outsiders/Within 
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society's definition of 
acceptable women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of 
difference—those of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black, who 
are older—know that survival is not an academic skill. It is learning how to 
stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how to make common 
cause with those others identified as outside the structures in order to define 
and seek a world in which we can all flourish. 
—Audre Lorde 112 
I frame this chapter with an epigraph from Audre Lorde's collection of essays Sister 
Outsider to elucidate that women who exist on the margins of "legitimate" female 
subjectivity occupy a unique position from which to create survival skills for redefining what 
it is to be "acceptable." Borrowing from Patricia Hill Collins's theory of black feminist 
epistemology, I group those who exist in non-privileged, non-normative socio-political 
positions (relative to an already marginalized lesbian social location) within the term 
outsiders/within. Hill Collins uses the unique position of black domestic workers as a 
launching point from which to describe the outsider/within perspective: 
Domestic work allowed African-American women to see white elites, both 
actual and aspiring, from perspectives largely obscured from Black men and 
from these groups themselves. In their white "families," Black women not 
only performed domestic duties but frequently formed strong ties with the 
children they nurtured, and with the employers themselves. On one level this 
insider relationship was satisfying to all concerned. Accounts of Black 
domestic workers stress the sense of self-affirmation the women experienced 
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at seeing white power demystified. But on another level these Black women 
knew that they could never belong to their white "families," that they were 
economically exploited workers and thus would remain outsiders. (11) 
Where dominant culture has suppressed knowledge produced from this vantage point, Hill 
Collins reclaims the outsider/within position as that which offers a wider perspective than 
either an insider or outsider perspective.9 Extending the metaphor of outsiders/within to 
assumptions of normative membership in intellectual communities, Hill Collins states: 
The assumptions on which full group membership are based—whiteness for 
feminist thought, maleness for Black social and political thought, and the 
combination for mainstream scholarship—all negate a Black female reality. 
Prevented from becoming full insiders in any of these areas of inquiry, Black 
women remain outsiders within, individuals whose marginality provides a 
distinctive angle of vision on the theories put forth by such intellectual 
communities. (12) 
Paradoxically, because these subjects are at once over-determined in a racist and sexist 
culture and rendered invisible "as a fully human individual[s]" (94), Hill Collins suggests that 
they have a perspective that offers a "peculiar angle of vision... [that is] a tremendous source 
of strength" (94) as well as "frustration and creativity" (233). The outsider/within position is 
a kind of double-edged sword—a position in which the pain of inhabiting an undefined space 
between competing cultural contexts is that which feeds the creativity to seek new ways of 
being that enable the flourishing of humanity. Or, as Lorraine Hansberry has stated, 
9 Hill Collins notes that other factors, such age, ethnicity, and urbanization, also influence the complex of 
experiences that inform Black women's epistemological standpoint that she theorizes (24). 
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"Eventually it cornes to you.. .the thing that makes you exceptional, if you are at all, is 
inevitably that which must also make you lonely" (qtd. in Hill Collins 233). 
Significantly, the position of outsider/within is born of a "culture of resistance" (Hill 
Collins 12) and is not a de facto perspective of those who are positioned on the margins of 
society. Similarly, Chandra Talpade Mohanty explains in her work on third-world women's 
life histories and oppositional consciousness, "I do challenge the notion 'I am, therefore I 
resist!' That is, I challenge the idea that simply being a woman, or being poor or black or 
Latino, is sufficient ground to assume a politicized oppositional identity" ("Cartographies" 
33). The outsider/within position is both a product of one's relative position to normative 
subjectivity and the struggle against oppressive relations of domination and subordination. 
In the remainder of this chapter I show how two outsiders/within (Audre Lorde and 
Gloria Anzaldua) invoke a politics of location while engaging Sandoval's technologies of 
sign reading and differential cognitive mapping. These technologies allow outsiders/within 
to dis-identify from hegemonic representations of themselves as "others," which requires 
naming and excavating the meanings ascribed to social positions in order to ultimately re­
construct subjectivities. In Michelle Cliffs words, these women engage in a process of 
"claiming an identity they taught me to despise." 
Audre Lorde's Politics of Location as Sister/Outsider 
Audre Lorde's 1984 collection of essays Sister Outsider provides an excellent 
example of how a politics of location is invoked by an outsider/within through a detailed 
mapping of the various trajectories along which she identifies herself and an excavation of 
the meaning embedded in those social locations through sign reading. Lorde writes, "poetry 
is the revelatory distillation of experience" (37); her collection of essays is a similar 
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distillation of experiences, perceptions, and analyses of her locations in the world as an 
outsider/within. In the analysis that follows I first argue that Lorde uses two elements of a 
politics of location for reconstructing her subjectivity.10 She reclaims emotion and 
experience, thus locating alternative topoi as sources of knowledge production. And, she 
locates herself across a variety of socio-cultural groups to localize and specify her "truth" 
claims as well as evoke a similar degree of accountability in her audience. I then show how 
Lorde uses a politics of location to excavate the meanings embedded in a variety of identity 
categories, an excavation driven by the desire to expose oppressive modes of being and the 
hope of realizing non-oppressive ways of engaging across difference. 
Locating Emotion 
Throughout Lorde's essays, "locating emotion" is a central force in excavating the 
meaning of social positions and the subsequent creation of different ways of being in the 
world that are not built upon domination and subordination. Therefore, one significant way 
that Lorde uses a politics of location for articulating her subjectivity and asserting discursive 
agency is through reclaiming emotion, or non-rational ways of knowing, as a launching point 
for understanding. She writes, "For each of us as women, there is a dark place within, where 
hidden and growing our true spirit rises, 'beautiful/and tough as chestnut/stanchions against 
10 Lester Olson has provided a rhetorical analysis of Lorde's essays, "Age, Race, Class, Sex: Women 
Redefining Difference" in which he argues that Lorde's struggle with language offers sophisticated techniques 
for using language to redefine difference. Olson has also analyzed Lorde's rhetoric in "The Transformation of 
Silence into Language and Action," arguing that her discussion of the relationships between speech and silence 
offer communication scholars excellent discussion of both the possibilities and limitations of rhetoric. 
However, where Olson focuses primarily on these two rhetorical artifacts in order to distinguish Lorde's 
contribution to rhetorical theory, I examine Lorde's collection Sister Outsider as a whole in order to illustrate 
how she invokes a politics of location similar to other radical lesbian feminists during the 1980s and 90s. 
(y)our nightmare of weakness/' and of impotence" (36). Lorde makes two significant 
discursive moves here. First, she dis-identifies with a hegemonic construal of emotion as 
negative and dark by positively positing darkness and emotion as strong and beautiful. 
Second, she seeks to excavate internalized oppression through the dual meaning of "(y)our," 
effectively collapsing an us/them dichotomy and demanding accountability from all who 
associate emotion and darkness with weakness. 
Lorde insists that sources of change and possibility are not in the brain, not in 
rationality or logic, but in the inner darkness of emotion, "our feelings and the honest 
exploration of them become sanctuaries and spawning grounds for the most radical and 
daring of ideas" (37). Lorde does not simply reconceptualize emotion as sacred and creative, 
she maintains that in order to use emotion in the larger project of social change we must 
engage in the hard work of "honest exploration." Finally, she states: 
there are no new ideas. There are only new ways of making them be felt—of 
examining what those ideas feel like being lived on Sunday morning at 7 a.m., 
after brunch, during wild love, making war, giving birth, mourning our 
dead—while we suffer the old longings, battle the old warnings and fears of 
being silent and impotent and alone, while we taste new possibilities and 
strengths. (39) 
While there may be "new combinations, extrapolations and recognitions from within 
ourselves" (38) of old ideas, the driving force creating new ways of being, for Lorde, is the 
courage to realize those ideas in how we experience/feel our quotidian lives. Lorde's 
reconfiguration of emotion as both a source of knowledge and the key to future possibilities 
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is akin to Chela Sandoval's hermeneutics of love; it is a form of psychic and social activism 
through renewal, social reconstruction, and emancipation (Sandoval 10). 
Some feminists have critiqued Lorde for relying on a traditional dichotomy that 
separates male rationality from female emotion, reducing women's knowledge to intuition, 
which cannot be validated as "hard" knowledge. Lorde rejects this generalization of her 
argument that feelings and perceptions are the creative source of social change. In an 
interview with Adrienne Rich, Lorde argues that the refusal to claim emotion as a source of 
social change constitutes a form of internalized oppression in which the oppressed have been 
coerced to "discipline" themselves, thus contributing to their own submission: 
we have been taught to suspect what is deepest in ourselves, against our 
feelings. When we talk in terms of our lives and our survival as women, we 
can use our knowledge of the erotic creatively. The way you get people to 
testify against themselves is not to have police tactics and oppressive 
techniques. What you do is to build it in so people learn to distrust everything 
in themselves that has not been sanctioned, or reject what is most creative 
about themselves to begin with, so you don't even need to stamp it out. (102) 
Lorde also explains reclaiming and revaluing emotion and perception is a result of a life-time 
battle with people who consistently question her perceptions: "That's the only thing I've had 
to fight with, my whole life, preserving my perceptions of how things are, and later, learning 
how to accept and correct at the same time. Doing this in the face of tremendous opposition 
and cruel judgment" (105). Lorde locates the devaluation of emotion through her own life 
experiences and connects it to a more global level as an internalization of oppression. As 
indicated in chapter two, revaluing emotion, perception and experience is one element of a 
politics of location; it is not, however, an ending point. Lorde contends we must start with 
revaluing that which we have been taught to distrust; then we must be open to "correct" or 
add layers of dimension to our perceptions as we work collectively to create meaning through 
our interchanges with others. Thus, this invocation of knowing through perceptions and 
feelings is driven by an "honest exploration" of and "disciplined attention" to meaning of 
feelings (37). Lorde contends the real work is in the struggle to understand the meaning of 
perceptions and emotions and the subsequent transformation of them into language and 
action that can be shared. 
Fear is one of the primary emotions Lorde locates as a launching point for excavating 
the meaning of her social positions throughout her collection of essays. For example "The 
Transformation of Silence into Language and Action" invokes a politics of location as a 
rhetorical strategy both by reclaiming emotion as a launching point for creating knowledge 
and by moving between the collective "we" and the individual "I." In this essay Lorde 
locates the genesis of her understanding about fear in the physical realm, in her potential 
mortality after grappling with the knowledge that she required breast surgery that might 
result in the discovery of a malignant tumor. In review of her life she realizes her greatest 
regrets all involve choices to remain silent. As she excavates in search of meaning, Lorde 
locates the emotion behind this silence, which she defines as "fear of contempt, of censure, or 
some judgment, or recognition, of challenge, of annihilation. ..of., .the visibility without 
which we cannot truly live" (42). However, in facing death, the ultimate silence, she comes 
to the realization that fearlessness is a luxury, not a necessity for speaking: "we have been 
socialized to respect fear more than our own needs for language and definition" (44). And as 
Lorde indicates through her essays in Sister Outsider, language and definition are the means 
108 
by which we make ourselves visible and alive. This reclaiming (and representation) of fear 
as a location for creating knowledge provides a double-layered form of discursive agency 
over that which threatened to push Lorde into silence and inaction. First, claiming emotion, 
claiming the intangible, as a valid means of knowing and understanding the world is a move 
that enables agency. The excavation of the meaning and function of that fear also provides 
an agentive opportunity because it moves her through fear and into action, enabling her to 
represent the confrontation of fear as a source of change. In addition to enacting discursive 
agency through an exploration of the function of the fear, Lorde makes the important move 
of contextualizing her claims by creating links between the body, personal experiences, and 
the collective experiences of oppressed peoples who exist in silence. She begins her 
excavation of fear in the material realm of her body, then moves to discuss her experiences 
with fear; finally, she moves to a more general level to discuss the racist function of fear in 
feminist coalitions. Lorde consistently locates emotions in each of the essays in Sister 
Outsider as she maps her identity across and between different social groups. Emotion 
becomes a discursive launching point for honest exploration of oppressive relations of 
domination and subordination that inhibit the exercise of agency and the creation of 
intersubjectivity. 
Locating Identity Positions 
Lorde consistently identifies herself as a black, lesbian, feminist, mother, and poet— 
indeed she argues that self-definition is essential for the "humanization" of all oppressed 
peoples, particularly black men and women whose subject positions are especially over-
determined in the culture of the United States. She writes, "If we do not define ourselves for 
ourselves, we will be defined by others—for their use and to our detriment" (47). The listing 
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of the identities in Lorde's essays operates as a starting point from which to explore those 
identities. Gloria Hull insists that "Lorde's seemingly essentialist definitions of herself as 
black/lesbian/mother/woman are not simple, fixed terms. Rather, they represent her 
ceaseless negotiations of a positionality from which she can speak" (159). Central to Lorde's 
self-definition and exploration is a desire for a fuller understanding of her social identities as 
well as a desire that such an understanding will open dialogue with others through which she 
can enact compassionate connection across differences. Importantly, when Lorde lists her 
identity positions she does not assume that a shared identification with a particular social 
group ensures either emotional connection or a common political consciousness. For 
example, speaking of relations between black women, Lorde writes, "connections between 
Black women are not automatic by virtue of our similarities, and the possibilities of genuine 
communication between us are not easily achieved" (153). In each of her essays in Sister 
Outsider, Lorde begins with a similar assumption about a priori connections between 
members of a social group. This assumption enables her listing of identities to function as a 
rhetorical launching point from which to map her memberships within and across a variety of 
social groups. Such mapping ultimately enables Lorde to exercise discursive agency through 
excavating the meaning of identity categories, thus articulating her subjectivity in the face of 
misrepresentations by the dominant culture and in the face of divisions within subcultures. 
Claiming identities serves several other important rhetorical and political functions in 
Lorde's writing. First, Lorde's consistent insistence on naming the positions from which she 
speaks works to radically contextualize her truth claims, thus situating the construction of 
knowledge within her subjective location rather than making abstract and grand assertions to 
"Truth." At the same time, she moves between the situated "I" and the collective "we" 
110 
throughout her essays. Committed to the potential of intersubjective, cooperative 
knowledge-creation through discursive interaction, she writes, "We are women making 
contact within ourselves and with each other across the restrictions of printed page, bent 
upon the use of our own/one another's knowledges" (72). In calling her audience to speak 
their truths, to step through the fears that drive the belief that silence provides protection, she 
writes: 
What are the tyrannies you swallow day by day and attempt to make your 
own, until you will sicken and die of them, still in silence? Perhaps for some 
of you here today, I am the face of one of your fears. Because I am woman, 
because I am Black, because I am lesbian, because I am myself—a Black 
woman warrior poet doing my work—come to ask you, are you doing yours? 
(41-42) 
Lorde locates herself in relation to her audience, takes accountability for the interestedness of 
her work, and pushes her audience members to be accountable for their participation in the 
collective construction of a better world, which Lorde believes always begins with self-
definition and rejection of externally imposed "tyrannies." 
Additionally, locating her identity positions is a part of Lorde's larger political effort 
to posit representation and self-definition as tools of empowerment. Both through example 
and calls to her audience to define themselves, she invites all subjects to articulate their 
individual subjectivities and collective identities in non-oppressive ways. For example in 
discussing the interconnections between sexism and racism in the black community, Lorde 
demands that black women and black men take responsibility for empowered representations 
of themselves, rather than speaking for the "other" or believing that empowerment comes 
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through defining one group (black women, for example) in the service of another (black 
men). She explains that, "Black feminists speak as women because we are women and do 
not need others to speak for us. It is for Black men to speak up and tell us why and how their 
manhood is so threatened that Black women should be the prime targets of their justifiable 
rage" (60). She calls for black men to speak as black men, to "examine and articulate their 
own desires and positions and stand by the conclusions thereof' (62), to open a dialogue 
among black men in which they can remain accountable for their own self-representations, 
thus leading to more productive dialogue between black women and black men. In this case, 
claiming subject positions from which to speak is a move to dis-identify with relations of 
domination and subordination, a forward-looking move imbued with the vision of creating 
more equitable relations across different social positions through dialogue. Similarly, Lorde 
demands accountability in matters of representation from white women in her discussions of 
racism in white feminist communities. She demands that white women face their own racism 
when they misrepresent (or completely ignore) black women's work, lives, and contributions 
to society, or alternatively, when white women represent their own and other white women's 
lives as representative of all women's lives (43, 69). At stake for Lorde in consistently 
locating her own social position and inviting others to follow suit are issues of representation 
and accountability. Lorde uses a politics of location to construct her own subjectivity as she 
simultaneously calls for others to do the same. She asks that individuals take accountability 
for self-definition, self-representation, and representations of others; she asks that we all 
locate the positions from which we speak with an understanding of the dual capability to be 
oppressed and to be oppressive, so that, ultimately, dialogue can be opened across stratified 
groups. 
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Perhaps most importantly, Lorde's commitment to claiming identity positions 
operates rhetorically to situate herself, following her book title, as a "sister outsider." Lorde's 
position as always already different, always an outsider to some political group, becomes the 
driving force behind her archaeological dig. Speaking of her involvement in the social 
movements of the 60s, she explains: 
Either I denied or chose between various aspects of my identity, or my work 
and my Blackness would be unacceptable. As a Black lesbian mother in an 
interracial marriage, there was usually some part of me guaranteed to offend 
everybody's comfortable prejudices of who I should be. That is how I learned 
that if I didn't define myself for myself, I would be crunched into other 
people's fantasies for me and eaten alive. (137) 
Resisting externally imposed definitions occurs across multiple sites—not all of which can be 
neatly packaged into the realm of "the dominant culture," but all of which function similarly 
to colonize her sense of intersubjectivity and fragmenting her into disparate, unrelated parts. 
Writing about the interrelationship between age, race, class, and gender, Lorde states: 
As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different ingredients 
of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual freedom from 
oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one 
aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or 
denying the other parts of self. But this is a destructive and fragmenting way 
to live. My fullest concentration of energy is available to me only when I 
integrate all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular 
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sources of my living to flow back and forth freely through all my different 
selves, without the restrictions of externally imposed definition. (120-121) 
In utilizing a politics of location for articulating her intersubjectivity, Lorde resists pop-bead 
metaphysical identity politics, which suggests that any one of her identities can be neatly 
separated from the others and thus understood. In fact, it is through the integration of her 
identities that Lorde discovers a less restricted "flow" of power and the opportunity to 
proactively re-create a sense of self devoid of the schizophrenic state that Jameson believes is 
a necessary condition of the fragmented postmodern subject. Lorde's position as always 
already different is the impetus for rejecting difference as divisive and rearticulating it as a 
source of creativity and social change. 
The integrated subjectivity Lorde seeks through a politics of location is not 
essentialist; nor does she assume she can "return" to a "pure self," unfettered by socio-
cultural determinants. She writes, "For we must move against not only those forces which 
dehumanize us from the outside, but also against those oppressive values which we have 
been forced to take into our ourselves" (135). Lorde understands that the work of self-
definition and integration of identities is complex and fraught with struggle—struggle against 
exterior representations that are limiting and degrading and against interior forces that do the 
same. There are no easy solutions or paths to the kind of integrity she seeks. Rather, the 
struggle with naming and representation, a life-long engagement with language and with 
other people, leads the way in the creative and continuous process of be-coming: 
For those of us who write, it is necessary to scrutinize not only the truth of 
what we speak, but the truth of that language by which we speak it.. .primarily 
for us all, it is necessary to teach by living and speaking those truths which we 
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believe and know beyond understanding. Because in this way alone we can 
survive, by taking part in a process of life that is creative and continuing, that 
is growth. (43) 
Lorde's self-definition through a politics of location is about mobility, movement, and 
growth, not fixity. Only through continued engagement with language—resisting oppressive 
representations and claiming affirmative representations—can she remain alive and lively as 
a subject. Lorde indicates the process of living with an integrated subjectivity requires a 
cyclical process of naming, dialoguing, reflecting, and a return to naming. Lorde's 
invocation of a politics of location as a discursive strategy, then, is part of a life-long 
commitment to the continued development of an integrated subjectivity. 
Mapping Social Memberships 
Reclaiming emotion as a knowledge-source and locating identity positions work in 
tandem with Lorde's exploration of the interrelationship between racism, sexism, 
heterosexism, and homophobia. In her exploration Lorde maps the meaning embedded in 
relations between and among various oppressed peoples, relations which ultimately hinder 
coalition politics. Exploring the function of difference is central to Lorde's work in mapping 
and excavating the meaning of her identities, particularly its function in coalitions across and 
between social positions. Using her social positioning as a black lesbian feminist 
confronting racism, sexism, homophobia, and heterosexism and her commitment to the 
integrity of her intersubjectivity as a launching point, Lorde seeks to reconfigure difference. 
That is, her own social location informs the assumption that coalitions depend on respect for 
heterogeneity and should seek unity through a common vision, not a homogeneous group 
identity. She argues, "It is not our differences which separate women, but our reluctance to 
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recognize those differences and to deal effectively with the distortions which have resulted 
from the ignoring and misnaming of those differences" (122). Seeking the root of why 
difference functions as a divisive force, Lorde situates the misnaming of difference within a 
culture of hegemony and locates fear as the key to understanding its non-creative, non-
generative function. She argues: 
Institutionalized rejection of difference is an absolute necessity in a profit 
economy which needs outsiders as surplus people. As members of such an 
economy, we have all been programmed to respond to the human differences 
between us with fear and loathing and to handle that difference in one of three 
ways: ignore it, and if that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, 
or destroy it if we think it is subordinate. But we have no patterns for relating 
across our human differences as equals. As a result, those differences have 
been misnamed and misused in the service of separation and confusion. (115) 
No one escapes the implications of a xenophobic culture, no one speaks from a position of 
non-innocence; therefore, we all must confront the internalization of the fear of difference. 
Towards this end, Lorde proceeds in each of her essays to show how difference, when driven 
by fear, functions within identity-based groups as a divisive force. 
For example, in mapping relations between feminists of color and white feminists, 
Lorde locates how many white feminists are threatened by differences, believing that a 
unified social movement only occurs through homogeneity, a belief which erases the 
existence of women of color and leaves white women's racism and privilege unexamined 
(116-118). She also maps out the privileges and pitfalls of white women's relationships to 
white men, showing how they are "seduced into joining the oppressor under the pretense of 
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sharing power" by replicating racist, sexist, homophobic, and heterosexist modes of self-
definition (118). Such mapping exposes how fear hinders coalitions between women of color 
and white women. 
Lorde also maps her membership with the black community to explore the 
interconnections between racism, sexism, homophobia, and heterosexism—each of which 
thrives on a fear of difference that reproduces structures of oppression (48). In particular she 
examines the fear of lesbians and the connection between lesbian-baiting and fear of self-
defined black women. This fear is dependent on a sexist, homophobic, and heterosexist 
structure that encourages suspicion and competition between black women, rather than 
kinship and love, and defines black women only in relation to black men (49). Moving more 
deeply into her archaeological dig, Lorde excavates why self-defined black women too often 
are perceived as a threat to black men: 
The distortion of relationship which says "I disagree with you, so I must 
destroy you" leaves us as Black people with basically uncreative victories, 
defeated in any common struggle. This jugular vein psychology is based on 
the fallacy that your assertion or affirmation of self is an attack upon my 
self—or that my defining myself will somehow prevent or retard your self-
definition. The supposition that one sex needs the other's acquiescence in 
order to exist prevents both from moving together as self-defined persons 
toward a common goal. (51) 
She argues that the denial of black women's subjectivity is a dehumanizing force that is "no 
less lethal than dehumanization of racism," which also feeds on a denial of self-definition for 
people of color (50). Lorde uses a politics of location to explore how black men's and 
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women's identities take on meaning in relation to one another, urging a recognition of how a 
fear of difference has operated as a dehumanizing force for all. 
Locating various groups' perceptions of what is potentially threatening allows Lorde 
to map memberships across and within different identity-based groups. In so doing, she 
excavates how the identities of these groups are based in a fear of difference, a fear which 
functions to feed sexism, heterosexism, racism, and homophobia and a false hierarchy of 
oppressions. By locating interconnections between racism, sexism, heterosexism, and 
homophobia, Lorde reveals how all participants in relations of domination are diminished 
through an abnegation of the creative (rather than divisive) function of difference and the 
right to self-definition. Again, Lorde uses a politics of location as a rhetorical strategy for 
unearthing, naming and representing some of the embedded meanings of identity-based 
groups. It is a strategy that leads her to name how hegemonic culture fears difference and to 
deconstruct the divisive function of this fear. 
Lorde's map of inter-relational identities and her excavation of the function and 
meaning of difference does not stop with deconstruction. She also positively reconstructs 
difference as the ultimate source of regeneration, creativity, and social change. Such a 
reconstruction works to mobilize different political identities in a common goal of 
confronting the dehumanizing function of a fear of difference (135). Her reconstruction of 
difference becomes the locus of social change: 
Difference must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary 
polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. Only then 
does the necessity for interdependency become unthreatening. Only within 
that interdependency of different strengths, acknowledged and equal, can the 
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power to seek new ways of being in the world generate, as well as the courage 
and sustenance to act where there are no charters. (Ill) 
While a significant portion of her exploration of difference focuses on how it has been used 
negatively, as divisive force that reproduces oppressive structures, an equally significant 
portion of her exploration is devoted to the revaluing of difference as a creative force in 
creating new ways of being. In particular, Lorde argues that the imaginative function of 
difference can help us constitute a different map of social identities, a map that begins to 
move beyond the interlocking structures of racism, sexism, heterosexism, and homophobia. 
Lorde also maps her identity as a black woman in relation to white women and other 
women of color in order to excavate some of the embedded meanings of these identity 
positions (particularly in the context of personal and institutionalized racism). Similar to her 
use of fear as a launching point for understanding the intersections of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and heterosexism, Lorde uses the emotion of anger as a starting point for 
locating the meaning of relations between black women and white women. In her work, 
Lorde positively reclaims her anger as a black woman in a racist, sexist, and homophobic 
society because it enables a certain liveliness to "demolish the past" (152). In so doing she 
dis-identifies with hegemonic forces which suggest she should suppress her anger in response 
to exploitation and oppression. Importantly, she juxtaposes anger against hatred in order to 
show that hatred is built upon a desire for ill will and can only destroy (both the subject and 
object of hatred), "Hatred is the fury of those who do not share our goals, and its object is 
death and destruction" (129). Ultimately in using anger as a launching point for 
understanding, she points out that while anger has a positive use, it "is an incomplete form of 
knowledge... [because it] cannot create the future" (150). The essay, "The Uses of Anger: 
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Women Responding to Racism," provides the fullest exploration of these relationships. In 
the context of repeated requests by white women that she put aside her anger, Lorde 
positively reclaims this emotion; she writes, "My response to racism is anger. I have lived 
with that anger, ignoring it, feeding upon it, learning to use it before it laid my visions to 
waste, for most of my life. Once I did it in silence, afraid of the weight. My fear of anger 
taught me nothing. Your fear of that anger will teach you nothing, also" (124). As she 
reclaims anger she also calls white women, in particular, to face the anger of women of color 
in the "hard work of excavating honesty" (128). She then moves to explore the uses and 
limitations of anger in her relationships with white women and women of color, suggesting 
that it must be used for clarity and mutual empowerment if we understand it as an appropriate 
response to oppression (127). That is, recognition of anger is an absolute necessity in 
exploring relations between women of color and white women. Significantly, while Lorde 
reclaims her own anger in response to being a target of racism, she also recognizes her own 
ability to collude in racism. For example, she states: 
The woman of Color who is not Black and who charges me with rendering her 
invisible by assuming that her struggles with racism are identical with my own 
has something to tell me that I had better learn from, lest we both waste 
ourselves fighting the truths between us.. .And yes, it is very difficult to stand 
still and to listen to another woman's voice delineate an agony I do not share, 
or one to which I myself have contributed. (127-28) 
Taking a self-reflexive stance, Lorde uses a politics of location to place herself on the same 
critical plane of examination, showing that all women are implicated in systems of 
oppression, and that the path to different ways of being require struggle and pain. In fact, at 
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the end of this particular essay Lorde broadens the scope of her argument, contending that 
anger is an appropriate response to any form of oppression and that no woman, no identity 
position as "oppressed" frees us from potentially behaving in oppressive ways. Lorde asks, 
"What woman here is so enamoured of her own oppression that she cannot see her heelprint 
upon another woman's face? What woman's terms of oppression have become precious and 
necessary to her as a ticket into the fold of the righteous, away from the cold winds of self-
scrutiny?" (132). These are important rhetorical moves because they enable Lorde to map 
her subjectivity in relation to white women and other women of color in the context of 
learned oppression (racism in particular) and the desire for mutual empowerment. Mapping 
her identity in relation to both white women and women of color through an examination of 
the function of anger as a response to oppression constructs a complex subjectivity that 
cannot be neatly fitted into any particular category, a subjectivity that is not fixed or static, 
but always the process of be-coming through continued reclaiming/naming, dialogue, and 
self-reflection. 
Mapping her membership with other black women, Lorde also locates the emotion of 
anger as a launching point from which to excavate "the source of that mistrust and distance 
maintained between Black women" (147). In her essay, "Eye to Eye: Black Women, Hatred, 
and Anger," she places her reactions to other black women on the plane of critique when she 
queries why her anger "unleashes] itself most tellingly against another Black woman at the 
least excuse" (145). Her hope is to seek an understanding of the complex, complicated, and 
contradictory interrelationships between black women. Again, in locating herself on the 
plane of critique, Lorde maintains accountability for potentially participating in a way of 
being that is not commensurate with her values. Ultimately, what she discovers in mapping 
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her relations with other black women is a form of internalized oppression that is outwardly 
directed toward other black women; such oppression places black women somewhere 
between desire for self-love and desire for the obliteration of that which dominant culture 
suggests is most unwanted—black women (155). Lorde writes, "I am writing about an anger 
so huge and implacable, so corrosive, it must destroy what it most needs for its own solution, 
dissolution, resolution" (157). Through locating and reclaiming deeply embedded anger and 
mapping her relationship to other black women, Lorde opens a dialogue between black 
women, noting that, "It would be ridiculous to believe that this process is not lengthy and 
difficult. It is suicidal to believe it is not possible" (175). The use of a politics of location to 
excavate the meaning of her identity as a black woman in relation to other black women is no 
less than a struggle for life and the hope of a more life-affirming existence. 
At the heart of Lorde's struggle to map and excavate the meanings attached to the 
identities she claims is hope for ways of being that enhance her own humanity and enable her 
to feed the humanity of others. She locates this source of hope and change in erotic emotion 
(she defines the erotic within physical, emotional, psychic, or intellectual realms). In both a 
political and a personal effort, Lorde reclaims the erotic as a way of knowing, as that which 
reveals a capacity to feel joy and to share joy with another in such a way that creates bridges 
across differences (56); again, locating the source of change in non-rationale ways of 
knowing is a significant element of a politics of location. Additionally, Lorde identifies that 
which has been misnamed/misused by dominant culture (women's erotic energy), 
deconstructs how women have been taught to mistrust the erotic, and reclaims it at a source 
of social change that can move us out of old modes of being and into new ways of being (59). 
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Lorde's revisioned erotic is a place in which women can interact with a sense of joy and 
pleasure that enables them to realize their fullest potential in concert with other women. 
Lorde asserts discursive agency through a politics of location by naming her 
positionality, deconstructing relations of domination, and by reclaiming that which has been 
denied her or defined as negative (including reclaiming the power of affirmative self-
definition, reclaiming emotions such as fear and anger) as valid launching points for creating 
knowledge, and reclaiming the creative potential of difference. In these discursive moves, 
she constructs a fluid, mobile, and integrated subjectivity, a subjectivity dependent upon 
collective and individual desire to imagine new ways of being in quotidian experiences that 
allows for the flourishing of humanity. 
Gloria Anzaldua's Politics of Location in the Borderlands 
Gloria Anzaldua's collection of essays and poetry, Borderlands/La Frontera, provides 
another example of how an outsider/within uses a politics of locations to map her social 
positions, excavate the meanings of those locations, and reconstruct a life-affirming 
subjectivity.11 Anzaldua positions herself at the intersection of a number of different 
borderlands—the material borderlands of Texas-U.S. Southwest/Mexico, as well as 
psychological, sexual, and spiritual borderlands. She writes, "I am a border woman...I have 
been straddling that tejas-Mexican border, and others, all my life. It's not a comfortable 
territory to live in, this place of contradictions" (Preface). Borderlands/La Frontera is an 
effort to write her borderlands existence into being: 
11 In an interview with Anzaldua in J AC, Andrea Lunsford names Anzaldua's writing as "mestiza rhetoric," 
which "can enable transformations that, while often brutally painful, can allow for non-binary identity, for new 
states of mestiza consciousness, and for multiple writing strategies" (2). 
This book, then, speaks of my existence. My preoccupations with the inner 
life of the Self, and with the struggle of that Self amidst adversity and 
violation; with the confluence of primordial images; with the unique 
positionings consciousness takes us at these confluent streams; and with my 
almost instinctive urge to communicate, to speak, to write about life on the 
borders, life in the shadows. (Preface) 
Like the other authors' whose work I analyze in this project, Anzaldua is called into the 
struggle with language and representation. Invoking a politics of location to write her 
complicated subjectivity in the ambiguity of the borderlands becomes both a tool for survival 
and a tool to create spaces in which to thrive. She writes, the "struggle to render [words] 
concrete in the world and on paper, to render them flesh keeps me alive" (Preface). 
Anzaldua's collection of essays is marked by three general movements: an "inventory" that 
asks "Just what did she inherit from her ancestors?" (82); a deconstruction, or a "rupture with 
all oppressive traditions of all cultures and religions" (82); and finally a reconstruction, or 
reinterpretation of history and a shaping of new myths that leads to "new perspectives toward 
the darkskinned, women and queers" (82), to a mestiza consciousness marked by "a change 
in the way we perceive reality, the way we see ourselves, and the ways we behave" (80). In 
these moves Anzaldua rejects dichotomous oppositions and transforms into the shape-
changer, "Thought shifts, reality shifts, gender shifts: one person metamorphoses into 
another in a world where people fly through the air, heal from mortal wounds. I am playing 
with my Self, I am playing with the world's soul, I am the dialogue between my self and el 
espiritu del mundo. I change myself, I change the world" (70). Utilizing one of the central 
tenets of a politics of location (that subjectivities are fluid and always in the process of be­
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coming), Anzaldua writes a mobile, changing subjectivity. Movement between interior and 
exterior, between the individual and the collective, is central to her vision of change, a 
change which Anzaldua hopes will create an ambiguous space between these two worlds so 
that they can no longer be neatly separated and dichotomized. In the analysis that follows I 
first show how Anzaldua locates home as a central trope in excavating the meaning of her 
identities and in envisioning a different future homeland in una cultura mestiza. I then show 
how she uses a politics of location to map her identity in the material, socio-historical 
U.S./Mexico borderlands, in the cultural and spiritual borderlands, and in the linguistic 
borderlands between Spanish and English. Finally, I show how Anzaldua locates hope for 
individual and collective change in la mestiza consciousness. 
Locating Home 
Home is both a material and symbolic trope Anzaldua invokes repeatedly to position 
her social identities. Anzaldua locates the beginnings of her archaeological dig into the 
meanings of her identities in her choice to leave home. This choice set her apart from her 
family as she "was the first in six generations to leave the Valley, the only one in [her] family 
ever to leave home" (16). Leaving home, she seeks to discover herself, seeks to peel away 
the layers of externally-imposed identifications, "I had to leave home so I could find myself, 
find my own intrinsic nature buried under the personality that had been imposed on me" (16). 
The physical leaving of home provides a necessary distance for Anzaldua to begin 
deconstructing why her culture does not approve of her. This then clears space to reconstruct 
her sense of self and a place for other Chicanas to do the same. However, Anzaldua never 
loses a connection to her origins, to the sense that her identity is grounded in family and 
culture. Instead, she describes carrying her home, her culture wherever she goes, much like a 
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turtle and its shell (21). This is a significant rhetorical move because Anzaldua does not 
name culture as wholly negative or wholly positive. In leaving home and locating herself in 
the borderlands of culture and home, Anzaldua defines a new home in ambiguity, in the 
third-space between totally embracing and totally rejecting her culture and family. This new 
space provides the opportunity for agency and the reconstruction of her subjectivity. In this 
space she celebrates the strength, courage, and pride of her family and culture, while resisting 
the oppressive practices of family and culture. 
Locating home (in familial relations, in physical geography/region, in culture, and in 
language) operates as a launching point to take inventory of who she has been taught to be as 
a female, Mexican, queer, and who she wishes to become as the new mestiza—Chicana, 
feminist, queer. In the now much cited passage Anzaldua discusses how her "home" is 
always in the borderlands: 
As a mestiza I have no country, my homeland cast me out; yet all countries are 
mine because I am every woman's sister or potential lover. (As a lesbian I 
have no race, my own people disclaim me; but I am all races because there is 
a queer of me in all races). I am cultureless because, as a feminist, I challenge 
the collective cultural/religious male-derived beliefs of Indo-Hispanics and 
Anglos; yet I am cultured because I am participating in the creation of yet 
another culture, a new story to explain the world and our participation in it, a 
new value system with images and symbols that connect us to each other and 
to the planet. Soy un amasamiento. (80-81) 
Home is not a fixed location; home is a space of ambiguity and shifting borders. As such, 
home in the borderlands informs Anzaldua's reconstruction of fluid subjectivity. 
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Importantly, the ambiguity and contradiction of the borderlands is not a safe or comfortable 
place, as home might be traditionally understood; however, home-space in the borderlands is 
a place of generation and creativity, a third-space that is "greater than the sum of its severed 
parts" (80). 
Loss of safety in home-space is connected to Anzaldua's theory of lafacultad,12 which 
"is the capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of deeper realities, to see the deep 
structure below the surface. It is an instant 'sensing,' a quick perception arrived at without 
conscious reasoning" (38). This sign-reading capacity is developed in those who are pushed 
to the margins because of difference and is most developed in "Those who do not feel 
psychologically or physically safe in the world...Those who are pounced upon the most have 
it the strongest—the females, the homosexuals of all races, the darkskinned, the outcast, the 
persecuted, the marginalized, the foreign" (38). In fact, Anzaldua locates the beginnings of 
la facultad in her early childhood years prior to leaving home in which she found herself 
always on the margins of her culture and family as she tried "to live life on [herj terms no 
matter how unsuitable to others they were" (16). 
Similar to the way Lorde articulates the importance of reclaiming emotion as a site of 
knowing, Anzaldua reclaims la facultad and the psyche as sources of knowledge and 
resistance. Much as the initial leaving of (traditional) home involves rupture, there is loss 
and pain in experiencing the world through lafacultad, loss of "innocence...unknowing 
ways.. .safe and easy ignorance" (39). However, in stripping away layers of ignorance which 
create a false sense of safety, the subject with la facultad gains a deeper experience of and 
12 Chela Sandoval argues that lafacultad is akin to Barthes's sign-reading and deconstruction (82). 
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connection to what Anzaldua calls "Self," or the soul (Self includes both the individual soul 
and the collective soul of the world). The increased awareness of the interconnection 
between the soul of individuals and the soul of the world created through la facultad enables 
a shift in perception, which allows for the generation of new spaces to re-create home. 
Anzaldua writes, "And if going home is denied me then I will have to stand and claim my 
space, making a new culture—una cultura mestiza—with my own lumber, my own bricks 
and mortar and my own feminist architecture" (22). In la facultad (or the psychic 
borderlands) is the agentive potential to glean that which is life-affirming from family, 
culture, and home and to reject that which is oppressive in the service of a new homeland that 
is fluid, playful, mutable: una cultura mestiza. Much like Lorde uses emotion to rewrite her 
subjectivity, Anzaldua uses "home" as a central element in the deconstruction and 
reconstruction of self and community. 
Mapping Memberships: Material. Cultural. Spiritual. Linguistic Borderlands 
In addition to utilizing home as a location for excavating her borderlands identities 
and imagining a future home-space, Anzaldua invokes a politics of location through an 
exploration of the material U.S./Mexico border. She excavates the macro socio­
political/ economic implications of living on the U.S./Mexico geographical border and the 
micro implications of growing up in a family living on the border as sharecroppers. The 
greatest implication of this border on Chicano/a identities is a continual process of being 
"jerked out by the roots, truncated, disemboweled, dispossessed, and separated from our 
identity and our history" (8) through a long history of colonization (Anzaldua points out that 
five different countries—Spain, Mexico, the Republic of Texas, the U.S. Confederacy, and 
the U.S, again—have colonized the land and people). The violence of this geographical 
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border marked by "rolled barbed wire" along the length of the U.S./Mexico border is 
inscribed on Anzaldua's body: 
1,950 mile-long open wound 
dividing a pueblo, a culture, 
running down the length of my body, 
staking fence rods in my flesh, 
splits me splits me 
me raja me raja 
This is my home 
this thin edge of 
barbwire. (2-3) 
The socio-material borderland has constructed a distinctive Chicano/a identity. An important 
element in locating her identity in the violence of this material border is reclaiming a history 
of rupture, a history that is erased when narrated from the colonizer's perspective. The 
fragmented, split subjectivity that results from this history of colonization is not simple 
jouissance. Anzaldua makes a point throughout her essays to reveal the discomfort and pain 
of dislocation even as she celebrates it as a space of creativity and change. 
Excavating and writing the history of the border from a Chicana feminist perspective 
is part and parcel of the work in reconstituting her individual subjectivity and the collective 
subjectivity of Chicanos/as. Anzaldua narrates the larger history of colonization: the broken 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo; the unleashed racism of vigilante Anglos and Texas Rangers 
and the subsequent lynching of Chicanos/as; the appropriation of Chicano/a land by 
agribusiness corporations and the subsequent exploitation of Chicanos/as through 
sharecropping; the continued colonization of Mexico by U.S. corporations through the 
creation of maquiladoras (which force the devaluation of Mexico's economy and creates a 
greater dependency on the U.S); and the continued exploitation of Chicanos/as through 
"illegal" hiring practices that enable the evasion of U.S. labor laws in domestic work, farm 
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labor, the garment industry, and the hotel industry, among others (5-12). Anzaldua couples 
this collective history with the specific history of land being stolen from her family by Anglo 
ranchers and lawyers. For example, she describes her paternal grandmother's wish to be 
buried next to her husband in the ancestral cemetery, and the inability of the family to grant 
the wish, "there was a fence around the cemetery, chained and padlocked by the ranch 
owners of the surrounding land. We couldn't even get in to visit the graves, much less bury 
her there. Today, it is padlocked. The sign reads: 'Keep out. Trespassers will be shot'" (8). 
She also details her family's struggle to survive (to provide shelter, food, and clothing) as a 
working-class people through sharecropping in which the farming corporations, unlike her 
family, always profited. Anzaldua engages in sign reading and differential cognitive 
mapping as she reclaims history and rewrites it from the perspective of the colonized. That 
is, she deconstructs and reconstructs a new history of the border and its impact on Chicano/a 
identities. 
The collective and individual history of oppression/colonization, the space of the 
contested border, and the continued resistance and will to survive contributes to the creation 
of a distinct cultural identity for Chicanos/as. In mapping the colonization of both the land 
and the people, in mapping the oppression and terrorization of Chicanos by Anglos, 
Anzaldua excavates the deep implications of these relations on the sense of self, both 
individually and collectively, "As a person, I, as a people, we, Chicanos, blame ourselves, 
hate ourselves, terrorize ourselves. Most of this goes on unconsciously; we only know that 
we are hurting, we suspect that there is something 'wrong' with us, something fundamentally 
'wrong'" (45). However, Anzaldua points out that Chicanos/as are not simply or finally 
defeated because there is an equally long history of resistance and a will to survive through 
maintaining cultural integrity. Locating her identity in the material and socio-political 
borderlands, Anzaldua takes inventory by examining what she has inherited from her 
ancestors—an identity marked by both oppression and resistance. In fact, the narration of 
this history is, itself, an act of resistance insofar as it renders visible an erased history. 
Indeed, the location of a resistant identity for Anzaldua is through language and 
communication. Anzaldua argues that the ability to narrate a fragmented history—to give 
reality shape through language—creates Chicanos/as as a "distinct people." She locates the 
mobilization of this political identity around 1965 through the leadership of Ceasar Chavez 
and the united farm-workers movement, the publication of I Am Joaquin, and the formation 
of la Raza Unida party (63). Narrating this new history is an effort to positively reconstruct 
subjectivity by confronting the erasure and lies of a white supremacist version of 
U.S./Mexico history. Thus, by using a politics of location to excavate the meaning of her 
cultural identity in the specific geographical space of the U.S./Mexico border and the socio­
political history of that space, Anzaldua asserts discursive agency by bringing into sharp 
relief the distinctive identity of Chicanas/os. 
In this rewriting of history and mapping of her identity, Anzaldua explores her 
complicated and contradictory relationship to her culture. She dis-identifies with the 
oppressive elements of her culture at the same time that she affirms the value of her culture 
in the face of the colonizer: 
I'll defend my race and culture when they are attacked by non-mexicanos, 
conosco el malestar de mi cultura. I abhor some of my culture's ways, how it 
cripples its women, como burras, our strengths used against us, lowly hurras 
bearing humility with dignity. The ability to serve, claim the males, is our 
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highest virtue. I abhor how my culture makes macho caricatures of its men. 
No, I do not buy all the myths of the tribe into which I was born. I can 
understand why the more tinged with Anglo blood, the more adamantly my 
colored and colorless sisters glorify their culture's values—to offset the 
extreme devaluation of it by the white culture. It's a legitimate reaction. But I 
will not glorify those aspects of my culture which have injured me and which 
have injured me in the name of protecting me. (21-22) 
In fact, excavation of the meaning of the feminine and the value of women in Chicano 
culture is a primary focus in Anzaldua's essays. For example, one of the ways she maps her 
relationship to Chicano/a culture is through a re-reading of myths and spirituality. In 
particular, Anzaldua challenges the "virgen/puta (whore) dichotomy" (31) by locating the 
roots of this oppressive dichotomy in traditional mytho-history of pre-Columbia conquest 
that conceives of Malinali (la Chingada) as the one who sold out the Aztec nation because 
she interpreted for and had sex with the conquistador, Cortes (34). La Chingada, la puta, is 
blamed for the fall of the entire Aztec people. Alternatively, La Virgen de Guadalupe "is the 
single most potent religious, spiritual and cultural image of the Chicano/mexicano" because 
she represents the will to survive in the face of devastation and genocide (30). However, 
coupling La Virgen with Malinali constructs a limited dichotomy of roles for Chicanas—they 
can be either chaste virgins or whores. Anzaldua refuses this dichotomy by excavating the 
history of Aztec culture, history, and spiritual deities in order to write a new history —one not 
based solely on Catholicism. In particular, this new mytho-history describes the fall of Aztec 
society through its own militaristic, predatory state, a state that sought to subvert the original 
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Toltec tribes that celebrated balance between the males and females, the masculine and the 
feminine: 
The Tlaxcalans were the Aztec's bitter enemies and it was they who helped 
the Spanish defeat the Aztec rulers, who were by this time so unpopular with 
their own common people that they could not even mobilize the populace to 
defend the city. Thus the Aztec nation fell not because Malinali {la 
Chingada) interpreted and slept with Cortes, but because the ruling elite had 
subverted the solidarity between men and women and between the noble and 
commoner. (34) 
Throughout her essays, Anzaldua excavates the myths and histories of all three cultures that 
constitute the new mestiza (Indian, Mexican, and white) for the meaning of her identity. For 
example, she rewrites the mythos of La Virgen by showing how her current incarnation is 
rooted in the indigenous deity, Coatlalopeuh. Ultimately, Anzaldua creates a new mytho-
history of historical figures and deities from indigenous religions as well as Catholicism in 
order to positively integrate all three cultural/spiritual forces. In so doing, she reclaims the 
creative potential of the feminine and establishes dignity and self-respect through a new 
history and cultural identity: la mestiza (87). This life-affirming representation of females 
and the feminine produces an integrated subjectivity for Anzaldua that begins to heal the 
splitting and fracturing that results from an unexamined inheritance of traditional myths 
about women. 
Similar to Audre Lorde's use of emotion as a generative space for understanding 
identity, Anzaldua looks to the interior world of the psyche as a place for understanding her 
identity. The psyche is a site that bears the mark of the external mytho-historical Chicano/a 
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struggle. In validating the psyche as a source of knowledge and creativity she rejects the 
white, singular "'official' reality of the rational" (36), rejects the split between rational and 
non-rational ways of knowing. Anzaldua locates struggle for existence in both an external 
and internal worlds: 
The struggle is inner: Chicano, indio, American Indian, mojado, mexicano, 
immigrant Latino, Anglo in power, working class Anglo, Black, Asian—our 
psyches resemble the border-towns and are populated by the same people. 
The struggle has always been inner, and is played out in the outer terrains. 
Awareness of our situation must come before inner changes, which in turn 
come before changes in society. Nothing happens in the 'real' world unless it 
first happens in the images in our heads. (87) 
Importantly, Anzaldua implicates herself in the complicated process of learning to validate 
the inner, psychic world as a location for creating a life-affirming consciousness by narrating 
a time in her life when she rejected her psychic experiences as "real": "Like many Indians 
and Mexicans, I did not deem my psychic experiences real. I denied their occurrences and let 
my inner sense atrophy. I allowed white rationality to tell me that the existence of the 'other' 
world was mere pagan superstition" (36). She places herself in the same critical plane of 
others who have internalized the rejection of ancient Indian modes of knowing and 
experiencing the world. Exploring her own process of integrating the parts of her identity 
she was taught to despise, Anzaldua writes a non-innocent subjectivity that is always in 
process. 
Throughout her collection of essays Anzaldua excavates how she has been sold out, 
marked as "deviant" by her culture and dominant culture, condemned as a woman and a 
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queer (18). She insists, "Not me sold out my people but they me" (21, 22). In using a 
politics of location to map her identities in a complex and fluid relationship to her culture and 
spirituality, she reclaims pieces of the mytho-history of her culture that lead to a sense of 
integrity, "All the lost pieces of myself come flying from the deserts and the mountains and 
the valleys, magnetized toward that center. Compléta" (51). The integrated subjectivity that 
Anzaldua creates is marked by a dynamic interplay between all the parts of her self. It is a 
subjectivity of mobility and change, a product of gathering what has been inherited and 
putting that tradition into play through revisionist history. 
Another way in which Anzaldua locates her identity is through language, through a 
complex mapping of her relationship to the various dialects of Spanish and English. She 
explores at least eight different languages she speaks and the different social memberships 
that each brings into being (55). The heterogeneity of languages and dialects that 
Chicanos/as speak is both a reflection and constitution of a fluid and heterogenous people, 
"Change, evolution de palabras nuevas por invention o adoption have created variants of 
Chicano Spanish, un nuevo lenguaje. Un lenguaje que corresponde a un modo de vivir" 
(55). She explores her personal history of being beaten and silenced in school for speaking 
Spanish and excavates the subsequent sense of shame that follows from this history. 
Anzaldua also turns inward, excavating and resisting how Chicanos have learned to oppress 
one another through an internalized form of linguistic terrorism, "We oppress each other 
trying to out-Chicano each other, vying to be the 'real' Chicanas to speak like Chicanos. 
There is no one Chicano language just as there is no one Chicano experience" (58). Moving 
in and out of varied dialects of Spanish and English in each of her essays, she positively 
reconstructs Chicano Spanish as a living, fluid valid language from those who deem it 
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"incorrect," "impure," or as a "mutilation of Spanish" (55). In the affirmation of her complex 
linguistic identity—in taking pride in language—lies the potential to gain self-respect, a 
sense of integrity in the living, fluid Chicano/a Spanish/English linguistic identity (59). 
Locating Change in Mestiza Consciousness 
Linking the excavation and deconstruction of her borderlands identity to a future 
vision, Anzaldua locates individual and collective change in a mestiza consciousness. This 
change in consciousness rejects both an either/or duality and a simple balancing of opposites. 
Instead, mestiza consciousness is a synthesis of multiplicity that creates a mobile and 
generative third-space subjectivity. She explains, "The work of mestiza consciousness is to 
break down the subject-object duality that keeps her prisoner and to show in the flesh and 
through images in her work how duality is transcended" (80). Anzaldua suggests that our 
future lies in this new consciousness and "though it is a source of intense pain, its energy 
comes from continual creative motion that keeps breaking down the unitary aspect of each 
new paradigm" (80). In embracing all of the previously splintered parts of identity to create a 
new consciousness, no part of the self is rejected: 
Rejection strips us of our self-worth; our vulnerability exposes us to 
shame.. .We can no longer camouflage our needs, can no longer let defenses 
and fences sprout around us. We can no longer withdraw. To rage and look 
upon you with contempt is to rage and be contemptuous of ourselves. We can 
no longer blame you, nor disown the white parts, the male parts, the 
pathological parts, the queer parts, the vulnerable parts. (88) 
The difference in this new consciousness is a life-affirming stance, and affirmation of the 
hated parts of one's self as well as the hatred of others. 
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However, Anzaldua does not forward a simple celebration of multiplicity and 
diversity. Accountability is a central element of this new consciousness—the oppressive 
history of colonization and its subsequent relations of domination must be rewritten, not 
forgotten. This requires active engagement in taking responsibility for one's participation in 
oppressive relations and a willingness to collectively and individually start recreating 
alternative ways of being. Anzaldua demands accountability from all participants in relations 
of domination, particularly Chicanos and Anglos. Following the general tenor of her efforts 
to explore the complex and contradictory nature of a borderlands identity, she excavates the 
meaning of Chicano "false machismo." She recognizes that it is, in part, a product of a 
history of forced humility and self-effacement in response to white colonization. She also 
shows how Chicanos' loss of dignity and self-respect leads to the domination and violation of 
women, particularly Chicanas. Nonetheless, Anzaldua demands accountability from 
Chicanos and the development of a new form of consciousness: 
Though we "understand" the root cause of male hatred and fear, and the 
subsequent wounding of women, we do not excuse, we do not condone, and 
we will no longer put up with it. From the men of our race, we demand the 
admission/acknowledgement/disclosure/testimony that they wound us, violate 
us, are afraid of us and our power. We need them to say they will begin to 
eliminate their hurtful put-down ways. But more than words, we demand 
acts. We say to them: We will develop equal power with you and those who 
have shamed us. (83-84) 
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Equally important, she demands accountability from Anglo society, demands that Anglos 
excavate the ways in which their own identities, sense of entitlement, and privileges are built 
upon dualistic thinking that results in the domination and colonization of Chicanos/as: 
We need you to accept the fact that Chicanos are different, to acknowledge 
your rejection and negation of us. We need you to own the fact that you 
looked upon us as less than human, that you stole our lands, our personhood, 
our self-respect. We need you to make public restitution: to say that, to 
compensate for your own sense of defectiveness, you strive for power over us, 
you erase our history and our experience because it makes you feel 
guilty—you'd rather forget your brutish acts.. .To say that you are afraid of us, 
that to put distance between us, you wear the mask of contempt. (85-86) 
Embracing a mestiza consciousness is part of a larger healing process and hope for different 
ways of being. Taking a counter-stance in relation to cultures of domination and demanding 
accountability from those who benefit from and reproduce these cultures is a necessary tactic, 
but Anzaldua points out a counter-stance "is not a way of life" (78) because it is reactionary. 
Instead, the mestiza consciousness is that which acts rather than reacts; it is that which 
enables the creation of new possibilities, new relations, new cultures—none of which are 
based upon divisive dualities nor a mere celebration of pluralism. 
La mestiza is a product of living in the shifting spaces of the psychic, material, 
cultural, linguistic, and spiritual borderlands. Dominant culture has suggested la mestiza is 
an "impure" and inferior race; Anzaldua rewrites the hybrid as a "more malleable species 
with a rich gene pool" (77). La mestiza is a shape-changer, a hybrid in motion and 
movement, "She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode—nothing 
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rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the 
ambivalence into something else" (79). Within the synergy of this third-space is the potential 
to move beyond fixity and duality and into an ever evolving process of be coming. 
Conclusion 
Audre Lorde and Gloria Anzaldua provide excellent examples of how 
outsiders/within invoke a politics of location to positively re-affirm marginalized identities 
and reconstruct alternative subjectivities that are consummate with their feminist ideals. 
While the basic tenets of a politics of location remain the same for both, each offers a unique 
approach to re-writing their subjectivities. Lorde reveals the centrality of reclaiming that 
which others' have trained us to doubt—in particular, our emotional sensibility. She 
consistently insists that we map our identity relations to reveal the intersectionality of 
oppressions and the thread that binds them: fear of difference. Reconstructing her 
subjectivity through reclaiming the "house difference" (Zami 226) as a positive and 
generative location, Lorde articulates the interdependency and intersubjectivity of subject 
positions and the radical possibility for a different future through coalitional work: 
We have chosen each other 
and the edge of each others battles 
the war is the same 
if we lose 
someday women's blood will congeal 
upon a dead planet 
if we win 
there is no telling 
we seek beyond history 
for a new and more possible meeting. (123) 
The unknown and unknowable are held out as hopeful places (not a reason for despair), 
which can only be achieved through the hard work of coalitional struggle. Through her use 
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of a politics of location, Anzaldua displays the significance of material spaces and how these 
locations are written on our sense of self. She maps a complicated relationship to language, 
culture, and family by locating both the positive and negative imprints of these factors on her 
identity. Insisting that we name and excavate the negative effects of colonization, Anzaldua 
reclaims hybrid identities, multiplicity, and fluidity as generative locations, a spaces of vision 
and hope. 
Both authors contribute to the creation of a politics of location as a set of rhetorical 
strategies for feminists to engage in the creation of a subject of feminism that embraces 
difference, multiplicity, and communal vision of a world not built upon relations of 
domination and subordination, an intersubjectivity that interrupts the normative subject of 
rhetoric. They contextualize their truth claims in time and space by writing from culturally 
specific bodies, experiences, geographies, and spiritualities. In so doing they construct a 
non-innocent, accountable, and socio-culturally located speaking subject. They locate non-
rational ways of knowing and perceiving as sources of individual and collective change. In 
mapping identity positions they construct a malleable, fluid subjectivity that is always in 
processes of be-coming as they move from the general to the particular in efforts to 
deconstruct oppressive relations and reconstruct egalitarian relationships across and between 
differences. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Mapping Resistant Subjects: Insiders/Without 
So this is one gain for me as I change: I learn a way of looking at the world 
that is more accurate, complex, multi-layered, multi-dimensioned, more 
truthful: to see the world of overlapping circles, like movement on the 
millpond after a fish has jumped, instead of the courthouse square with me at 
the middle. 
—Minnie Bruce Pratt 17 
As indicated in chapter three, reading signs and mapping social positions are two of 
the preeminent tools of writers who use a politics of location as a rhetorical strategy for 
constructing alternative subjectivities and a differential consciousness. It is my argument 
that some subjects who exist in dominant, or centered, social locations follow a parallel 
process of dis-identification with hegemonic representation of themselves. However, these 
subjects dis-identify with their centered status. In this process of dis-identification they 
become "off-center," thus becoming "insiders/without." As the opening passage from Minnie 
Bruce Pratt indicates, insiders/without gain a more complicated, multi-dimensional 
understanding of the world than those subjects who view the world unquestioningly from 
"centered" positions. I separate outsiders/within and insiders/without to emphasize that while 
both kinds of subjects engage in parallel processes of a Foucauldian "refusal of the self," the 
direction of these processes are actually different depending on the context and the writer's 
relative position to normative subjectivity. In excavating the meaning of social locations, 
outsiders/within positively reclaim a marginalized identity or set of character traits associated 
with a particular identity. Insiders/without, in excavating the meaning of their centered 
social locations, negatively deconstruct an identity or character traits associated with a 
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particular identity. Both kinds of subjects then move to re-create subjectivities that are not 
based on relations of domination and subordination. 
I use the term insider/without to signify the kind of movement involved when 
centered subjects critically investigate entrenched assumptions about their social locations. 
However, the movement I am suggesting is one of consciousness and discursive actions 
rather than a material shift in social position. In her work on traitorous identities, Alison 
Bailey argues that white people who are "race traitors" do not become "marginal" subjects, or 
insider/outsiders (which is the logical parallel term to outsider/insiders), because those who 
hold dominant subject positions can never fully abnegate their privileged status. As an 
example, Bailey details the story of a white, middle class heterosexual couple who bought a 
house in the white section of segregated Louisville, Kentucky and then deeded it to an 
African-American couple as an act of resistance to segregation. The white couple was 
deemed "traitorous" to the "white race" and ostracized by other whites in the local 
community. Bailey points out, however, that because the white couple carried a privileged 
racial identity in the larger context of the United States, they could never denounce their 
privileged position once and for all. For example, they could conceivably relocate to another 
community, who would not necessarily perceive them as "race traitors" unless they continued 
to engaged in transgressive acts. Thus, while race traitors might be ostracized in contexts in 
which they challenge white privilege, they carry their privilege with them to each new 
context or community. 
Bailey goes on to argue that ostracism in local contexts is not equivalent to always 
already being positioned on the margins. Extending Sandra Harding's (1991) and Allison 
Jaggar's (1983) work on standpoint theory, Bailey challenges the implication that traitors 
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"become marginal." That is, "becoming marginal" is misleading because the shift in race 
traitors' ways of seeing and knowing is conflated with a shift in social location. She explains, 
"The description [of becoming marginal] makes it sound as if traitors have a foot in each 
world and are caught equally between them, and this picture does not foreground white 
privilege" (32). For Bailey, a rejection of privilege or interruption of racism might enable an 
epistemic shift; but it can never result in a material shift in social positioning. Following 
Sandra Harding's discussion of privilege-cognizant heterosexuals, Bailey suggests that what 
is rejected is not whiteness per se, but a rejection of the "spontaneous consciousness" that is 
taken for granted as a result of living in a white supremacist culture. She extends discussions 
of how individuals who occupy dominant social locations can develop a reflective 
consciousness by arguing that the performance of traitorous scripts cultivates a traitorous 
character; thereby destabilizing naturalized positions of dominance. This traitorous character 
is never permanent, but a particular value-system that insiders attempt to embody through 
actions that decenter, subvert, or destabilize the center. It is also marked by a general way of 
being that engages critically and consistently with the consequences of experiencing the 
world through a dominant racial social location. Bailey writes, "Traitors choose to try to 
understand the price at which privileges are gained, they are critical of the unearned 
privileges granted to them by white patriarchal cultures, and they take responsibility for 
them" (36-37). Bailey makes an important argument, cautioning us not to conflate epistemic 
shifts with shifts in social status. She suggests that becoming a race traitor entails more than 
a shift in consciousness; there must be substantive action that accompanies this shift. 
While the term insider/without can be misleading; I use the category for several 
reasons that follow a line of reasoning similar to Bailey's articulation of traitorous identities. 
First, insiders/without provides a useful parallel term to outsiders/within; both positions are 
born of a culture of resistance against oppressive relations of domination and subordination. 
That is, the term implies that a critical consciousness and epistemic shift are necessary in 
order to question and destabilize the normative assumptions of centered subjects. Second, 
the term helps accentuate the different kind of work involved in "refusing the self for 
centered subjects: the deconstruction of a dominant subjectivity in order to get out of what 
Pratt calls the "narrow circle of self' (18), a standpoint from which those in dominant 
positions have been taught to view the world. And as the quotation from Pratt at the 
beginning of this chapter indicates, the dis-identification with a centered identity opens the 
possibility for a multi-dimensional perspective of the world. Importantly, dis-identification, 
in the case of race privilege and oppression entails more than a rejection of overt racism. For 
example, Adrienne Rich suggests that many white feminists need to dis-identify with white 
solipsism. She explains that this passive collusion with white superiority is "not the 
consciously held belief that one race is inherently superior to all others, but a tunnel-vision 
which simply does not see nonwhite experience or existence as precious or significant" 
("Disloyal" 306). To dis-identify with white solipsism is to become off-center. Third and 
perhaps most importantly, the "without" component of the term "insiders-without" does not 
signify "without privilege." Insiders/without are never without attendant privileges of 
dominant locations; rather, they are without "spontaneous consciousness," without 
unreflected-upon privilege. Finally, the status of an insider/without is not a permanent 
position, but is, following Bailey, a character trait that must be fostered through continued 
engagement in transgressive actions against the dominant social order. I argue that 
insiders/without invoke a politics of location in order to map and excavate the meaning of 
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dominant identities in such a way that they become "off-center," deconstructing both active 
collusion with systems of oppression and passive collusion through unreflected-upon 
privilege. Ultimately the goal in utilizing a politics of location as a discursive strategy is 
similar for insiders/without and outsiders/within: to re-construct subjectivities in a manner 
that is resistant to systems of domination and subordination. In the remainder of this chapter 
I show how two insiders/without (Minnie Bruce Pratt and Marilyn Frye) invoke a politics of 
location to map and excavate the meanings of their inherited identities and to re-construct 
subjectivities that are "without" a spontaneous consciousness about their centered social 
positioning. I have chosen two radical, lesbian feminists who occupy racially and 
economically privileged positions as insiders/without because I understand race and class as 
two of the preeminent stratifying forces in the context of the United States as well as the 
context of feminist communities and coalitions. This is not, however, intended to elide other 
forces of stratification. I have also chosen Pratt's and Frye's essays because they work in 
dialogue with one another. Frye's 1992 essay "White Woman Feminist" is an extension of 
her 1983 essay "On Being White" and she elements of Pratt's discussion of white morality as 
a launching point to map and excavate the implications of a white, middle class, feminine 
identity. 
Minnie Bruce Pratt's Politics of Location in "Blood Skin Heart" 
Minnie Bruce Pratt's essay "Identity: Skin Blood Heart" provides an excellent 
example of an insider/without utilizing a politics of location to map and excavate the 
embedded meanings of her white, middle class, Southern, Christian, female identity. Pratt 
grounds her examination of her identity in three geographical locations: her childhood 
hometown in Alabama, a town in North Carolina in which she first became involved in 
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feminist politics and came out as a lesbian, and her then current home in Washington D.C., 
which "white suburbanites" refer to as "the jungle" (11). Similar to Anzaldûa, Pratt explores 
her relation to these material places, their histories, and the people who inhabit them. In so 
doing, she narrates the painful process of coming to consciousness about how her (relatively) 
privileged social location has constrained her to "the narrow circle of self (18), 
disconnecting her from other women with whom she could engage in coalitional politics and 
loving relationships. 
Importantly, this essay is not simply a narrative of coming into consciousness. It does 
not follow the typical structure of a coming to consciousness narrative in which the narrator 
moves from constraint to liberation. Instead Pratt's narrative shifts forward and backward in 
time, tracing her continued struggle to find ways of speaking across the barriers that have 
divided her from others. Pratt frames her essay around the following questions: "How do we 
begin to change, and then keep going, and act on this in the world? How do we want to be 
different from what we have been?" (19 italics in original). These questions situate change, 
both personal and collective, as an on-going process of be-coming through a refusal of the 
self. Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty also suggest that Pratt's narrative is 
distinctive in "its tentativeness, its consisting of fits and starts, and the absence of linear 
progress toward a visible end" (305). The undefined "end" is envisioned through the 
hermeneutics of love. Throughout her essay, Pratt reveals how resistance to domination and 
change are potentially painful and frightening processes, but she insists that the motive for 
change is love: "I began when I jumped from my edge and outside myself, into radical 
change, for love: simply love: for myself and for other women.. .this love led me directly, 
but by a complicated way, to work against racism and anti-Semitism" (19). As indicated in 
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chapter two, the hermeneutics of love operates as a "punctum" or rupture; it "undoes the 'one' 
that gather the narrative, the couple, the race, into a singularity [and].. .Instead.. .gathers up 
the mezcla, the mixture that lives through differential movement between possibilities of 
being" (Sandoval 170). Pratt a politics of location as a discursive strategy to trace her 
history of coming to consciousness with the purpose of understanding the barriers that keep 
her from living out her feminist ideals: "I'm trying to get a little closer to the longed-for but 
unrealized world, where we each are able to live, but not by trying to make someone less 
than us, not by someone else's blood or pain: yes, that's what I'm trying to do with my living 
now" (13). The distinction between a narrative of coming to consciousness and a narrative 
that attempts to find answers to the question of how to enact social change through one's 
quotidian experiences is significant because it marks a different relationship to subjectivity 
and agency. In focusing her narrative on what she is attempting to "do with [her] living," 
Pratt situates her subjectivity as "in process." Martin and Mohanty also argue that Pratt: 
succeeds in carefully taking apart the bases of her own privilege by resituating 
herself again and again in the social, by constantly referring to the materiality 
of the situation in which she finds herself. The form of the personal historical 
narrative forces her to re-anchor herself repeatedly in each of the positions 
from which she speaks, even as she works to expose the illusory coherence of 
those positions. (295) 
The ways in which Pratt materially and historically grounds her narrative enables her to use 
strategic essentialism to locate the workings of her privileged identity and the way in which it 
has shaped her sense of self and perspective on the world. At the same time, the material and 
historical grounding across time and space in the narrative reveal the relational and shifting 
147 
nature of her identity. Narratives of coming to consciousness can fall into the danger of 
reifying a static relationship to identity. That is, these types of narratives can suggest that 
after "arriving" at the point of critical consciousness one's sense of subjectivity is finished or 
complete and one can then act freely in the world unfettered by hegemonic constructions of 
the self. However, in Pratt's essay, her narrative of coming to consciousness operates as a 
backdrop for a discussion of her desire to reconstruct her subjectivity so that she can engage 
with other women in ways that are consummate with her feminist ideals. In fact, she argues 
that subjectivity is always in process: "I have learned that.. .the process of change is long, 
and since the unjust world is duplicated again every day, in large and small, so I must try to 
recreate, every day, a new self striving for a new just world" (46). Pratt proceeds to explore 
how she recreates this self in each moment that she interacts with another, how she continues 
to engage with the struggle to seek social change, how she seeks new ways of being that 
allow her to live in loving connection with other women. It is my contention that her use of a 
politics of location allows for this recreation. 
Also important, Pratt situates herself in dialogue with other women. The knowledge 
she forwards about white, Southern femininity is a contribution to a larger conversation, not 
the "Truth" about all white, Southern women: 
I am speaking my small piece of truth, as best I can. My friend Barbara Deming has 
reminded me: we each have only a piece of the truth. So here it is: I'm putting it 
down for you to see if our fragments match anywhere, if our pieces, together, make 
another larger piece of the truth that can be part of the map we are making together to 
show us the way to get to the longed-for world. (16) 
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Throughout her narrative Pratt attempts to connect her individual experiences with the 
collective experiences of other groups of women; however she does not suggest that she 
speaks for any particular group of women. Rather, in using a politics of location as a 
discursive strategy to map her identity and relationships with others she maintains 
accountability for the interestedness of the meaning she construes from her social location in 
a larger effort to create coalitions with other women. 
Mapping Material and Psychic Spaces 
Similar to Anzaldua's location of identity in the material U.S Southwest/Mexico 
borderlands, Pratt invokes a politics of location through materially locating the construction 
of her identity in houses, public buildings, streets and the history inscribed in the places that 
she either unknowingly or willfully ignored throughout her life. For example, an exploration 
of her relationship to the geography of her hometown in Alabama helps her understand how 
she learned at early age to perceive herself as a centered subject. She recalls the time her 
father tried to coax her to climb to the clock tower atop the courthouse where she could be 
the center of the town and see "everything." Pratt ultimately disappoints her father by not 
being able to climb the final set of stairs to the clock tower. In reflection she realizes this 
view from the center is her inheritance. This centered view would allow her to see the 
courthouse, the grocery, the jail, the bank, the church, and other buildings within the town; it 
would occlude from her vision the sawmill, the houses of the town's black population, and 
the settlement of the white people who worked at the mill. Pratt goes on to excavate how her 
identity was constructed by her particular relationship to the geography of her town: 
I was shaped by my relation to those buildings and to the people in the 
buildings, by ideas of who should be working in the Board of Education, of 
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who should be in the bank handling money, of who should have the guns and 
the keys to the jail, of who should be in the jail; and I was shaped by what I 
didn't see, or didn't notice, on those streets. (17) 
The material map of her hometown becomes the launching point for Pratt's use of a politics 
of location to map her non-innocent social position in relation to others. The interrogation of 
her "position of material advantage" (16) is motivated by the desire to de-center her vantage 
point, which she believes will offer a more sophisticated vision of society and social 
relations. As she changes, she explains: 
I learn a way of looking at the world that is more accurate, complex, multi-
layered, multi-dimensioned, more truthful: to see the world of overlapping 
circles, like movement on the millpond after a fish has jumped, instead of the 
courthouse square with me at the middle.. .1 feel the need to look differently 
because I've learned that what is presented to me as an accurate view of the 
world is frequently a lie. (17) 
Throughout her narrative, Pratt the physical surroundings (public buildings, streets, houses) 
in each of the places where she has lived as a launching point to deconstruct how those 
material places, and the histories that have been written onto and erased from them in her 
memory, have shaped her identity and her perspective on the world. In deconstructing the 
non-innocence of her relationship to those sites, she begins to reconstruct her subjectivity 
through a differential consciousness. 
In addition to using material locations as places from which to excavate the meaning 
of her privileged location in the world, Pratt locates emotions as sites for excavating her 
social location and ways of perceiving the world that constrict her to the narrow circle of self. 
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For example, she narrates her coming-out experience as a lesbian and the intense grief and 
pain she felt when her children were taken from her by her own mother and husband. The 
anguish she experiences as a result of being thrust out of her "circle of protection" becomes 
the motive for seeking justice. She writes, "I became obsessed with justice: the shell of my 
privilege was broken, the shell that had given me a shape in the world, held me apart from 
the world, protected me from the world. I was astonished at the pain; the extent of my 
surprise revealed to me the degree of my protection" (27 italics mine). Pratt describes 
initially feeling as if no other person in the world "had sustained such loss" (27), a feeling 
that could have reified her solipsistic perspective of the world. However, she ultimately 
describes the pain and her reaction to it as that which compelled her to recognize the 
magnitude of her privilege and degree to which it informed her identity and subsequent view 
of the world. Stepping "outside the circle of protection" moves Pratt into a differential 
consciousness, which she to educate herself about her position in the world and the history 
of oppression and resistance inscribed in the geography and architecture of the U.S. South. 
Throughout her narrative she uses emotions as a location for questioning. Thus emotions 
become a way of knowing, but they are not held out as truth; they are used as a launching 
point to excavate the meaning of her social position in relation to others. 
Pratt also attempts to locate a space in between the emotions learned through her 
privileged identity (such as fear) and the emotions that drive her desire for a new sense of 
self (such as pain and love). She uses emotions strategically in her narrative to place a wedge 
between the ways she was taught to be and the ways she wants to be. For instance, she 
describes how criticisms of her statements in discussions of racism and anti-Semitism 
immediately induce fear in her, "I feel my racing heart, breath, tightening of my skin around 
151 
me, literally defense to protect my narrow circle" (18). She reads and deconstructs this fear 
as a response learned through a privileged world-view that is founded upon a larger culture 
of fear: "I have learned that my fear is kin to a terror that has been in my birth culture for 
years, for centuries: the terror of a people who have set themselves apart and above, who 
have wronged others, and feel they are about to be found out and punished" (17). Similar to 
Lorde, locating emotion in a culture of fear is a significant discursive strategy because 
emotions often are construed as essential, or somehow anterior to culture. However, Pratt 
makes an important connection between the emotion of fear in the context of conflicts about 
racism and anti-Semitism and her social location as a white middle class Christian-raised 
woman. Through an acknowledgement of how her emotions are tied to her identity, Pratt 
unearths the social constructedness of particular emotions, and thus has the ability to 
interrupt that fear and replace it with a different emotion: desire for connection with other 
women. The location of fear as a point of departure for excavation and a growing awareness 
of her protected and privileged location push Pratt to search for a new kind of "place" from 
which to enact social change. This new place is desire: desire to live in connection with 
other women, rather than in disconnection through superiority (or elevation at the top of the 
courthouse). Utilizing a politics of location to deconstruct negative emotions and replace 
them with positive emotions, Pratt begins to reconstitute her subjectivity through the 
hermeneutics of love. This hermeneutic operates as the launching point for her radical 
critique of how her identity as a white, middle class, Southern woman (and the concomitant 
"ways of being" that are attached to that identity) hinder coalitional politics specifically in 
addressing racism and anti-Semitism. 
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Locating, Mapping and Excavating Identities 
Pratt situates racism and anti-Semitism as moral issues of right and wrong, as matters 
of how to live (either in disconnection through superiority or connection through respect and 
equity). However, she understands that the culture she was raised in taught her a moral 
system, a way of being that potentially blocks genuine change in struggling against these 
oppressions. Nonetheless, she resignifies the framework of morality to position issues of 
domination as matters of right and wrong, thus re-appropriating a framework that has often 
been used to oppress anything and anyone considered "deviant." In her re-appropriation and 
resignification of morality, Pratt finds it necessary to first engage in sign-reading to 
deconstruct the moral/ethical system by which she was taught to live. She begins by 
exploring a moral system connected to her subject position as a white, Southern, middle 
class, Christian woman. Martin and Mohanty suggest that this system of morality constitutes 
"points of enunciation that she identifies as the legacy of her culture" (300), which taught 
Pratt ways of being that reduce processes of change and issues of how to live to a series of 
"ought-tos." Pratt's reading and deconstruction of these points of enunciation reveals the 
non-innocence of the subject-positions and roles constructed from this system of morality. 
Ultimately, her deconstruction is part of a larger effort discover ways of enacting change 
through a reconstituted subjectivity that does not reify these roles. 
Pratt describes the various roles she was taught to personify when confronting issues 
of right and wrong and how she struggles against these roles in her current efforts to confront 
racism and anti-Semitism: 
I was taught to be a judge, of moral responsibility and of punishment only in 
relation to my ethical system; was taught to be a martyr, to take all the 
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responsibility for change, and the glory, to expect others to do nothing; was 
taught to be a peacemaker, to mediate, negotiate between opposing sides 
because I knew the right way; was taught to be a preacher, to point out 
wrongs and tell others what to do. Nowadays, I struggle not to speak with the 
tones or gestures or notions of these roles when I raise, outloud, with other 
women, those interior questions that I have asked myself, about my 
understanding of anti-Semitism and racism. (14-15) 
Reading the roles of superiority as signs that have taught her how resistance to injustice and 
social change should occur, Pratt works to deconstruct how these roles affect her relations 
with others in coalition work. That is, these roles are deeply embedded in her privileged 
position and if she is to act against anti-Semitism and racism by animating these ways of 
being she will potentially reify her status as a "centered" subject in what Maya Angelou has 
called the "unknowing majority" (qtd. in Pratt 12), or what Bailey calls "spontaneous 
consciousness." Caught in a contradictory relationship between a desire to challenge racism 
and anti-Semitism and a sense of entrapment in roles of superiority learned through a 
privileged position in society, Pratt shifts her focus from leading by "ought-tos" to leading 
with a desire to live in loving connection with others: 
I am struggling now to speak, but not out of any role of ought-to; I ask that 
you try not to place me in that role. I am trying to speak from my heart, out of 
need, as a woman who loves other women passionately, and wants us to be 
able to be together as friends in this unjust world.. .trying to figure out my 
responsibility and my need in struggles against injustice in a way that will 
lead to our friendship. (15) 
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As indicated above, this shift in focus from envisioning social change through a structure of 
morality based on superiority to envisioning change through desire for greater connection 
with others is central to Pratt's use of a politics of location as a discursive strategy for 
rewriting her subjectivity because she locates the nexus of agency, of social transformation, 
in emotion. Desire, rather than rules, rationality, or roles of superiority motivates Pratt to 
become different from how she was taught to live, trapped in her white, middle class 
solipsism, living in disconnection from others. 
In choosing to shift from living by a set of rules to living out of need/desire, Pratt 
discursively emotion as a place from which to locate both motives and barriers in 
deconstructing oppressions; thus using alternative, non-rationale modes of knowing as a 
means for producing greater understanding. Similar to Audre Lorde and Gloria Anzaldua, 
Pratt returns again and again to emotions as a resource for creating social change. For 
example, she suggests that the actual process of living out her feminist ideal of equitably 
interacting with others is exhausting at times, pointedly stating that "It would be a lie to say 
this process is comforting" (12). Much as the pain of mestiza consciousness provides 
potentially productive avenues for new ways of being, Pratt describes this discomfort as a 
launching point for excavating the deeply embedded emotions that she confronts in 
dismantling her privileged position, such as fear of loss, fear of losing her sense of self. The 
pain of being in a third-space is transformed into a productive emotion. For instance, using 
the metaphor of a shroud, Pratt suggests that in stripping away the layered meanings of her 
identity she fears she will discover "a disintegrating, rotting nothing: that the values that I 
have at my core, from my culture, will only be those of negativity, exclusion, fear, death" 
(39). She links this feeling to a material history of how her identity was culturally 
155 
constructed through "negative characteristics: by the absence of 'no dogs, Negroes, or 
Jews'" (39). Pratt further explores the ways she learned at a very early age to define her 
sense of self in relation to what she was not, rather than in relation to positive qualities. 
Pratt's mapping and excavation of her identity reveals the degree to which her sense of self is 
based upon oppression of others through a fear of difference. This enables her to draw 
connections between her emotions and a larger culture: "When we discover truths about our 
home culture, we may fear we are losing our self: our self-respect, our self-importance" (47). 
Linking emotions with a material history of learning to define herself through negativity is a 
significant rhetorical move because it enables Pratt to locate the deeply rooted implications 
of her centered identity and the effects of that identity on her current desire for individual and 
collective social change. That is, through her excavation she is able to expose one of the 
consequences of her cultural identity as a white, Southern, middle class woman: a fear that 
changing her ways of being in the world might lead to nihilism. 
Pratt does not end her excavation of the connection between a "negative identity" and 
fear here. She goes on to explore how the sense of a "naked self often leads to the 
appropriation of other cultural identities and struggles. For example, she offers the example 
of the Christian-raised woman who feels a sense of exclusion and pain stating that she 
"always felt like a Jew" (40). Or, she provides the example of a Euro-American woman 
renaming herself from three different Native American tribes, which functions to clothe "our 
naked, negative selves with something from the positive traditions of identity which have 
served in part to help folks survive our people" (40). Alternatively, appropriation occurs 
through taking something, such black gospel music, and using it to support her white 
solipsism. For example, after examining her emotional reaction to black gospels and 
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spirituals, she states, "I was using Black people to weep for me, to express my sorrow at my 
responsibility, and that of my people, for their oppression: and I was mourning because I felt 
they had something I didn't, a closeness, a hope, that I and my folks had lost because we had 
to tried to shut other people out of our hearts and lives" (41). Pratt recognizes this response 
to a fear of nihilism as a reification of her privileged status—reproducing a way of being that 
is linked with her cultural history as a Euro-American taking from others and re-centering her 
sense of self, her plight, her loss. Thus, her excavation moves her into the position of 
insider/without, into a differential consciousness rather than re-enacting the spontaneous 
consciousness that reproduces a centered status. As Pratt strips away layers and layers of her 
identity through mapping emotion, cultural history, and personal history she deconstructs 
how her emotional responses and ways of acting are deeply implicated in her centered 
position as an insider. This deconstruction, she argues, is a necessary action in a process of 
creating a new way of being; however, it should not lead to guilt or shame because these 
emotions feed the solipsism she struggles against. 
In addition to deconstructing an identity built upon a false sense of self-importance 
and respect and disconnection from others through a fear of difference, Pratt engages in sign 
reading to reconstruct a different kind of self-respect through reclaiming positive elements of 
her cultural history and identity (which is similar to Anzaldua's move to claim the life-
affirming elements of her culture). For example, she recognizes that her Christian 
(Presbyterian) identity trained her to be skeptical in her thinking and her Southern identity 
taught her to value connection to history and people—both of which are integral in her 
struggle against anti-Semitism and racism (44). She also recognizes a historical tradition of 
Southern white women who worked for social justice through the abolition movement and 
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anti-Klan activities, a history which she chooses to claim in addition to a cultural history built 
upon the enslavement and exploitation of black people and Native Americans. Martin and 
Mohanty suggest that Pratt's reflection on her own and others' histories and her refusal "to 
allow guilt to trap her within the boundaries of a coherent 'white' identity" is what allows her 
to take responsibility for "working through the complex historical relations between and 
among structures of domination and oppression" (299). Pratt maintains a complicated 
relationship to her history and privileged location—understanding it both as an obstacle and a 
potential resource in creating new ways of relating to others. A politics of location provides 
the discursive agency to deconstruct and excavate layers of meanings in her identity 
positions, allowing her to dis-identify with a false sense of self importance. As well, there 
are agentive opportunities in acting on the knowledge she gains from the deconstruction. 
With this knowledge she can begin to act in ways that don't reify her privileged position as 
the centered, all-knowing judge of right and wrong or as the negatively defined subject who 
must appropriate other cultural identities to assuage a fear of nihilism. In choosing not to 
live through ought-tos and disconnection and instead live through need, desire, and 
connection with others, Pratt is able to re-construct an intersubjectivity. 
Locating and Excavating "Safe" Spaces 
Pratt's invocation of a politics of location allows her to excavate the deeply embedded 
meanings of her white, middle class, Christian, Southern identity, dis-identify with the 
oppressive elements of that social identity, and imagine and enact relations devoid of 
domination. However, even as Pratt begins to envision a different "place," or community, 
from which to create non-oppressive ways of interacting with other women, she reveals how 
her desire for what she calls a "safe place" is dangerously rooted in her history and identity as 
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a privileged woman. Pratt does not reject the desire for a place of safety to engage creatively 
with other women, but she does suggest that her notions of what safety might look like are 
built upon a non-innocent understanding of it. She writes, "I had not admitted that the safety 
of much of my childhood was because Laura Gates, Black and a servant, was responsible for 
me; that I had the walks with my father because the woods were 'ours' by systematic 
economic exploitation, instigated, at that time, by his White Citizens' Council" (25). She 
explains that her "experience of a safe space to be was based on places secured by omission, 
exclusion or violence, and on [her] submitting to the limits of that place" (26). To carry over 
those notions of safety into feminist coalitions would necessitate also bringing the very 
values that she actively attempts to deconstruct in challenging her privileged social location. 
Excavating the implications of her own privileged notions of the new "place" she envisions 
enables Pratt to maintain a sense of non-innocent subjectivity and accountability for the 
future she imagines. 
Martin and Mohanty ask how a narrative such as Pratt's "might translate into the 
building of political collectivity" (308). Certainly autobiographical narratives are limited in 
actually creating coalitions. However, I believe Pratt's use of a politics of location as a 
radical political rhetoric does lay the groundwork for creating bridges across differences 
because she is confronting and dismantling normative subjectivity by mapping, 
deconstructing, and reconstructing her sense of self and community at an important historical 
moment in the 1980s when hegemonic feminism was being challenged.13 Pratt's narrative is 
one contribution to a collective set of intervening practices that move us beyond a feminist 
13 And, although less fixed in the new millennium than it was in the late 1970s, I believe hegemonic feminism is 
in continued need of interruption. 
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discourse based on universal interests, fixed subject-positions, and homogeneity and into a 
place that centers accountability through non-innocent subjectivity, desire and hope for 
transformation of all oppressive relations, and the hermeneutics of love or the "alliance and 
affection across lines of difference" (Sandoval 170). I also believe the narrative has effects 
beyond a simple transformation of Pratt's consciousness because it is historically and 
materially situated and provides us with a model of understanding subjectivity as relational 
and mobile in such a way that avoids the theoretical abstractions indeterminacy and 
performativity. 
I also believe part of the answer to Martin and Mohanty's question lies in the way in 
which Pratt's demands accountability from her audience, stating that women must "ask 
ourselves in what ways we have recreated in our 'new' world, our 'women's world,' a replica 
of our segregated culture-bound homes" (49-50). Thus she calls readers to deconstruct how 
their identities and sense of a feminist community have been shaped in relation to geography, 
history, and culture, a deconstruction that can lead to the kind of self-reflexivity that is a 
necessary component of coalition building. Another part of the answer to Martin and 
Mohanty's question is the way in which Pratt's narrative is grounded in her relationship to 
specific historical and political contexts. That is, Pratt does not retreat to an abstract level of 
self-examination, but locates the reconstruction of her subjectivity in a long and continual 
struggle to build a sense of community, which calls readers to examine the specificity of their 
own positions within coalition building. Equally important, her narrative also confronts the 
fear and pain involved in coalition building by admitting that such self-examination can lead 
to a fear of losing a sense of self. But she insists that if women are to create coalitions across 
differences, then excavating the "negative identity" of centered subjects is the necessary 
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precursor to ultimately reconstructing subjectivities that coincide with feminist political 
ideals. Pratt suggests that we can displace emotional fears by perceiving the many gains on 
the other side of facing complicity in oppressive ways of interacting with other women, 
which ultimately amounts to hope and belief that we do have the agency to be different from 
what we have been, to engage in the refusal of self.14 
Marilyn Frye's Politics of Location in Whitely Feminism 
Marilyn Frye's work on whitely feminism provides another example of an 
insider/without utilizing a politics of location as a discursive strategy for deconstructing and 
then reconstructing her identity. In her 1983 essay "On Being White: Thinking Toward a 
Feminist Understanding of Race and Race Supremacy" Frye begins excavating the meaning 
of "being white" in white supremacist society. She continues this work in her 1992 essay 
"White Woman Feminist: 1983-1992," which offers a more fully developed excavation of 
this identity category. 
In her first essay, Frye locates the beginnings of her excavation in her experience in a 
collective of other white women exploring racism in their lives (a collective formed in 
response to demands by women of color for white women to address the rampant racism at 
feminist conferences, festivals, and meetings). In response to the organization of this group, 
several women of color suggested that it was racist to exclude women of color from the 
14 Katherine Adams has forwarded a model of coalition discourse based on Hannah Arendt's theory of "self-
interest" and, contrary to my interpretation, she argues that Pratt's narrative is not "self-interested" enough to 
constitute a coalition discourse. She argues that "coalition discourse calls for remaining completely self-
interested—not only articulating the self through interest, but also staying interested in the self, curious, 
observant, open to the full play of motivation and desire, and willing to negotiate all aspects of this self across 
the coalition table" (27-28). More specifically, Adams perceives Pratt's dismantling of her privilege as a white 
woman as a disavowal of her interest. On the other hand, she argues that Pratt does enact coalition discourse 
through her self-interest as a lesbian "because owning and articulating [her interests] drives her into that world 
of things that lies between, connecting and dividing" (27). 
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consciousness-raising group, and further, that the white women would never achieve their 
goal of dismantling racism in their lives by working only with white women. The group 
decided to open discussions to all women after the first few meetings, a decision which one 
woman of color in particular found to be another replication of white women's privileged 
status. In response to these events, Frye states, "It seemed that what our critic was saying 
must be right; but what she was saying didn't seem to make any sense. She seemed crazy. 
That stopped me" ("On Being White" 112). Frye stops because she realizes she has used a 
technique of dismissal used too often against women who refuse to be dutiful daughters. 
Reading the sign of her accusation, Frye reflects upon how resistant women have historically 
been dismissed as "crazy," which becomes a juncture from which to map, excavate, 
deconstruct, and reconstruct her identity position as a racially centered subject. Frye locates 
herself within a complicated and contradictory position in which she feels trapped—wanting 
to take the responsibility to unlearn racism and not put the onus of cultural work/education 
on women of color, yet re-enacting her race privilege through the freedom to decide when to 
open the group to women of color and consequently dismissing her critic through a reaction 
born of spontaneous consciousness, or unreflected-upon privilege. However, through a 
process of self-reflexivity and mapping of her relationship to the other women, Frye 
recognizes that "every choice or decision I make is made in a matrix of options," which is 
different from the matrix of options available to women of color in responding to racism: 
As a white woman I have certain freedoms and liberties. When I use them, 
according to my white woman's judgment, to act on matters of racism, my 
enterprise reflects strangely on the matrix of options within which it is 
undertaken. In the case at hand, I was deciding when to relate to white women 
and when to relate to women of color according to what I thought would 
reduce my racism, enhance my growth and improve my politics. It becomes 
clear why no decision I make here can fail to be an exercise of race privilege. 
("On Being White" 113) 
In an honest and painful acknowledgement of her complicity in oppression, Frye locates how 
her actions and the options available to her are implicated in her social location as a racially 
privileged woman. This moment of reflection becomes a starting point for her to excavate 
the meaning of whiteness and the ways in which white people reproduce race privilege. 
Mapping Privileged Memberships 
In her effort to excavate whiteness, Frye begins with a deconstruction of the notion 
that whiteness is simply a matter of skin color. Instead, she suggests that whiteness is a 
socio-political category maintained through certain ways of behaving in the world. In this 
early essay she focuses on two dimensions of whiteness: definitional power (defining 
membership in the group of white people) and a commitment to "ignorance and being 
stubborn in its defense" ("On Being White" 119). The shift from perceiving whiteness as a 
biological characteristic to a cultural behavior enables agency to be "disloyal to Whiteness" 
("On Being White" 126). Frye suggests that the preeminent way to be disloyal to whiteness 
is through education, which requires a dual move: first, those in privileged positions must 
learn about the experiences and perspectives of peoples about whom they are ignorant; and 
second, they must study their own ignorance. 
The second move constitutes the most developed aspect of Frye's excavation of this 
identity position. She suggests that ignorance for most white Americans is not passive; nor is 
it a simple over-sight; rather, most white American's willfully ignore the lives/perspective of 
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others, which allows for the relocation of their centered subject positions. For example, Frye 
places her own willful ignorance and definitional power on the plane of critique when she 
explains, "a friend of mine to whom I have been quite close off and on for some fifteen or 
twenty years, noticed I was assuming she is white: she told me she had told me years ago 
that she is Mexican. Apparently I did not hear, or I forgot, or it was convenient for me to 
whitewash her" ("On Being White" 114-115). Frye excavates willful ignorance as a 
manifested behavior learned by most white Americans, a behavior that can be unlearned 
through educating oneself about the experiences and perspectives of others and by paying 
attention to one's tendency towards willful ignorance, that is, not taking the lives, voices, or 
perspectives of others seriously. The way in which Frye maps her relationship and calls for 
white women to refuse the status of the "unknowing majority" and move beyond spontaneous 
consciousness is similar to Pratt's narrative and is significant because it is a call for white 
women, in particular, to take responsibility for moving outside the narrow circle of self. 
However, Pratt weaves into her narrative the processes through which she educated herself 
about the histories of the towns and collective struggles of resistance and oppression of 
which she had been ignorant. Thus, Frye's mapping and invective against "willful ignorance" 
remains less grounded in a material context and history; nonetheless, it is a significant 
rhetorical and political move because it is a call for accountability and Frye's example, 
although limited, situates her subjectivity as non-innocent. 
In addition to exploring willful ignorance as a white way of being, Frye examines the 
interlocking relationship of race, gender, and (hetero)sexuality to excavate how race and race 
privilege are at work in some white women's goal to be "equal" with white men. She 
suggests that white women's attachments to white men are inextricably linked to race 
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privilege and racism. That is, in seeking identification with white men, in seeking to be 
"equal" to men, white women are given some access to this group's "material and educational 
benefits and the specious benefits of enjoying secondhand feelings of superiority and 
supremacy" ("On Being White" 125). Frye maps the interlocking relationships between 
whiteness, gender, and sexuality to show how these social positions are built upon existing 
relations of domination and superiority. Reading and deconstructing how equality has been 
conceptualized by some feminists, she suggests that a dis-identification with the notion of 
"equality" is a starting point for creating different ways of being and relating to others. As 
indicated in chapter two, the concept of equality has too often meant access to structures and 
positions of privilege that are built upon structures of domination. Thus, Frye's mapping 
reveals how oppressions work in conjunction with one another and pushes us to envision 
novel ways of relating to one another across differences that are built on a concept of 
egalitarianism rather than equality. 
While Frye uses a politics of location to unearth the complex and interlocking 
relationship between oppressions, there is a tendency in this early essay to reproduce binary 
relations, which leads to a reductionist, essentialist, and fixed construal of identity (this is 
evident particularly in relation to her discussions of white men and heterosexuality). For 
example she states, "For hundreds of years and for a variety of reasons, mostly economic, 
white men of European stock have been out, world-wide, conquering, colonizing and 
enslaving people they classify as dark" ("On Being White" 122). Such a statement elides 
white women's complicity in this history of oppression. Additionally, the statement that 
white women enjoy "secondhand feelings of superiority and supremacy" ("On Being White" 
125 emphasis mine) undercuts the kind of complex relationship Frye seems to be trying to 
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uncover in excavating white ways of being in the world. Furthermore, it seems to be a 
"willful ignorance" of the social context in which she initially situates her discussion: 
woman to woman relations within the context of feminist conferences, festivals, and 
meetings. 
Nonetheless, the most significant aspect of this early essay is Frye's excavation of 
whiteness as a socio-political category with certain ways of being (definitional power, willful 
ignorance, and collusion with white masculinity) that can be resisted. In locating race as 
non-essential identity she resists the nihilism that suggests white people are finally or simply 
trapped by systems of racism and race privilege. In fact, she ends the piece on a hopeful 
note, suggesting that a critical consciousness of whiteness as a social construct, as a way of 
behaving in the world, is a starting point for an injunction against reproducing whiteness: 
I do not suggest for a moment that I can disaffiliate by a private act of will, or 
by any personal strategy. Nor, certainly, is it accomplished simply by 
thinking it possible. To think it thinkable shortcuts no work and shields one 
from no responsibility. Quite the contrary, it may be a necessary prerequisite 
to assuming responsibility, and it invites the honorable work of radical 
imagination. ("On Being White" 127) 
Despite this overt claim, Frye's essay might seem to construe change as an act of individual 
or private will because her analysis lack the degree of material and historical grounding that 
is particularly evident in the work of Anzaldua and Pratt.15 However, I believe this 
conclusion to her early essay is significant for several reasons. First, she suggests that the 
15 In her later essay she attempts to avoid the over-reliance on political abstractions by placing her excavation of 
whiteness in conversation with three different texts by people of color, which I discuss below. 
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work of excavating the meaning of whiteness in this piece is incomplete. Second, her 
statement creates a place of hope for re-creating subjectivity through both imagination and a 
degree of accountability. And finally, she insists that choosing not to reproduce whiteness 
must occur in coalitions with others interested in dismantling racism and race privilege. In 
an attempt to avoid Enlightenment notions of agency based on individualism and rationality, 
Frye suggests that change does not occur through mental fiat, but through communal 
engagement. Despite the limitation of falling into the trap of essentialism through vilifying 
white men as the locus of all oppression and erasing white women's complicity in systems of 
oppression conjoined with white men, Frye's early essay begins the preliminary work of 
using a politics of location to excavate a white subject position and create spaces for 
rewriting subjectivity. 
I believe the use of a politics of location in this essay is best understood by situating it 
within a larger, ongoing conversation. Frye indicates in an introductory footnote that the 
essay "reflects and is limited by my own location, both culturally and in the process of 
change. The last thing I would want is that it be read either as my last, or as a complete, 
account of what whiteness is and of what that means to a white feminist" (110). She situates 
the excavation of her white identity, as partial, interested, and incomplete, or in process. She 
extends her discussion of whiteness in a later essay, "White Woman Feminist: 1983-1992," 
which she suggests is one and the same with the first essay "emerging after several 
metamorphoses" ("White" 147), thereby displaying an ongoing engagement over the period 
of a decade with the naming and deconstruction of her white identity. The combination of 
both essays illustrates that the use of a politics of location is not simply a cursory recognition 
of one's social position. Rather, mapping whiteness is a process that must be engaged 
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continually in order to cultivate new forms of subjectivity in a life-long endeavor of be­
coming. 
Locating and Mapping Whiteliness 
Similar to her first essay, Frye begins her 1992 essay by exposing the dangerous 
double-bind she experiences as an insider/without: wanting to disassociate with her 
membership in the dominant race, but cognizant that rejection of a group identity does not 
erase the history of white privilege that informs much of her consciousness and potential 
actions. More pointedly, the very choice to disassociate is inevitably an exercise of privilege, 
which Frye contends has "the distinctive finality of a trap," seemingly closing the possibility 
of social change ("White" 150). Frye is unwilling to accept the closed circuit of this logic 
that deceptively binds her to a position of paralysis devoid of agency. 
In looking for a way out of this catch-twenty-two, she creates a neologism that is 
analogous to the concept of masculinity: whiteliness. This term denotes a distinction 
between a way of being in the world and physical characteristics. Frye argues that "being 
white-skinned (like being male) is a matter of physical traits presumed to be physically 
determined; being whitely (like being masculine) I conceive as a deeply ingrained way of 
being in the world" ("White" 151 emphasis mine). This neologism allows her to explore 
whiteness in further detail than in her 1983 essay, and, as I will show below, leads the way 
out of her initial quandary feeling that white people are simply and finally trapped by their 
position as insiders because it elucidates whiteness as a performance rather than an essence. 
Frye suggests that while there is not a direct correlation between maleness and masculinity, 
or whiteness and whiteliness, there is a contingent correlation—which moves the excavation 
of whiteliness away from particular kinds of people that might be identified through fixed 
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identity categories and into a discussion of ways of behaving, ways of seeing the world, ways 
of being—thus suggesting that different ways of being are possible in people who have 
white-skin privilege. Positioning her excavation of this identity category in performance, in 
a way of being, as opposed to biology offers the kind of agency to reconstruct her 
subjectivity that the double-bind seems to preclude. 
In tandem with her first essay, Frye suggests that white women do two things to resist 
the spontaneous consciousness of insiders: reflect on ways of being in the world that reify 
privilege and listen to the voices of people of color. Consciously following her proposed 
methods for unlearning whiteliness, Frye places her experiences as a white woman in 
dialogue with several other texts that discuss whiteliness. First, she uses Minnie Bruce 
Pratt's categories of white morality (being judge, preacher, martyr, and peacemaker) as a 
general framework. Second she uses excerpts from This Bridge Called My Back, Feminist 
Theory: From Margin to Center, and Drylongso, all of which offer perceptions of white 
people and whitely ways of being from the vantage point of people of color. In juxtaposing 
these voices, Frye shows how the process of excavating whiteness and formulating a 
differential consciousness is not an individualistic act, but one born of dialogue and 
coalitional politics. 
Frye begins her excavation by locating whitely assumptions she learned as a young 
Southerner, "I learned that I, and 'we,' knew right from wrong and had the responsibility to 
see to it right was done; that there were others who did not know what is right and wrong and 
should be advised, instructed, helped and directed by us" ("White" 153). Placing these 
assumptions in conversation with Pratt's categories and statements from people of color 
included in This Bridge Called My Back, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, and 
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Drylongso, Frye proceeds to excavate the meaning embedded in roles of judge, preacher, 
martyr, and peacemaker that whitely people assume. This exploration leads Frye to identify 
the following whitely ways of being in the world: 
Whitely people generally consider themselves to be benevolent and good-
willed, fair, honest, and ethical. ("White" 154) 
Whitely people have a staggering faith in their own Tightness and goodness, 
and that of other whitely people. We are not crooks. ("White" 154) 
Their ethics is in a great part an ethics of forms, procedures, and due process. 
As Minnie Bruce Pratt said, their morality is a matter of 'ought-to,' not 'want 
to' or 'passionately desire to.' ("White" 155) 
By believing in rules, by being arbiters of rules, by understanding agency in 
terms of the applications of principles to particular situations, whitely people 
think they preserve their detachment from prejudice, bias, meanness and so 
on. ("White" 155) 
belief in one's authority in matters practical, moral and intellectual exists in 
tension with the insecurity and hypocrisy that are essentially connected with 
the pretense of infallibility. ("White" 156). 
whitely people make it clear to people of other races that the last thing the 
latter are supposed to do is to challenge whitely people's authority. ("White" 
157) 
These characteristics of whiteliness build on Frye's earlier discussion of whiteness and 
superiority, allowing for a more in-depth exploration of this identity position. Additionally, 
her excavation enables Frye to circle back to her discussion of why white people often feel 
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trapped when they begin to challenge the spontaneous consciousness of insiders. That is, the 
assumptions embedded in the roles of judge, preacher, martyr, and peacemaker are the crux 
of the problem in the education of white people in conversations about racism and race 
privilege. Frye asks: 
How can you be a preacher who does not know right from wrong, a judge who 
is an incompetent observer, a martyr who victimizes others, a peace-maker 
who is the problem, an authority without authority, a grownup who is a child? 
How can someone who is supposed to be running the world acknowledge their 
relative powerlessness in some matter in any politically constructive way? 
Any serious moral or political challenge to a whitely person must be a direct 
threat to her or his very being. ("White" 157) 
Locating and excavating the roles white women have been taught to perform allows for a 
clearer understanding of why white women often react negatively to criticism from people of 
color. Dis-identification with the performance of whiteliness and its attendant roles becomes 
the key to constructing a differential consciousness in confronting racism and race privilege. 
Another important move that Frye makes in this later essay is a more complicated 
analysis of the interrelationship of gender, race, class, and sexuality. Perhaps most pointedly, 
she uses the metaphor of a lever to analyze how whitely femininity operates in relationships 
between white men and white women, further excavating the implications of how whiteliness 
is connected with white women's performance of gender and power: 
The white girl learns that whiteliness is dignity and respectability; she learns 
that whiteliness is her aptitude for partnership with white men.. .Adopting and 
cultivating whiteliness as an individual character seems to put it in the 
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woman's own power to lever herself up out of a kind of nonbeing (the status 
of woman in a male supremacist social order) over into a kind of Being (the 
status of white in white supremacist social order). ("White" 160) 
Mapping potential relations between privileged men and women permits Frye to unearth how 
privilege and oppression exist in contradictory and interlocking relationships with one-
another, seemingly giving white women status as Beings in the world, while simultaneously 
binding white women to a performance of self which is oppressive to themselves and to 
women and men of color. Frye quotes doris davenport to exemplify this contradiction, 
"Somewhere deep down (denied and almost killed) in the psyche of racist white feminists 
there is some perception of their real position: powerless, spineless, and invisible. Rather 
than examine it, they run from it. Rather than seek solidarity with wimmin of color, they pull 
rank within themselves" (qtd. in "White" 161). Frye's use of a politics of location to map and 
excavate the meaning of a whitely femininity is significant here because it begins to move 
beyond the reductionist analyses that she tended to make in her early essay on race privilege. 
That is, this later essay identifies more concretely how white heterosexual women potentially 
animate their whiteliness. Merely stating that oppressions are interlocking offers little in 
understanding how these systems of domination and subordination operate in quotidian 
experiences. On the other hand, locating specifically feminine whitely ways of being 
provides a starting point to assert agency in deconstructing and then reconstructing 
subjectivity. 
Also important in Frye's invocation of a politics of location to excavate the embedded 
meanings of her identity is her analysis of class and her potential bias as a "lifelong member 
of the middle-class" (158). She questions whether her economically privileged social 
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location has placed her in a position to collapse middle class ways of being with whiteliness. 
However, in her observations she has recognized that "poor and working class white people 
are perfectly confident that they are more intelligent, know more, have better judgment and 
are more moral than Black people or Chicanos or Puerto Ricans, or Indians, or anyone else 
they view as not-white" (158). While she does, ultimately, determine that these ways of 
being in the world are connected more to whiteness than middle class-ness, she admits that 
she offers a peculiarly "middle-class version of [whiteliness]" because she is drawing largely 
on her own social location to excavate the meaning of whiteness. In utilizing a politics of 
location to interrogate her own location as a Southern, white, middle class woman, Frye 
forwards a complicated understanding of her identity and a desire to understand the 
interrelationship between and among her social positions. 
Using a politics of location to deconstruct her subjectivity as a white middle class 
woman and understand the interrelationship between race, gender, and sexuality, Frye makes 
the pointed statement that in rejecting whiteliness: 
might make it possible for us to know that it is a dreadful mistake to think that 
our whiteliness earns us our personhood. Such knowledge can open up the 
possibility of practical understanding of whiteliness as learned character. ..a 
character which is not desirable in itself and neither manifests nor merits the 
full Being to which we aspire. ("White" 162-63) 
Importantly, Frye suggests that deconstruction of whiteliness is not enough to create change: 
"analyzing a concept and circulating the analysis among a few interested colleagues does not 
make the concept go away, does not dislodge it from the matrix of concepts in the active 
conceptual repertoire even of those few people, much less of people in general" ("White" 
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163). She contends that deconstruction and the identification of a contingent correlation 
between identity categories and learned behaviors of superiority and dominance lead the way 
to the "practice of freedom" ("White" 164). The practice of freedom occurs through a refusal 
of self, through a refusal to animate whiteliness, which can then open spaces for hope and 
imagination "in the moment of knowing another way of being is possible" ("White" 166). 
The reconstruction of subjectivity is possible only when white women locate and excavate 
racial identities and actively work on a daily basis to be disloyal to performances of 
whiteliness. While Frye's essays should be understood in conjunction with one another, her 
later essay offers a more sophisticated development of a politics of location. In keeping with 
the metaphor of an archaeological dig, she reveals through her deconstruction of whiteliness 
some of the deeply engrained ways in which this identity position is animated; thus moving 
into a differential consciousness in which there is hope for performing ways of being that are 
not built upon assumptions of moral superiority and dominance. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated how Minnie Bruce Pratt's and Marilyn Frye's use of a 
politics of location to map and excavate their histories, experiences, and identities enable 
them to reconstruct fluid and mobile subjectivities. Along with Lorde and Anzaldua, these 
writers contribute to the creation of a set of radical political rhetorical strategies that displace 
the normative subject of rhetoric. These strategies move both rhetoric and feminism into a 
space in which deconstruction of self, difference, fragmentation, and multiplicity are 
embraced in the same moment that a common vision of a better world is not forfeited. Each 
author invokes a politics of location as a rhetorical strategy to excavate the meanings 
embedded in their identities and to re-write new subjectivities, at the same time, they each 
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offer a unique approach to the reconstruction of self and community. Place and history are 
central to Pratt's narrative—locating the rootedness of her identity in material sites that 
shaped her sense of the world and her place in it. She locates emotions as keys to exploring 
how experiences shape our identities and our understanding of the future. In particular, she 
elucidates how recreation of the self is a process of loss and fear, but also a process of gain, 
hope, and love as she creates a vision of how we might interact in ways that are free of 
domination and violence. Somewhat dis similar from the work of Lorde, Anzaldua, and 
Pratt, Frye's decade-long excavation of whitely feminism reveals what a politics of location 
looks like when focused more on "mental fiat." And, although Frye suggests that 
disassociating from a privileged position requires more than mental fiat, I include her work in 
my analysis because I think it represents an important contribution to a politics of 
location—that is, she offers an significant excavation of the texture and meaning of 
whiteness in feminist coalitions and she displays the importance of a life-long engagement 
with a politics of location. However, as indicated above I also think it falls short in 
significant ways. That is, though Frye suggests that change must involve more than the 
mind, her use of a politics of location lacks the kind of integration of the mental, psychic, and 
physical realms that are particularly salient in the work of Pratt and Anzaldua. 
I also believe it is useful to read Pratt's and Frye's essays together because they invoke 
a politics of location in very different ways. Certainly the political abstraction in Frye's work 
makes it seem as if change is a matter of individual "mental fiat" or personal will. Also, 
because her essay lacks the kind of historical and personal grounding evident in Pratt's 
narrative, it may seem that she is simply deconstructing a concept and circulating it amongst 
interested colleagues. As indicated in my analysis of Pratt's work, we can (and should) 
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question the degree to which an autobiographical narrative such as Pratt's leads to collective 
change and coalition, rather than a simple change in one woman's consciousness. However, 
when placed together (as well as with the work of Lorde and Anzaldua) we can read the 
discursive practices of these writers within a larger set of practices which worked to 
collectively interrupt normative subjectivity through the excavation of inherited identities and 
refusal to animate ways of being based upon relations of domination and subordination. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Beyond Outsiders and Insiders 
To resist destruction, self-hatred, or lifelong hopelessness, we have to throw 
off the conditioning of being despised, the fear of becoming the they that is 
talked about so dismissively, to refuse lying myths and easy moralities, so see 
ourselves as human, flawed, and extraordinary. All of us—extraordinary. 
—Dorothy Allison 36 
As discussed in chapter two, a politics of location does not strive to affirm a "true" 
self at the core of one's being; it is a set of practices aimed at locating subject positions so 
that the meanings embedded in particular socio-cultural positions can be mapped relationally 
and excavated. This process of excavation potentially creates spaces for different ways of 
being, ways of engaging with others that are not grounded in relations of domination and 
subordination. In reading signs and mapping identities through a politics of location, the 
radical, lesbian feminists whose work I analyze in chapters four and five engage in a form of 
what Michel Foucault calls a "refusal of the self," or a refusal of unreflexive identification 
with hegemonic representations of various subject positions in order to create agentive 
opportunities for the reconstruction of subjectivities. However, as I point out in chapter three, 
dis-identification does not operate similarly across different social contexts and identities 
because women's lives are at stake in incredibly different and disproportionate ways. I 
concur with Ruth Frankenberg and Lata Mani who suggest that notions of heterogeneity 
"have at times led critics down the very problematic path of what one might call 
'neorelativism,' such that it is sometimes argued that 'we' are all decentered, multiple, 'minor,' 
or 'mestiza' in exactly comparable ways. It becomes critical, then, to maintain a sharp 
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analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and power" (289). Thus, I have used 
Foucault's "refusal of the self' to call attention to the fact that sign reading and mapping 
through a politics of location operate differently based on one's position relative to normative 
subjectivity, a position that shifts with different spatio-temporal contexts. To avoid the 
trappings of collapsing and erasing differential relationships to power and normative 
subjectivity I have organized my textual analyses in chapters four and five around the 
categories outsiders/within and insiders/without—categories which are particularly relevant 
given the historical rupturing of hegemonic feminism by women of color and white anti-
racist women in the 1980s. That is, if identity is understood as always relational and 
situational, then the positive movement that I associate with outsiders/within and the negative 
movement that I associate with insiders/without is useful for distinguishing the different 
ways in which a politics of location operated as a political discourse at this particular 
historical moment in feminist politics. I maintain that these categories are useful temporary 
conceptual tools, but like all categories, they are limited and limiting in what they allow us to 
perceive. Perhaps most limiting about insiders and outsiders is the way in which these terms 
reify binary relations, which can easily (if not understood as a tactical move) fall into the 
dangers of reproducing a rigid, static, and unified representation of subjectivity. Therefore, I 
conclude with a textual analysis of Dorothy Allison's use of a politics of location to map and 
excavate her white, working class social position, an identity that challenges the tidy 
dichotomy of center and margin and pushes against the parameters by which I have 
conceptually organized this project. 
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Dorothy Allison's Politics of Location in Skin 
In her collection of essays Skin: Talking about Sex, Class & Literature Dorothy 
Allison a politics of location to explore her complicated relationship to race, class, family, 
sex, and writing. Importantly, many of the essays in this collection were written in the early 
90s, over a decade after the shift in consciousness in the feminist movement that Teresa de 
Lauretis identifies as an "effort to work through feminism's complicity with ideology, both 
ideology in general (including classism or bourgeois liberalism, racism, colonialism, 
imperialism, and I would also add, with some qualifications, humanism) and the ideology of 
gender in —that is to say, heterosexism" (Technologies 10). I believe the way in which 
Allison writes her complicated and contradictory subjectivity is, in part, a result of this early 
shift in feminist consciousness and the product of benefiting from at least a decade of 
feminist publications and presentations that further challenged hegemonic feminism as well 
as the normative subject of rhetoric. Additionally, Allison's self-identification as a white, 
Southern, working class sex radical places her indistinctly between insider and outsider. 
Thus the movements she makes in constructing an alternative subjectivity through a politics 
of location challenges the simple dichotomy between either positive reaffirmation of a 
marginal identity or a negative rejection of a centered identity. Allison writes: 
If we are forced to talk about our lives, our sexuality, and our work only in the 
language and categories of a society that despises us, eventually we will be 
unable to speak past our own griefs. We will disappear into those categories. 
What I have tried to do in my own life is refuse the language and categories 
that would reduce me to less than my whole complicated experience. (213) 
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To reiterate, the categories I use in this project are a framework for recognizing how a 
politics of location works differently for marginalized and centered identities. They are tools 
with which to think, not an indication of fixed or final social locations. In using 
insiders/without and outsiders/within I hope to avoid a kind of normative heterogeneity that 
erases different relations between power and subjectivity and to point out at least two 
distinctively different ways in which writers re-construct their subjectivities through refusal 
of the self. Even as I wish for my categories to elucidate complexity and differences between 
writers, I recognize that they also necessarily operate to obscure other elements important in 
re-writing subjectivity and claiming discursive agency. I agree with Allison. All categories 
are reductive. 
Allison's work complicates my organizational scheme as she explores what she calls 
"the politics of they," the separation of humans into categories through fear and 
stigmatization (35). Similar to Audre Lorde, she insists that we are all born into a culture 
that fears difference; thus she advocates that "Class, race, sexuality, gender—and all the 
other categories by which we categorize and dismiss each other—need to be excavated from 
the inside" (35). The politics of them and us, margin and center, are useful tools for 
generalizing and organizing, but the meanings of our identities must be located within lived 
experiences, excavated, and then challenged if there is hope for agentive opportunities to re­
create subjectivity. Throughout her essays, Allison does precisely this by exploring the 
function and meaning of "skin," its relationship to family and to the world outside of home, 
and the importance of excavating the shame, hate, and hope embedded below the surface: 
Skin, the surface of the skin, the outer layer protecting the vulnerable inside, 
the boundary between the world and the soul. What is seen from the outside 
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and hides all the secrets. My skin, my mama's skin, my sisters' skin. Our 
outer layer hides our inner hopes. White girls, tough-skinned and stubborn, 
born to a family that never valued girls. I am my mama's daughter, one with 
my tribe, taught to believe myself of not much value, to take damage and 
ignore it, to take damage and be proud of it. We were taught to be proud that 
we were not Black, and ashamed that we were poor. Taught to reject 
everything people believed about us—drunken, no-count, lazy, whorish, 
stupid—and still some of it was just the way we were. The lies went to the 
bone, and digging them out has been the work of a lifetime. (225) 
Allison locates and excavates the categories to which others have asked her to 
conform—some of which place her in a privileged/centered class and others which place her 
in a hated/marginalized class. Through a politics of location Allison reveals the hard truths 
of how her experiences and social positioning have shaped her identity, sense of self, and 
hope for a different world. 
Locating Context 
Allison begins Skin with the essay "Context" in which she describes taking a lover, "a 
Yankee girl from a good family" (12), home to Greenville, South Carolina to meet her family 
and the subsequent trepidation she feels in anticipating the collision of these two worlds. 
Upon reflection, however, Allison realizes that she is not afraid of how her family will 
receive her lover; she fears that her lover might see her "through new eyes, hateful eyes, the 
eyes of someone who suddenly knows how different we were" (9). Thus, Allison begins 
with one of the primary threads of her identity, a thread that weaves itself through her 
experiences and sense of self—the deeply embedded contempt she has received as "white 
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trash," the anger and shame written onto her person as a result of this contempt, the desire to 
run and hide from this identity, and the fear of being found out. 
Allison's lover does not respond as she anticipated; but she does see Allison with new 
eyes, eyes filled with "awe, confusion, uncertainty, and shame" (9). Her lover explains, "'I 
thought I understood what you meant when you said 'working class' but I just didn't have a 
context'" (10). Afterwards, Allison lays next to her sleeping lover in a motel room cooled 
with air conditioning thinking about context, "We had never owned an air conditioner, never 
stayed in a motel, never eaten in a restaurant where my mother did not work" (10). 
Context—understanding the material texture and shape of our identities, understanding how 
our histories and choices are written on our sense of self, and how we then negotiate the 
implications of who we are and who we wish to become. Allison writes, "Context is so little 
to share, and so vital" (12). This revelation sets up the framework for her collection of essays 
in which she argues that context, the complicated and contradictory experiences of her 
family, her choices, and her sense of self must be shared if there is to be greater 
understanding among people who wish to remake a world that can be "more just and more 
truly human" (165). 
Mapping and Excavating Poverty 
Allison locates white poverty as the primary "context" that has influenced the 
development of her identity: 
I have known I was a lesbian since I was a teenager, and I have spent a good 
twenty years making peace with the effects of incest and physical abuse. But 
what may be the central fact of my life is that I was born in 1949 in 
Greenville, South Carolina, the bastard daughter of a white woman from a 
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desperately poor family, a girl who had left the seventh grade the year before, 
worked as a waitress, and was just a month past fifteen when she had me. 
That fact, the inescapable impact of being born in the condition of poverty that 
this society finds shameful, contemptible, and somehow deserved, has had 
dominion over me to such an extent that I have spent my life trying to 
overcome or deny it. (15) 
Only after spending years running away from this identity and compartmentalizing her sense 
of self does Allison begin to excavate the implications of growing up a bastard daughter of a 
poor, white, Southern woman. Locating her position as a white, working class lesbian is 
significant because there are so few narratives that explore the implications of class on the 
development of subjectivity. For example, one of the most crucial elements Allison reveals 
in excavating her identity in relation to her middle class friends and lovers is entitlement. 
She explains: 
Why are you so afraid? my lovers and friends have asked me the many times I 
have suddenly seemed a stranger, someone who would not speak to them, 
would not do the things they believed I should so, simple things like applying 
for a job, or a grant, or some award they were sure I could acquire easily. 
Entitlement, I have told them, is a matter of feeling like we rather than they. 
You think you have a right to things, a place in the world, and it is so 
intrinsically a part of you that you cannot imagine people like me, people who 
seem to live in your world, who don't have it. (14) 
Allison explains that when she first began to explore the implications of her working class 
white identity on her sense of self and life choices she had no one to speak with because there 
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was "no common language" (32) among lesbian feminists. This void creates the impetus for 
Allison to write new narratives which represent the complexity of her social positioning. 
Importantly, unlike Adrienne Rich's dream of a common language, Allison pursues a 
representation of her identity and experiences that shifts between the particular and the 
general, excavating and reading the signs from her history, generalizing and connecting the 
meaning she extrapolates from her experiences to other women's experiences, and returning 
again to her own experiences to critically question her own assumptions. Also important, 
Allison consistently calls others to write their narratives in a search for a shared language and 
a more humane world: "Each of us has our own stories and none of them are the same no 
matter how similar some of the details. Tell me the truth and I make you a promise. If you 
show me yours, I'll show you mine" (219). It is Allison's call for new narratives, her refusal 
of a "politics of they," and her movement between the general and the particular that 
constructs an accountable and non-innocent subjectivity, distinguishing her desire for a 
shared language from Rich's dream of a common language, which erased the specificities of 
many women's lived experiences through totalizing assertions about patriarchal domination 
and over-arching generalizations about "woman." 
In her excavation, Allison first locates and reads the myth of the poor in literature and 
movies, which is invariably a romanticized and "clean" version of the poor. They are the 
"noble Southern whites portrayed in the movies, mill workers for generations until driven out 
by alcoholism and a family propensity for rebellion and union talk" (35). Her family, on the 
other hand, moved from job to job, were not "joiners," and only believed in "luck and the 
waywardness of fate" (25). Allison examines the seduction of the romanticized poor and her 
propensity to internalize the myth as the story of her own people and identity. Although she 
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admits a temptation to write her family as hard-working, down-trodden heroes, she knows 
that this would simply render invisible the complicated reality of her family and its 
implications on her identity. Instead, she describes her family as: 
The bad poor: men who drank and couldn't keep a job; women, invariably 
pregnant before marriage, who quickly became worn, fat, and old from 
working too many hours and bearing too many children; children with runny 
noses, watery eyes, and the wrong attitudes. My cousins quit school, stole 
cars, used drugs, and took dead-end jobs pumping gas or waiting tables. We 
were not noble, not grateful, not even hopeful. We knew ourselves despised. 
My family was ashamed of being poor, of feeling hopeless. What was there to 
work for, to save money for, to fight for or struggle against? We had 
generations before us to teach us that nothing ever changed, and that those 
who did try to escape failed. (18) 
Allison invokes a politics of location to map the myth of the noble poor against the reality of 
her family as the "ungrateful poor" (13). Locating the relationship between these two allows 
her to deconstruct the myth and bring into relief a different, non-romantic portrait of the 
Southern, white working poor. 
Despite her family's non-conformity to the myth of the "noble poor," Allison does not 
simply dismiss the power of these narratives. Instead, she excavates how the myths have 
informed her sense of self and history. For example, when her family left Greenville, South 
Carolina for Central Florida she also left behind a community who had known her family for 
generations and had already determined her future as worthless trash who would never finish 
high school. In Central Florida she could remake herself through the myth of the poor: 
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In that new country, we were unknown. The myth of the poor settled over us 
and glamorized us. I saw it in the eyes of my teachers, the Lion's Club 
representative who paid for my new glasses, and the lady from the Junior 
League who told me about the scholarship I had won. Better, far better, to be 
one of the mythical poor than to be part of the they I had know before. I also 
experienced a new level of fear, a fear of losing what had never before been 
imaginable. Don't let me lose this chance, I prayed, and lived in terror that I 
might suddenly be seen again as what I knew myself to be. (21) 
By using a politics of location to read the signs of the mythical poor and map her relationship 
to it, Allison excavates her complicated relationship to this fictionalized identity. The myth 
erases the existence of her identity, feeding shame and contempt; at the same time, it allows 
her to be received in a new community with a degree of kindness from those who recognized 
her intelligence rather than her family background. Conforming to a culturally intelligible 
identity ultimately enables her escape—she is the first in her family to graduate from high 
school. This escape leads to years of unexamined contempt for an identity she feared; the 
escape also leads to the place where she deconstructs the myths, writes new narratives of the 
poor, and a new subjectivity for herself. 
Allison maintains a complicated relationship to the myth of the noble poor; refusing 
to construe it as entirely negative or positive. She argues that the problem with myths is their 
propensity to feed simple dichotomies, vilifying the patriarchy or the middle and upper 
classes in order to create heroes out of the oppressed. She writes, "The difficulty is that I 
can't ascribe everything that has been problematic about my life simply and easily to the 
patriarchy, or to incest, or even to the invisible and much-denied class structure of our 
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society" (15-16). Thus she begins a complicated process of exploring the elements which 
have shaped her identity, an identity carefully crafted out of loyalty, rage, lies, secrets, and 
dreams of escape. 
Mapping and Excavating Contempt 
One of the primary elements connected to Allison's complicated identity is contempt, 
a contempt that moves in multiple directions: contempt felt for herself, felt for her family, 
and felt for a world that despises the "ungrateful poor." The mythical poor are thought to 
have a deep inner pride. Allison cannot claim this ennobled emotional response to suffering. 
Reading signs from her childhood, she writes, "What Mama taught us was to keep our heads 
up and refuse to act ashamed. She could not teach us how not to feel ashamed. She didn't 
know how to do that herself. No one in our family did. What they knew most deeply was 
the power of rage and silence" (240). Elsewhere she writes, "We had not been raised to love 
ourselves, only to refuse to admit how much we might hate ourselves" (237). Allison reveals 
the volatile combination of shame, rage, and silence at the root of contempt, and the 
subsequent desire to hide and run from a despised identity. In fact her running becomes a 
central location from which she is able to explain how much the contempt was woven into 
her identity. 
For example, she narrates years spent deliberately and thoroughly disassociating from 
her history and family—going to college and imitating the mannerism, dress, and ambitions 
of the middle class people she met, telling only stories of her history that fit into the mythical 
norm of the noble poor, living in a lesbian collective and becoming a feminist activist 
working for social change. She writes, "I worked as hard as I could to make myself a new 
person, an emotionally healthy radical lesbian activist, and I believed completely that by 
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remaking myself I was helping to remake the world" (22). Using a politics of location to 
read and excavate contempt allows Allison to reveal the degree to which she believed she 
could mold herself into an acceptable version of the normative subject within the lesbian 
community, a subjectivity built upon denial and homogenization. In retrospect Allison 
realizes that the compartmentalization of her life only resulted in a "splintering" (16), that the 
contempt she felt for her identity as poor white trash and the lies through which she 
constructed an acceptable lesbian identity would never lead her to a place where she could 
have a chance to live out her feminist politics and name her own life. She explains, 
"Dividing yourself up, lying to yourself and the rest of the world, being afraid of who you 
might really be—none of that could possibly be of any use to the person I wanted to become" 
(85-86). Running and hiding were central to her identity; they changed nothing by feeding 
the systematic forces that encouraged the self-destruction of her people: "It has taken me 
most of my life to understand that, to see how and why those of us who are born poor and 
different are so driven to give ourselves away or lose ourselves, but most of all, simply to 
disappear as the people we really are" (34). Using her experiences running from her history 
and identity allows Allison to collectively generalize how any culture that fears difference 
deeply impacts those who do not conform to normative subjectivity. In conjunction with her 
call for others to write their stories, Allison's excavation of an inherited identity, her refusal 
to "wear the coat the world has made for [her]" {Two or Three 71), operates as a discursive 
strategy pointing the direction to collective change in re-writing subjectivity, a change that 
calls others to refuse to reside in the dictates of a culture that fears difference and 
heterogeneity. 
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As Allison excavates the implications of her history on her sense of self she also 
examines how her desire to escape is not merely a result of contempt; it is also connected 
with how her identity has shaped her notion of change itself. That is, she learned that 
change, the ability to reconstruct her subjectivity in relation to others, is not possible; thus the 
only option is abandonment of the despised identity: 
the life you have lived, the person you are, is valueless, better off abandoned, 
that running away is easier than trying to change things, that change itself is 
not possible. Sometimes I think it is this conviction—more seductive than 
alcohol or violence, more subtle than sexual hatred or gender injustice—that 
has dominated my life and made real change so painful and difficult. (19-20) 
And yet, Allison adds another level of complexity to how her identity has shaped her desire 
and belief in social change; she asks, "If I had not been raised to give my life away, would I 
have made such an effective, self-sacrificing revolution?" (31). Similar to Pratt, Allison 
invokes a politics of location to explore the messy and contradictory way in which her notion 
of change is connected to her social identity. 
Much like Lorde and Pratt locate emotion as an entry point to excavation, Allison 
identifies an unexpected moment of grief and rage—emotions that could not be silenced or 
hidden—as the genesis, or the punctum, that allowed for a shift in consciousness about her 
identity and the years of brutal contempt she felt for her family. The grief and rage were 
consequences of speaking to two different groups in the period of one week: an Episcopalian 
Sunday school group and a women's juvenile detention center (31 -34). The juxtaposition of 
her two speaking engagements, the sense of love and comfort she feels in response to the 
raucous curiosity of the women in the detention center and the rage she experiences in 
189 
response to the looks of outright contempt from the guards in the center and the polite 
contempt from the Episcopalians brings her to a breaking point, "I no longer knew who I was 
or where I belonged. I had run away from my family, refused to go home to visit, and tried 
in every way to make myself a new person" (33). Understanding how completely she had 
accepted the shame connected with her identity motivates Allison to begin writing stories in 
the hope to "reverse the process," to reclaim her family, history, and despised identity (34). 
Writing, then, changes her understanding of feminism and activism: 
It is only as the child of my class and my unique family background that I 
have been able to put together what is for me a meaningful politics, to regain a 
sense of why I believe in activism, why self-revelation is so important for 
lesbians. There is no all-purpose feminist analysis that explains the 
complicated ways our sexuality and core identity are shaped, the way we see 
ourselves as parts of both our birth families and the extended family of friends 
and lovers we invariably create within the lesbian community. (35) 
Much as Anzaldua excavates her complicated and contradictory relationship to her family 
and culture, Allison comes to realize that writing stories from the specificity of her 
experiences is not "frivolous" to the "revolution"; without the ability to claim the complexity 
and contradictions of her identity, there could be no hope for social change because she 
would continue to work within categories not of her own making. Offering a non-innocent 
representation of herself in the hope of more accurately representing the lives of other 
women is at the root of Allison's use of a politics of location to excavate her identity as a 
white, Southern, working class woman. 
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Moving from macro to micro, Allison maps and excavates how the contempt 
associated with her working class identity does not stop with the dominant culture; it is 
deeply rooted within the lesbian community as well, which fed Allison's self-hatred and 
desire to hide. She writes, 
I know that I have been hated as a lesbian both by "society" and by the 
intimate world of my extended family, but I have also been hated or held in 
contempt (which is in some ways more debilitating and slippery than hatred) 
by lesbians for behavior and sexual practices shaped in large part by class. 
My sexual identity is intimately constructed by my class and regional 
background, and much of the hatred directed at my sexual preferences is class 
hatred—however much people, feminists in particular, like to pretend this is 
not a factor. (23) 
Allison excavates the intersectionality of her sexuality and working class identities, and the 
contempt associated with both. Deconstructing and rejecting the contempt of lesbians who 
deem her politically incorrect and a "pawn of the patriarchy" (105), Allison recognizes that 
her familiarity with contempt from her class background has given her resilience and strength 
to understand that attempting to please her critics would "only further engage their contempt, 
and my own contempt as well" (24). In locating contempt for the unacceptable elements of 
her identity she reveals a continuum in which someone else consistently works to delimit the 
parameters of who she can be. The realization of this system provides the tools for 
reconstructing her subjectivity. That is, reading and excavating the complex and 
contradictory ways in which her identity has been informed by contempt allows Allison to 
deconstruct and reclaim her identity "from the cauldron of hatred" (23), to insist that others 
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imagine her as she is rather than who they wish her to be. She writes, "to make any 
contribution to other lives, I know that I must first begin in the carefully examined specifics 
of my own" (213). The work of creating her own subjectivity and encouraging others to do 
the same is as much a part of the "revolution" as political canvassing. 
Allison's excavation also requires her to map how her identity and family history are 
built upon overt contempt for others, specifically in the form of anti-Semitism and racism. 
For example, she explores the work ethic her mother and aunts taught her, one not based on 
ambition and self-respect; instead: 
Work was just work for them, necessary. You did what you had to do to 
survive. They did not so much believe in taking pride in doing your job as in 
stubbornly enduring hard work and hard times. At the same time, they held 
that there were some forms of work, including maid's work, that were only for 
Black people, not white, and while I did not share that belief, I knew how 
intrinsic it was to the way my family saw the world. Sometimes I felt as if I 
straddled cultures and belonged on neither side. I would grind my teeth at 
what I knew was my family's unquestioning racism while continuing to 
respect their pragmatic endurance. (26) 
Racism and pragmatism are complexly woven into her non-innocent identity as a working 
class white woman. Utilizing a politics of location to excavate embedded meanings of her 
identity, Allison gleans what is positive from this history and rejects the negative. She 
writes, "We learn prejudice and hatred at the same time we learn who we are and what the 
world is about.. .The real choice is whether we will simply swallow what we are given, or 
whether we will risk our whole lives shaking down and changing those very bottle-fed 
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convictions" (116). In utilizing a politics of location to map and excavate her sense of self, 
Allison asserts discursive agency similar to Anzaldua's, who argues for the creation of una 
cultura mestiza by refusing the injurious aspects of her culture and family and reclaiming the 
positive, life affirming aspects: "I want the freedom to carve and chisel my own face, to 
staunch the bleeding with ashes, to fashion my gods out of my entrails" (.Borderlands 22). 
Allison's use of a politics of location to examine the complexity of her identity 
reveals the importance of excavation and the impossibility that simply stating a social 
position will elucidate anything. She shows that we cannot know exactly "what we are 
given" until we engage in the hard work of locating the origins of our convictions about who 
we are and how those convictions continue to impact our sense of self and vision of the 
world. Ultimately, in locating the impact of contempt on her life, Allison returns to her 
theory of a "politics of they" built upon binary thinking and fear of difference: 
The horror of class stratification, racism, and prejudice is that some people 
begin to believe that the security of their families and communities depends 
on the oppression of others, that for some to have good lives there must be 
others whose lives are truncated and brutal. It is a belief that dominates this 
culture. It is what makes the poor whites of the South so determinedly racist 
and the middle class so contemptuous of the poor. It is a myth that allows 
some to imagine that they build their lives on the ruin of others, a secret core 
of shame for the middle class, a goad and a spur to the marginal working 
class, and cause enough for the homeless and poor to feel no constraints on 
hatred and violence. The power of the myth is made even more apparent 
when we examine how, within the lesbian and feminist communities where 
193 
we have addressed considerable attention to the politics of marginalization, 
there is still so much exclusion and fear, so many of us who do not feel safe. 
(35-36) 
In utilizing a politics of location to map larger systems of stratification which inform her 
complicated identity as a white, working class woman, Allison makes a call to her audience 
to excavate how fear and hatred are woven into our own communities and identities. Allison 
shows that there can be no simple heroes or villains; yet, there are systematic forces which 
limit and constrain our lives. She moves from the particular to the general, thus embodying 
one of the key elements of a politics of location—linking her social location to something 
greater and returning again to the specificity of her experiences, thus constructing an 
accountable and non-innocent subjectivity. 
Locating Accountability 
As Allison excavates her working class identity she explores the inter-relatedness of 
oppressions without collapsing important differences. For example, Allison speaks of 
reading Irena Klepfisz's poetry and experiencing "a frisson of recognition" with Klepfisz's 
Jewish lesbian identity. However, Allison clarifies "It was not that my people had been 
'burned off the map' or murdered as hers had. No, we had been encouraged to destroy 
ourselves" (17). As she maps her identity in relation to others, Allison maintains 
accountability for the specificity of her experiences while recognizing the connection to 
something greater than the individual. Allison also speaks of how This Bridge Called My 
Back called her to examine the racism in her life in new ways because the contributors to the 
collection were so different from her, and yet, shared similar hopes and dreams. Mapping 
herself within a coalitional framework with women who are different from her, Allison 
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recognizes the vulnerability exposed on the pages of Bridge and is propelled to share her own 
vulnerabilities in writing. There is a connection for Allison between the hard work of 
representing the specificities of differences between women and maintaining a "shared vision 
of feminism" (115). This shared vision seeks the creation of new relations, new forms of 
subjectivity that do not require the sacrifice of any one woman's life, which Allison situates 
within a larger culture: 
As feminists, many of us have committed our whole lives to struggling to 
change what most people in this society don't even question, and sometimes 
the intensity of our struggle has persuaded us that the only way to accomplish 
change is to make hard bargains, to give up some points and compromise on 
others. What this has always meant in the end, unfortunately, is trading some 
people for others. 
I do not want to do that. 
I do not want to require any other woman to do that. 
I do not want to claim a safe and comfortable life for myself that is purchased 
at the cost of some other woman's needs or desires. (114) 
Excavating her identity and mapping relations across differences and similarities leads 
Allison to maintain an acute attention to very real desires and lives of women at the heart of 
feminist politics, lives which too often are erased in the search for large scale revolution or 
theoretical purity. 
Another significant element of Allison's sense of accountability is her insistence on 
naming and excavating the complex interweaving of love and betrayal in her family 
(particularly between her mother and sisters) and the connection to contempt, shame, and 
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silence. She points out that theories of the "patriarchal order" do not help her understand the 
complexity of the choices her mother made, how she "had, and had not, saved [Allison] as a 
girl" (34), and the subsequent impact of the interweaving of love and betrayal on Allison's 
identity. Maintaining accountability for her complicity in this interweaving, Allison writes, 
"I come at my mother's life from my own, remembering that I loved my little sisters but 
wanted them to sleep closest to the door " (54-55). One consequence of a combination of 
love and betrayal and a history of physical and sexual abuse is a life and identity shaped by 
lies: "The world lied, and we lied, and lying becomes a habit" (55). Thus Allison invokes a 
politics of location to examine the degree to which lying (and fear of the truth) has shaped 
her identity. In reconstructing her subjectivity she commits herself to confront fear and tell 
the truth, the whole, complicated, and painful truth from her partial perspective because this 
is the only way to resist the "splintering" and compartmentalization that constrained her for 
years. 
Allison also recognizes the partiality and interestedness of her representation. For 
example, after spending years judging aunts and cousins with contempt for engaging in 
"amateur prostitution" as waitresses who always kept "sugar-daddies" on the side, she 
explains, "There was a certain truth in this, though like all cruel judgments rendered from the 
outside, it ignored the conditions that made it true" (26). Context—so little to share, and so 
vital. Allison maintains a degree of accountability for the non-innocence of her 
representations and the partiality of her perspectives because it is commensurate with her 
political vision—a politics in which the personal is intimately tied with the collective in such 
a way that strives not to deny complexity of anyone's subjectivity. 
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Locating "Safe" Spaces in the Future 
Allison's experiences in self-hatred, contempt, running, and finally finding that she 
could not escape her identity all shape her vision of a better world. Although Allison 
explains she has never felt safe, she maintains a desire for an imagined space of safety, which 
she describes as "the ability to love without fear of betrayal, the confidence that we can 
expose our most hidden selves and not have the women we love literally disappear from our 
lives" (119). In the context of a lesbian community that rejected her as a sex radical, a "pawn 
of the patriarchy, an antifeminist writer, and a pimp for the pomographers" (105), prophetic 
love is that which propels Allison to imagine a different world. Linking her ostracism with 
her desire for a safe place in which women can construct their own subjectivities, she 
suggests that: 
None of us is safe because we have not tried to make each other safe. We 
have never even recognized the fearfulness of the territory [of sex]. We have 
addressed violence and exploitation and heterosexual assumptions without 
first establishing the understanding that for each of us, desire is unique and 
necessary and simply terrifying.. .1 want to once again start by saying that as 
women we don't know enough about each other—our fears, our desires, or the 
many ways in which this society has acted upon us. (113) 
Allison points out that we all are accountable for creating this space, we are all potentially 
complicit in allowing what is terrifying to dictate a set of exclusionary practices that 
determine "acceptable" or "legitimate" expressions of subjectivity. This is particularly 
cogent in the context of a lesbian feminist community that has worked to change so many of 
the restrictions on women's subjectivities, but which is also built upon a "politics of they." 
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Allison reveals how the struggle for the envisioned world in which women can assert agency 
in the construction of intersuhjectivity is a continuous battle and begins with the particulars 
of women's needs and desires. 
Despite her alienation from a particular sect of the lesbian feminist community that 
was important to the early development of her consciousness, Allison never loses hope for an 
imagined space of safety. Further, she begins to create the safety for which she yearns by 
writing what is most terrifying about her own desires and fears, thus creating a dialogue 
through which other women can begin to articulate their subjectivities. She also shows that 
no matter how she might have tried to escape her identity, it was written on her life in ways 
that she would have no control over, no agency to change, until she claimed the whole of it, 
both the positive and the negative. 
Because contempt, secrets, shame, and dishonesty have been written into her identity 
in such complex ways, Allison understands the struggle to reconstruct her subjectivity is in a 
continuous process of be coming. She explains, "Trying always to know what I am doing 
and why, choosing to be known as who I am—feminist, queer, working class, and proud of 
the work I do—is tricky as it ever was. I tell myself that life is the long struggle to 
understand and love fully" (250). Equally important, Allison points out that a politics of 
location has as much to do with the present as with the future. In encouraging others to write 
their stories, she urges, "Imagine me. I was born to die. I know that. If I could have found 
what I needed at thirteen, I would not have lost so much of my life chasing vindication or 
death. Give some child, some thirteen-year-old, the hope of the remade life. Tell the truth" 
(219). While Allison's work may seem to be a self-centered and reductionist political 
sensibility, it is, I believe, an exemplary use of a politics of location to reconstruct her 
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subjectivity. She clearly reveals that we cannot make generalizations without examining the 
specificity of our inherited identities. We cannot recreate our subjectivities or a different 
world without examining how much the "politics of they" pervades our collective and 
individual consciousness. 
Allison's politics of location reveals how much remains unnamed and unnamable 
because a politics of they pervades all communities, including radical, lesbian feminist 
communities. She maps the multiple directions that contempt, rage, and hate flow, insisting 
that we embrace the messiness of our inherited identities even as we reject relations of 
domination. Through locating and excavating the meaning of her own complicated identity, 
she insists that a different future and a sense of intersubjectivity rests on our capacity and 
desire to honestly explore and respect the contradictory intersectionality of our identities. 
Implications of Reclaiming a Politics of Location 
I return to Chela Sandoval's statement that we must reclaim "theory from the halls of 
the academy where it has been intercepted and domesticated" (7) and look to the 
methodology of the oppressed for clues about how subjects survive and thrive in the context 
of a changing and changeable postmodern world through differential consciousness. This 
differential consciousness refuses to be bound by dictates of theoretical or ideological purity; 
instead, it is marked by movement and change, using whatever tactical means are necessary 
to intercede in relations of domination and reconstruct more equitable social conditions: 
The differential mode of social movement and consciousness depends on the 
practitioner's ability to read the current situation of power and self­
consciously choosing and adopting the ideological stand best suited to push 
against its configurations...Differential consciousness requires grace, 
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flexibility, and strength: enough strength to confidently commit to a well-
defined structure of identity for one hour, day, week, month, year; enough 
flexibility to self-consciously transform that identity according to the 
requisites of another oppositional ideological tactic if readings of power's 
formation require it. (60) 
I contend that a politics of location is one methodology of the oppressed that allowed radical, 
lesbian feminists to resist forces of oppression and normalized subjectivity and re-write fluid, 
mobile, intersubjectivities during the 1980s and early 90s. As indicated in chapter two, the 
rupturing of hegemonic feminism by radical women of color and the proliferation of small 
feminist publishing houses and local feminist bookstores in the late 70s provided the socio-
historical and material contexts for the creation of a collective set of intervening practices of 
illegitimate subjects that created spaces for change, both individual and collective. Chandra 
Mohanty argues that "Sisterhood cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged 
in concrete, historical, and political practice and analysis" ("Under Western Eyes" 178). A 
politics of location constitutes one set of concrete political practices for forging coalitions 
across differences. That is, maintaining accountability through partial, non-innocent, 
reflexive narratives, struggling with language and the politics of representation to make fluid 
connections between local and general claims to knowledge, celebrating difference as a 
creative force, and centering hope and desire, or prophetic love, as the motivating force 
behind social change all constitute a politics of location, a set of discursive and political 
practices for interrupting normative subjectivity, re-writing a fluid intersubjectivity, and 
creating a differential consciousness. 
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As a collective set of discursive practices, a politics of location forged new ground for 
both writers and readers to envision and realize intersubjectivity. I concur with AnaLouise 
Keating who proposes an interactional, performative theory of reading in which "borders 
between writer, reading, and text dissolve: Words have concrete physiological, ideological, 
and psychic effects" (183). Reading political essays of self-representation, much like 
Sandoval's technologies of sign reading, deconstruction, and reconstruction, can lead to 
transformation: 
Each time we read, we engage in new convers(at)ions—transformational 
dialogues between writer, reader, and text. As we recognize ourselves in the 
various others we encounter as we read, and these others in ourselves, we 
define ourselves differently. Binary oppositions between self and other break 
down. We cross over, rewriting culture, rewriting self, as we go. (Keating, 
Women 186-187) 
As radical, lesbian feminist writers in the 1980s and early 90s, such as Rich, Anzaldua, 
Lorde, Pratt, Frye, and Allison, invoked a politics of location to re-write their subjectivities, 
they also called readers to a space of non-innocent accountability and created 
transformational possibilities for readers to move into differential consciousness and 
reconceive their subjectivities as fluid, mobile, and inter-connected. Equally significant, 
these texts infuse theories of multiplicity, fragmentation, and partiality with hope, life, and 
desire through the hermeneutics of love, which counters the paralysis of some poststructural 
theories of subjectivity and social change. 
While it's important to historically situate a politics of location within the socio-
material context in which it emerged in the 80s and 90s in order to understand its impact as a 
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set of intervening practices, I believe it can continue to be a significant rhetorical and 
political strategy. First, texts that invoke a politics of location can potentially continue to 
impact readers in productive ways that lead to a third-space understanding of subjectivity, 
agency, and accountability. Second, reclaiming a politics of location as one of the skills of 
the oppressed for coping in a postmodern world is significant given the tendency to collapse 
(and hence dismiss) a politics of location with identity politics. Third, documenting the 
rhetorical strategies of radical, lesbian feminists is an important move in avoiding what 
Emma Perez calls "cultural and political suicide" that homogenizes and censors the voices of 
marginalized others ("Irigaray's" 88). Representing and theorizing the tactics of resistance 
and creativity by lesbians and making those theories available to others can counteract the 
sense of invisibility and loneliness that too many lesbians continue to face. 
There are also more specific implications for the field of feminist rhetorics in 
reclaiming a politics of location as a discursive political strategy. First, and perhaps most 
obvious, is the importance of reclaiming the rhetorical strategies of a group of radical 
feminists that enabled the interruption of normative subject of hegemonic feminism. Also 
important in the context of contemporary rhetoric studies is reclaiming a set of discursive 
practices that displaces the normative (disembodied, rationalist, unified) subject of rhetoric. 
These intervening practices of illegitimate subjects thus contributes to the growing body 
scholarship in feminist rhetorical theory. Second, I believe the non-innocent subjectivity and 
sense of accountability created through a politics of location in the context of a radical, 
lesbian feminist community contributes to our understanding of a feminist ethos. Nedra 
Reynolds makes a similar argument. In her article "Ethos as Location" she proposes that we 
expand our notion of ethos beyond individual characteristics and instead situate ethos within 
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social contexts: "ethos is not measurable traits displayed by an individual; rather, it is a 
complex set of characteristics constructed by a group, sanctioned by that group, and more 
readily recognizable to others who belong or who share similar values or experience" (327). 
This expansion can help us perceive that character is not an essential trait of certain rhetors, 
but a set of habits formed through a community. Reynolds suggests that "writers earn their 
rhetorical authority by being responsible—by stating explicitly their identities, positions or 
locations, and political goals" (330). While I agree with Reynolds that ethos can be created 
within specific social context through taking responsibility for our social positions and the 
ways in which these locations inform our perceptions of reality, I tend to disagree with her 
claim that stating identities establishes credibility and responsibility. To reiterate a point 
made in chapter one, I believe a politics of location has been dismissed because it is often 
misunderstood as that rhetorical move to self-disclose one's positionality at the beginning of 
a text in order to create an ethos through either a call to experience ("I've been there, grant 
me credibility) or self-reflexivity ("I am aware of my subject positions, so grant me 
credibility"). This move has been critiqued as an empty gesture because it leaves 
unquestioned how a rhetor's social locations inform and limit her or his claims to knowledge. 
However, as I have illustrated, a politics of location is more than a reflexive moment of self-
disclosure in a text; that is, it is more than a horizontal listing of adjectives that indicate the 
identity positions of a rhetor, such as race, class, and sexuality. It is an unearthing of the 
subject positions into which writers have been interpellated and a critical interrogation of 
how those subject positions inform relationships with other subjects. The accountability and 
non-innocent subjectivity created through the specific socio-historical practices of radical, 
lesbian feminists mapping and excavating their identities, I believe, establishes a degree of 
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responsibility and credibility that can expand our notion of a feminist ethos by pointing to a 
third-space, a space between the individual and collective, between the particular and the 
general as a generative space for unearthing new forms of accountability and authority that 
are fluid and always in processes of be-coming. 
Finally, I believe a politics of location continues to be a salient rhetorical and political 
strategy, albeit somewhat changed given a different socio-material context at the turn of the 
century. For example, in their introductions to This Bridge Called Home: Radical Visions 
for Transformation (an extension of This Bridge Called My Back) Gloria Anzaldua and 
AnaLouise Keating both locate in space and time their claims to knowledge thus asserting 
non-innocent subjectivity, they center desire as central to social transformation, they insist 
that representation and coalition involve struggle, and they show how subjectivities remain in 
a continual processes of be coming. However, Anzaldua points out how the context and has 
changed since the publication of This Bridge Called My Back: "Twenty-one years ago we 
struggled with the recognition of difference within the context of commonality. Today we 
grapple with the recognition of commonality within the context of difference" (2). Anzaldua 
suggests that we must move beyond easy identifications with racial and gender categories in 
order to create "bridge identities" because race and gender are understood as more permeable 
almost a quarter of a decade after the first publications of Bridge: 
[This Bridge Called Home] questions the terms white and women of color by 
showing that whiteness may not be applied to all whites, as some possess 
women-of-color consciousness, just as some women of color bear white 
consciousness. This book intends to change notions of identity, viewing it as 
part of a more complex system covering a larger terrain, and demonstrating 
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that the politics of exclusion based on traditional categories diminishes our 
humanness. (2 emphasis in original) 
Much like Allison's use of a politics of location to represent her complicated and 
contradictory positioning, Anzaldua and Keating insist that we can no longer rely on easy 
identification with centered or marginal identities. Keating argues that while labels and 
traditional categories continue to be necessary in particular contexts, "holding tightly to 
labels, even when self-chosen, can be destructive—erecting walls that separate us from each 
other" (18-19). The contemporary context of feminist politics calls for a different kind of 
struggle with language and representation, which Keating names as a living in the 
contradiction between spiritual activism and identity politics. She defines spiritual activism 
as a vision of the radical interconnectedness "that recognizes the many differences among us 
yet insists on our commonalities and uses these commonalities as catalysts for 
transformation" (18). Despite the shift from a "context of commonality" to a "context of 
difference," it is the third-space, the spaces between, that Anzaldua and Keating define as 
generative locations for radical social change. 
In "Notes Toward a Politics of Location" Adrienne Rich writes, "a movement for 
change is a changing movement" (225). This Bridge Called Home exemplifies how a politics 
of location continues to be vital and how it has changed. Location cannot be defined through 
easy identity categories that reproduce binaries of margin and center in this new anthology; 
instead, location is marked by nepantla, which Keating defines as "a point where we're 
exiting from the old worldview but have not yet entered or created a new one to replace 
it.. .nepantla represents a threshold, a place of potential transformation: Do we choose to 
enter into and cross over this threshold, or do we continue clinging desperately to the place 
we're now at?" (19). A politics of location as invoked during the 80s and 90s allowed for 
rupturing of hegemonic feminism through the mapping, naming, and excavating of women's 
identities and the creation of fluid and multiple intersubjectivity. In the new millennium, 
although changed in texture and form, I believe a politics of location remains vital to 
feminism as we continue to create bridges that fuel a hopeful vision of political practices 
committed to existing in the tensions between our differences and commonalities. 
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